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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Logic PrograrniTiing aXid Rsvisabl6 r€3.sonirig 
Many areas of Artificial Intelligence rely heavily on representing the knowledge 
an entity has about its environment in an explicit or syiribolic form. Kno"^^'ledge 
represented in this fashion is often referred to as declarative knowledge because it is 
contained in declarations about the world. There are many reasons to prefer declara­
tive representation of knowledge when designing intelligent systems. One advantage 
is that it is relatively easy to make changes to the knowledge present in the system: 
this can be done by modifying a small subset of the statements that make up the sys­
tem's knowledge base. Furthermore, declarative knowledge can usually be extended, 
beyond ihe explicit set of declarations, by the virtue of som^e reasoning process that 
can derive additional knowledge. The issue of formalizing knowledge has thus been 
one of the central building blocks and research 3.rea£ of Artifi C13.1 Intelligence. Xh.e 
purpose of formalizing declarative knowledge is to provide intelligent machines with 
a mathematically precise definition of the knowledge that they possess, in a manner 
which is independent of procedural considerations and easy to m-anipulate. 
For many years, particularly in the 70"s, it was believed by many AI practitioners 
that first-Oider logic can serve as an adec]^uate framework and a universal language for 
knowledge representation. The power of first-order predicate calculus as a language 
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for expressing declarative knowledge in AI systems cannot be disputed. However, 
it later became clear to most adherents of this view that first-order logic suffers 
from certain inadequacies, especially when trying to represent or reason with inexact, 
incomplete, or contradictory information. This kind of reasoning process is, of course, 
one that faces intelligent systems in many problem domains. 
Presumably, a typical AI system using first-order logic would work in the follow­
ing manner. The knowledge that the system has about the problem domain is given 
as a finite set of axioms (formulas of first-order logic), say F. To answer a query or 
take some action, the system would then try to determine whether a formula F is a 
logical consequence of F. This task is accomplished by using the deduction rules of 
first-order logic to derive F from F (in most theorem proving systems, for instance, 
this is done by using the resolution rule of inference on the clausal form of F U -^F to 
derive a contradiction). It was research in the area of theorem proving that eventually-
led to logic programming. 
The main tenet of logic programming, the idea that first-order logic could be 
used as a programming language, was revolutionary because it not only capitalized 
on the ability of logic as a way to specify knowledge, but also it showed that first-order 
logic has a proccduval lutcvprctcition. The idea here was that given a program clause 
A ^ Bi, • • • ,  Bn, one could interpret this clause as giving a definition for a procedure 
A. Now, if a goal •t— B[, - • • .B'^is given to the system, each B- can be interpreted as a 
•nrocfdv.rp. rnjl. The computation, then, would be comprised of ?. sequence of steps each, 
involving an attempt to unify one of the B[ with A. The unification process records 
bindings obtained for the variables of A in the form of substitutions. Thus unification 
will becom.e a uniform m.echanism for param.eter pa.ssing, data selection, and data 
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construction. This procedural interpretation emanates from the proof theory of first-
order logic, and computation of the resulting substitution essentially amounts to a 
constructive proof of an existential formula. 
Logic programming is based on the idea of declarative programming stemming 
from Kowalski's principle of separation of logic and control [28]. Ideally, the pro­
grammer should be only concerned about the declarative meaning of the program 
(i.e.,  what needs to be done), while the procedural aspects of the execution (i.e.,  hov: 
it needs to be done) are handled automatically. Unfortunately, this ideahzed view of 
logic programming ha^ not yet been realized. One reason is those same Hmitations 
of first-order logic as a knowledge representation language, described earher. A par­
ticular instance of this problem is the lack of clarity ets to what should be the proper 
declarative semantics for negation within logic programs. Let us examine some of 
the limitations mentioned above more closely. 
One important limitation of the aforementioned model of AI systems using first-
order logic (even in the context of logic programming) is that often the rules specified 
hiT-> tho c^'ctoT-n o cuKior-f -i t-> H ofi tt» f o -n i i t-tv Kz^t* ^4-1 /J 
J V AX <>.«. Jk A .4 ^ X X. ^ V V./^ X XX O CVXXNX. U.<X>XlllVCc~ 
tions. In a sense our set of axioms and rules are but an approximate description of 
the real world. Ideally, the representation language should be robust enough to deal 
with conclusions that will need to be further revised and specified. Systems based 
on classical logic are inherently monotonic in the sense that addition of new infor-
^ ,,.:n :_r j!.x ...i. ,  ^  xiAcxvuw/ii ovy a, i.'cxov vi wiiji iicvci icouiv lii tiiat >VLLcll 
was originally known . The type of reasoning in which an intelligent agent engages, 
however, often involves revising or retracting old conclusion as a result of expanding 
the set of axioms by nevv'ly obtained information, ihis type of reasoning is called 
4 
nonmonotonic. 
Another limitation of first-order logic stems from the fact that statements are 
evaluated to be either true or false. Intelhgent agents, however must often deal 
with information which is uncertain, or incomplete. This suggests that certain non-
classical logics which allow statements to be evaluated by truth values other than 
true or false mav be more suitable for knowledge representation in some AI systems. 
There have been several approaches for formalizing nonmonotonic and revisable 
reasoning. These include default logic [44], nonmonotonic modal logics [33], and 
Autoepistemic logics [34, 35]. For a review of these approaches see [54]. These and 
other logical approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning and reasoning with uncertain 
beliefs have been studied in [22]. 
The kind of "brittleness" resulting from the Umitations of the underlying first-
order logic within the logic programming systems, has caused many AI practitioners 
to shy away from using logic prcgramirung languages as the knowledge representation 
language in AI systems. It is therefore desirable to construct logic programming sys­
tems that can overcorue tlie uiflicultieb iiieniioiieu aoove. i ne work prpspntpn nprp 
is an attempt to provide a general framework for such logic programming languages. 
The above brief discussion suggests that such systems must have two common charac­
teristics: they musi rely on the expressive power of an underlying multi-valued logic 
which can deal with contradictory as well as incomplete or uncertain information, 
and secondly, such systems should be able to inierpret statements not cased on tiieir 
truth or falsity, but based on some measure of the knowledge contained within those 
statements. 
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1.2 Semantics of Negation and Knowledge-based Logic Programming 
In the context of logic programming and deductive databases, much of the 
research along the aforementioned lines has manifested itself in attempts to deal 
with the issue of adequately representing negative or conflicting information. The 
presence of negation within logic programs, however, causes certain semantic prob­
lems [49, 50, 29]. and the full inclusion of clcLSsical negation in logic programs and 
queries is generally thought to be infeasible for computational reasons. 
Negation as Failure is the most common treatment of negation in logic program­
ming. It is essentially a rule of inference stating that if A is a ground atom, then 
the goal -^A succeeds if A fails, and the goal ->.4 fails if A succeeds. However, it is 
well known that Negation as Failure is not sound with respect to classical semantics 
for programs [49, 50]. There have been many attempts to give a reasonable declara­
tive semantics with respect to which Negation as Failure is sound, including Reiter's 
Closed World .A.ssum.ption [43] and Clark's program completion [8]. Unfortunately, 
while these and other approaches have resulted in various declarative semantics with 
respect to which Negation eis Failure is sound, the corresponding completeness results 
hold only for restricted classes of logic programs. 
These semantic problems are also present when the declarative semantics for logic 
programs involving negation is specified using fixpoints. Fixpoint semantics for logic 
programs were originally developed by van Emden and Kowaiski [56] in the context 
of logic programs without negation. The idea is to associate, with each program P. 
a natural closure operator Tp on interpretations and to identify models of P with 
fixpoints of TP. The interpretation given by the least fixpoint of TP is generally taken 
to be the intended model for the oro^ram. W hen negations are oresent. however, the 
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Tp operator is generally not monotonic and Tp may have no least fixpoint. 
Much of the literature about negation in logic programming examines the rami­
fications of choosing non-classical semantics based on multi-valued logics [14. 15. 29]. 
From a related but different point of view, several approaches have proposed dealing 
with negation by ordering statements and formulas not according to the degree of 
truth or falsity, but according to the degree of knowledge "present in the system" 
about these statements and lormulas. Ginsberg [23, 24] introduced a family of multi­
valued logics based on certain algebraic structures called bilattices, which combined 
the two aforementioned approaches. Ginsberg's work focuses on those logics that 
have a knowledge dimension as well as a truth dimension and thus can be used to 
model the connection between truth and knowledge in a particular logic program or 
deductive database. The first logic of this kind originated with Belnap [3]. It is based 
on the idea that information in a database can have both a positive and a negative 
content with regard to the truth of a particular event. 
The two situations in which only positive or only negative information is available 
give rise to rwo rn.ir.n vanie? rnai cari he ineT^tinen with T.rnp 
respectively. But there are two other situations: when the information has both a 
positive and a negative content, and where there is no information of either kind. 
These lead to a third and fourth "truth value" that are denoted respectively by T 
and ±. Part of the m.otivation here is that, in a distributed database, information 
a.Doiii a given event is coiiecieG. irom various sourccs a-t vdrioiis times aiicl some ol it 
might be contradictory. So the truth value of the event can be viewed as representing 
our state of knowledge about the classical truth or falsity of the event rather than its 
actual truth or falsity, and as we have seen there are four possibilities for this state 
/ 
of knowledge. This 4-element Belnap logic is the simplest example of a bilattice. 
Fitting [16, 17, 18, 19] further studied properties of bilattices. He expanded the 
theory of bilattices into a full fledged mathematical theory of the truth-knowledge in­
teraction and made this the basis of a well behaved fixpoint semantics for a knowledge-
based logic programming system. For logic programs based on the class of distribu­
tive bilattices, he developed a fixpoint semantics and a procedural semantics based 
on Smullyan style semantic tableaux. 
The significant feature of knowledge-based logic programming is that logical 
negation is monotonic with respect to knowledge: Having more information about 
event Ei than event E2 means we have more positive and more negative information. 
Hence we also have more information about ^Ei than ->£2 since logical negation 
simply switches the polarity of the information. In contreist, logical negation is anti-
monotonic with respect to classical truth. Bilattices provide a setting in which one can 
successfully deal with negation in programs, at least when programs are interpreted 
according to their knowledge content. Many of the problems that arise in classical 
truth.-uaScci iosic tliat o-rc (iuc to tiic a-iiti-riioiiotoiiic na-turc of Hc^atioii. 
such as the nonexistence of least fixpoints, can be avoided in a knowledge-based 
system. 
1.3 An Overview 
i'he results presented in this thesis also use bilattices as the underlying frame­
work for the logic prograrnxrung language. We use a fixpoint semantics similar to the 
one proposed by Fitting, but we develop a nev; procedural semantics based, partly, on 
resolution. We present a generalized framework for knowledge-based logic programs. 
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Depending on the choice of the underlying bilattice, the resulting knowledge-based 
logic programming language can be used to model many useful logics such as prob­
abilistic logics, intuitionistic logics, and modal logics based on the possible-worlds 
semantics. The procedural semantics presented in this work, generalizes the ideas 
behind SLDNF-resolution to provide a natural and efficient computational model for 
logic programming. The results presented in the sequel are organized as follows. 
In Chapter 2, v/e provide some necessary background information on lattices. 
Lattices provide the underlying structure of bilattices. They are also used as the 
basis of fixpoint semantics which we use to characterize the declarative semantics 
of logic programs. An important part of this chapter is the discussion of the join-
irreducible elements of a lattice and their role as a representative subset of elements 
in distributive lattices which satisfy certain finiteness conditions. These ideas are 
later extended to bilattices. 
In Chapter 3. we present some general background material on logic program­
ming. In particular, we discuss various elements of logic programming systems based 
on riTct-nmpT tho ^cicclc.r" 
ative semantics, and procedural semantics of logic programs. W'e also introduce the 
basic concepts of unification theory. Finally, we give a brief discussion of the role of 
negation in logic programming and some of the pitfalls and problems that arise in 
obtaining adequate semantics for negation. 
i he new results presented in this work are discussed in Chapters 4 through 7. In 
Chapter 4 we present a general theory of bilattices. We provide the basic definitions 
and some motivating examples of bilattices. We also present the basic construction 
and representation theorems for bilattices originally due to Ginsberg. For reasons 
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that will become clear later, the definition of bilattice given here is somewhat dif­
ferent from those found in the works by Ginsberg and Fitting mentioned earlier. 
There are two different mechanisms by which the relationship between the truth and 
the knowledge dimensions can be specified. One is the requirement that the lattice 
theoretic operators for each ordering be monotonic with respect to the other order­
ing. This called the interlacing condition. We call structures that have this property 
pre-b'd&iticts. 
Another way of capturing the connection between the two orderings is by means 
of a negation operator which is monotonic with respect to the knowledge ordering 
but not with respect to the truth ordering. Ginsberg's definition of bilaUices consists 
of structures (with two complete lattices) which have such an idempotent negation 
operator. We, hovvever, insist that a bilattice also satisfy the interlacing condition. 
In other words, every bilattice is a pre-bilattice. In this way we can discuss more 
general results in the context of the weaker notion of a pre-bilattice. whereas for the 
results specific to bilattices, we can focus on the properties of the negation operator. 
Tt. mnst HP notpn for rn^ ri5>c;c r»f i artiroc in mCSt. 
interested, nam.ely, distributive bilattices, the alternative definitions are equivalent 
as the distributivity laws imply the interlacing condition. 
For our purposes, the most important part of this chapter is the discussion of 
elements of a bilattice that are join-irreducible in the knowledge ordering. We extend 
many ot ttie properties oi the join irreducible elements to bilattices. We study these 
orooerties in detail and oresent several new results which are original contributions 
to the theory of bilattices. In particular, we prove several results which show that 
the knowledge join-irreducible elements provide a representing set for distributive 
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bilattice that have the descending chain property in the knowledge ordering. In the 
logic programimng context, these are precisely the type of bilattices in which we are 
the most interested. 
In Chapter 5 we extend the notion of unifiers to substitutions themselves and use 
this concept of substitution unification to provide the necessary machinery for parallel 
evaluation of queries in our procedural semantics. Our procedural semantics uses an 
AND- and OR-parallel interpretation model (see [52, 9, lOj), in which the AND-
parallel component is independent. In an independent AND-parallel model, even 
when subgoals share variables, they are solved independently. After termination, 
however, answer substitutions obtained independently for shared variables are tested 
for consistency. Substitution unification is used to ensure the consistency of answer 
substitutions for shared variables. In Chapter 5 we present an in-depth treatment 
of substitution unifiers and study many of their interesting properties. The results 
about substitution unifiers are significant in two respects. First, they represent an 
interesting contribution to the theory of unification, and secondly, they may be found 
A  n _ i  i  _  
iJLt V vx p'G.xa.XiCA lliljC-X MX C tO-tlVil i.VX 
Similar ideas have been studied before in the literature, particularly in the con­
text of parallel logic programming [26, 381. Most of these approaches reduce the 
problem of unification to that of finding a solution to a system of equations or to 
other methods which involve dealing with substitutions in the context of their appli­
cation to sets of expressions. Our development provides an expression and equation 
iree \jreatment of substi^juoions and their uniiiers. This allowS us uo deveiOp a luh 
fiedged algebraic theorv of substitution unification. 
In Chapter 6. we carefully study an important special case of our generalized 
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knowledge-based logic programming framework, namely, one based on a four-valued 
bilattice. This special case serves as the basis of many of the concepts which we later 
generalize to arbitrary bilattices. It is significant in its own right since the resulting 
logic programming system can be used as a representation language in AI systems 
that have to deal with contradictory or incomplete information. In particular, we 
will show how this particular system can resolve many of the problems associated 
with negation. 
For this purpose we use a four-valued logic of Belnap in which the space of 
truth values includes not only true and false, but also two other truth values which 
represent degrees of knowledge about the truth or falsity of a particular statement, 
in particular, no information and conflicting information. The space of truth values, 
and by extension, the space of ail interpretations, is now partially ordere l in two 
dimensions using two separate orderings. One is called the truth dimension and the 
other is called the knowledge dimension. In the truth direction we have all of the 
machinery of classical logics. In the knowledge dim-ension, interpreting a program 
accuruiii^ lo iib kuowleugc couicul a iuoiiOiOuic uucraloi" abSOCiatcu Willi lliat 
program. When programs are interpreted according to their knowledge content, a 
statement can potentially be evaluated as both true and false, suggesting the existence 
of conflicting information. In this sense these programs have the paraconsistency 
property introduced in [5]. For instance, interpreting the program clause A true 
1 rr t  r\ itc i o/i <t<o f r -rvxaori rnof zj ic rr'no rNTir T-pfr>^T" t r» p f 
there is evidence suggesting that A  is true. 
We fully utilize the self-duality of knowledge operators under negation allowing 
us 10 evaluate negative queries with variables without encountering the usual seman­
12 
tic problems associated with negation in standard truth-based logic programming. 
It is worth emphasizing that interpretation of programs under the knowledge order­
ing gives rise to a monotonic logic which has potential for efficient implementation. 
The procedural semantics presented here treats the notions of success and failure 
symmetrically, and thus it is can be used to deduce both negative and positive infor­
mation in a uniform manner. Furthermore, this procedural semantics lends itself to 
parallel and distributed evaluation of queries, and thus it can serve as the basis for 
implementation of parallel knowledge-based logic programming languages. 
In the last part of this chapter we e.xtend the bilattice-based fixpoint and proce­
dural semantics to incorporate a version of Closed World Assumption (CWA). This 
allows inference of negative information when no information is present. W'e give 
soundness and completeness results, with and without the presence of CWA. Our 
soundness and completeness results are general and are not restricted to ground 
atomic goals. 
In Chapter 7 we generalize the four-valued semantics to arbitrary distributive 
bilattiCcS. As mentioned above, a novel feature of our oueralioiiai semantics oaseo. ori 
the 4-element Belnap bilattice is the introduction of completely symmetric notions 
of proof and refutation. Roughly speaking, the existence of a proof (respectively 
refutation) for a given goal, corresponds to having positive (respectively negative) 
information about it. 
Ill this chapter Lhe operational semantics is generalized lo an arbitrary distribu­
tive bilattice. We introduce the notion of a b-proof for each element of the bilattice 
except T and ±. (In the 4-eiement case true-proofs coincide with proofs and a false-
proofs with refutations.) We prove a soundness and completeness theorem for this 
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procedural semantics, again with respect to the declarative fixpoint semantics. 
Although the resulting logic programming system, is quite satisfactory in some 
respects, for example the symmetry between truth and refutation in the 4-element 
case is carried over and the mathematical theory is quite smooth, it has some serious 
defects. For a given truth value b. the search for a 6-proof of a complex goal G 
may entail searches for c-proofs of the subformulas of G for a large number of truth 
values c that are only remotely related to 6; moreover, this complexity ramifies as 
we pass down the parse tree of G. It turns out that for finite distributive bilattices 
(more generally, bilattices with the descending chain condition) we can essentially 
restrict our attention to fe-proofs where h ranges over a relatively small subset of 
special truth-values. Moreover, in the search for a &-proof for G, we need only look 
for 6-proofs of the subformulas of G. These special truth values turn out to be the 
so-called join irreducible elements of knowledge part of the bilattice. We present 
a join irreducible operational semantics as an alternative to the standard one, and 
prove the connection between the two in the main result of the chapter. This allows 
US lO obtain a cornnietenpss t.nporpm for t.ne lom-irrpnnn niP nnpr;^noni Qprn^anrTrc 
X ' V - - --
(with respect to Fitting's fixpoint semantics) as a corollary of our first completeness 
theorem. 
14 
CHAPTER 2. LATTICE BACKGROUND 
Before introducing the notion of a bilattice, which is central to the work presented 
in this thesis, we need to provide some background material on lattices. Lattices not 
only provide the underlying structure of bilattices, but they also are used cis the 
foundation of logic programming semantics based on fixpoints which we shall use as 
the declarative semantics for logic programming system studied in this work. 
Lattices are a special class of ordered sets which can be represented by certain 
algebraic axioms based on the existence of lower and upper bounds of subsets of 
the given ordered set. In the following, we will make these notions precise. We 
will also introduce and study a special subset of lattice elements, namely the join-
•  A  A  - 1 -  '  .  J *  1  .• r 
Will yiav an iiiiuuiiaiii lOic lii liic Ul 
our knowledge-based logic programs. 
2.1 Some Basic Concepts in Lattice Theory 
Definition 2.1 Let P be a set. A partial order on P is a binary relation < on P 
s u c h  t h a t ,  f o r  a i l  x , y , z  E  P .  
1. X < X (refiexivity): 
2. X < y and y < x imply x = y (anti-symmetry); 
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3. X < y and y < z imply x < z (transitivity). 
A set P on which a partial order < is defined is called a partially ordered set (or 
simply an ordered set), denoted by \P-< ). The relation < is called a, full (or total 
or linear) order on P, if < is a partial order on P and for any x.y E P. either x < y 
ox y < X. In this case, we say that P is & fully (or totally or linearly) ordered set. 
Definition 2.2 Let P be a partially ordered set and let S C P. An element x E P 
is an upper bound of 5 if s < x for all s ^ S. A lower bound is defined dually. The 
element x E P is the least upper hound of 5 if x is an upper bound of 5, and x < y 
for all upper bounds y of 5. The notion of greatest lower bound is denned dually. 
The greatest element of P, if it exists, is called the top element of P and denoted by 
T. Similarly, the least element of P, if it exists, is called the bottom element of P, 
and denoted by ±. 
Note that if a partially ordered set P has a top element, then T is the unique 
least upper bound for P. Similarly, the bottom element, ±, if it exists, is the unique 
greatest lower bound for P. 
We usually denote the least upper bound oi x and y by x w y \^reacL "x join y j 
and the greatest lower bound of x and y by x A y (read "x nittt y '). Accoruingly, 
for a set 5, we write V S and /\ 5 to denote the least upper bound (join) and the 
greatest lower bound (meet) of 5, respectively. 
Definition 2.3 L et P be a non-empty partially ordered set. 
1. If X V y and x A y exist for all x, y c P, then P is called a lattice. 
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If P is a lattice, then V and A are binary operations on P and we have an algebraic 
structure (P, A. V) (we leave out the relation < since its association with P is generally 
clear from context). 
It is clear from the above definitions that any complete lattice is bounded, that 
is. it has top and bottom elements. Furthermore, if P is a lattice, we can easily verify 
the following relationships between its ordering relation and its binary operators. A 
and V. 
Theorem 2.4 Let L be a lattice and let x.y ^ L. Then the following are equivalent: 
1- X < y: 
2. xy y = y; 
3. X  A y = X .  
Hence, to show that P is a lattice it suffices to show that x V y and x A y exist 
in P for all non-comparable pairs x,y E P. 
It iS Well knovvii for an. ordercu set P ilial fur every uon-emoiy suosei. ol r' 
which has an upper bound in P, if A 5 exists in P , then V S exists in P; in fact, 
\i c — A 1 ~ ^ - CT / \  ^  y ^ 
In other words, y S is the meet of the set of all upper bounds of S. We thus have 
the followino' re$nlt, 
Theorerrx 2.5 Let P he a non-empty partially ordered set. Then the following are 
tCpilVdlcTttl 
1. P is a complete lattice: 
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2. /\S exists in P for every subset S C P; 
3. P has a top element. T. and f\S exists in P for every non-empty S Q P. 
By a similar argument we can also establish the dual the above theorem: 
Theorem 2.6 Let P be a non-empty partially ordered set. Then the following are 
equivalent: 
1. P is a complete lattice; 
0  \ /  I T )  P  f n r  ^  n f  P-
3. P has a bottom element, ±, and V S exists in P for every non-empty subset S 
of P. 
The following properties of lattices are often used when studying lattices as 
algebraic structures. They provide an alternative definition for lattices. W'e often use 
these properties without explicit mention. 
Theorem 2.7 Let L be a lattice. Then, for all a,b,c G L, A and V satisfy the 
following conditions. 
1. (Associativity) {a V 6) V c = a V (6 V c) and (a A 6) A c = a A (6 A c) 
2. (Commutativity) a\/ b = bV a and a A b = b /\ a 
3. (Idempotency) ay a — a and a A a = a 
4 -  (Absorption) a V  (a A  b) = a and a A  (a V  b) = a. 
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There are a number of ways to construct new lattices (or more generally, ordered 
sets) from existing ones. We are particularly interested in two of these constructions 
which will be useful in subsequent discussions. 
Let L and K be lattices. Consider the ordered set L x K with V and A defined 
coordinatewise, cis follows: 
(Zl, fcl) V (^2, ^2) = (^1 V /25 V ^2) 
{ h j  k i )  A  { I 2 ,  k 2 )  —  { l i  A  I 2 :  k i  A  k 2 ) .  
It is easy to check that L x K is also a lattice with the partial order < defined 
coordinatewise. Furthermore, we have: 
(^1: ki) V (/2, k2) = {I21 ^ 2) ^1^/2 — ^2 S'Hd ki V k2 = k2 
^ /i < /2 and ki < ^2 
{ h i  k i )  <  { I 2 ,  k 2 ) .  
Hence, the lattice obtained by taking the product of lattices L and K is the same as 
the one obtained b\- defining V and A as above. If L and K azc complete lattices, 
then L x K is a complete lattice (with joins and meets formed coordinatewise). 
Another important class of lattices is obtained by considering the set of all 
mappings from a set to a lattice. 
Definition 2.8 Let P and Q be ordered sets. 
1. A map o : P —>• Q is said to be order-preserving (or monotons) if ~ < y in 
P implies that g{x) < o{y) in Q. o is an order-embedding if x < y in P if 
and only if d(x) < ^(l/) in Q- If- in addition, o is onto, then it is called an 
0 vd cr-isoTTio TV h ? .  
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2. The set of all maps from P to Q is denoted by . 
Let P be any set and Q a (complete) lattice. Then, under the usual pointwise 
order, the set of maps from P to Q is also a (complete) lattice with join and 
meets formed in a pointwise fashion. Therefore, the join p, of {6,- £ Q^}tei is given 
by 
for ail X  ^  P, o(i) — \y O i { x ) .  
iei 
and similarly for meet. When P is an ordered set and all the maps p,- are order 
preserving, then V{p:' I ^ ^ -} s.nd A{p: | ? € /} are also order-preserving. Hence, 
the resulting ordered set of mappings is a (complete) lattice. 
Definition 2.9 Let L and K be lattices. A map 6 : L —f K is said to be a (lattice-) 
homomorphism if q is join-preserving and meet-preserving, that is, for all a.b ^ L, 
o{a W b) — p(a) V (?(6) and c>(a A 6) = 6{a) A q{b). 
A bijective homomorphism is a (lattice-) isomorphism. If o : £ —> A' is a one-to-one 
T \  i- : r Mixioiii, tiiCii ciic ij ] ui i\. 1:5 1j aiiU wc iCiCi lU C 
as an embedding (of L into K). 
: /• X „ 1 
xii ^Cxxcxax, axi 'w'luci-picoci v i i i a p  i i i d v  l i u i  u c  a iiUillUiliurpillbiXi. 
But, a stronger relationship holds betw-een order-isomorphisms and lattice isomor­
phisms, as the following result indicates [11]. 
Lemma 2.10 Let L and K be lattices and o : L K a map. 
1. Tilt folloiVlTl^ (irc C(^ZLlVCllC7Zt^ 
^0. ^ o t$ ovd^T-vr^s^Tv^Ti^' 
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(b) for all a.b ^ L, p(a V 6) > p(a) V p(6); 
( c )  j O T  a l l  h  G b} ^ djyCi^j A Oybj. 
In particular, if  g is a komomorphism, then o is order-preserving. 
2. The following are equivalent: 
(a) 0 is an order-isomorphism; 
(b) o is bijective and an order-embedding; 
(c) (p is a lattice-isomorphism. 
Complete lattices play an essential role in our discussion since they constitute 
the building blocks for bilattices, which we introduce in the next section. It is easy to 
verify that every finite lattice is complete. There are, however, other weaker finiteness 
conditions which guarantee that a lattice is complete. We will now state some of these 
conditions. 
1. A subset 5 of P is a chain in P, if for all z,y £ P, either x < y oz y < x. We 
usuallv represent a chain as a (possibly infinite) sequence (cQ.Ci.'''). where 
C; < C;- 1. 
2. If C = (co.ci. • • • .Cy) is a finite chain in P. then we say that the length of C is 
71. 
•3. P has length n if the length of the longest chain in P is n. 
4. P is oi finite length if it has lene'th n for some n < 
5. P has no infinite chains if every chain in P is finite. 
6. P has the ascending chain property (ACP), if given any infinite sequence xi < 
X2 < • • • < Xn < • • • ot elements of P, there exists a A: < w such that Xk = 
Xk+i — • • The dual of the ACP is the descending chain property (DC?) and 
is defined accordingly. 
The following theorems provide other characterizations of the ACP and the DCP. 
We state them without proof (see [11]). 
TTV, 
' V). ^  ^ VfCV 1 X ^ d. t/J I ^ I t I ^ ^ 
subset A of P has a maximal element (a E A is a maximal element of A, if a < x ^ A 
implies a = x; minimal element of A is defined dually). P satisfies the DCP if and 
only if every non-empty subset A of P has a minimal element. 
Theorem 2.13 An ordered set P has no infinite chains if and only if it  satisfies both 
the ACP and the DCP. 
Lattices witii no inhnite ciiams are complete as the toiiowing more general result 
in>d.ic5,th^s 
Theorem 2.14 Let P be a lattice. 
1. If P satisfies the ACP, then for every non-empty subset A of P there exists a 
finite subset F of A such that \/  A — \/ F (which exists in P). and similarly for 
ihc rir'D U'li'U/ / \> 
2. If P has a bottom- element. ±, and satisfies the A.CP. then P is com.plete, and 
siTnildvly for T (771/7 fhe DCP. 
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3. If  P has no infinite chains,  then P is complete.  
Definition 2.15 Let Q be an ordered set and let P Q Q. Then P is join-dense in Q 
if for every element s ^ Q there is a subset A of P such that s = A. The notion 
of meet-density is defined in a dual manner. 
The next theorem shows the relationship between complete lattices and the join-
dense subsets of an ordered set. Let (]. s)p denote the set {y ^ P \ y < 5}, for every 
s ^  Q. 
Theorem 2.16 Let Q be an ordered set  and let  P C Q. Then the foilowing are 
related by (1) (2) => (3) in general and are equivalent i f  Q is a complete latt ice: 
1.  P is join-dense in Q; 
2.  s  = MQH S)P for all  s  G Q; 
3.  for all  s . t  E Q with t  < s there exists a y E P with y < s and y ^ t .  
Another very important class of lattices, with useful algebraic properties, is the 
CiclSS Oj. J. IIC SLu-GV 01 tllC GlStTlOuijl'v ItV COUCHtiOij.S OH i^tiiCcS lii 
^ iXJ-Al-'Vi. t-to. 01_tCi.ll OCO lOrtVi. ijllCll,- VJ.J O X;I i U U*.tl V c UXiClt . di C 
taken as the basis for the procedural semantics of knowledge-based logic programs, 
due to the special properties they exhibit. 
Definition 2.17 Let X be a lattice. The L is distributive if it satisfi.es the distributive 
law, that is. for all a.b.c  ^  L.  
a A (a V a) — (a A b) V (a A c) 
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or (equivalentiy) 
G V (a A c) = (a V b) A (a V c). 
It is well known that if Z is a distributive lattice, then every subset of L and 
every image of L under a homomorphism is also a distributive lattice. Furthermore, 
if L and K are distributive lattices, then L x K is distributive. 
2.2 Join-Irreducible Elements 
There is a rich subclass of the class of distributive lattices which will play an 
important role in our discussion of procedural semantics for knowledge-based logic 
programs. These are distributive lattices which satisfy certain finiteness conditions, 
as described above. A special subset of the elements, namely the join-irreducible 
elements, provide a representing or characteristic set for this class of lattices. In the 
subsequent sections, we will extend these notions to bilattices and further study the 
properties of the join-irreducible elements. 
Definition 2.18 Let {L. < ) be a lattice with A, V, _L, and ! . ilien a E L is join-
ci})lp '•f n ^ ^ \/ ^ qt- q — ^ iOIT SVSTV v C ^ ^ 
tvip cpt o't ir*i^_Trr<=>r^n^iklo olomonfc T ky J J ^ \  TTiCCt'lTTCd'HClblc 
element of a lattice is defined dually. 
t* v» is •r»£>vr+ + a  ^  ^ ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^-c .  — - — .l .l_ 
»»n^xj. *» ij.  x\^ou.iv/o ojjlv.:- KJI .  
elements in the context of distributive lattices. 
Lemma 2.19 Lei L he a distributive latt ice and let  x  G L. with x ^ ±. Then the 
follon'ing are equivalent:  
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1 .  X  i s  j o i n - i r r e d u c i b l e ;  
2. i f  a,b  ^  L and x < aW b then x < a or x < b; 
Proof: To show that 1 =?> 2, let x 6 JIR{L) and suppose that a.b E L are such that 
x < ay b. By distributivity we have x = x A (a V 6) = (x A a) V (x A 6). Since x is 
join-irreducible, x = xAaorx = xA6. Hence, x < a or x < 6. 
It remains to show that 2 =» 1. Suppose that 2 holds and that x = a V 6. Then 
obviously, x < a V 6, and so x < a or x < 6. But, x = a V 6 implying that a < x and 
b < X. Hence, x = a or x = 6. I 
Based on the above lemma we have a more general result. 
Theorem 2.20 Let L he a distributive latt ice and let  x  G L, with x ±.  x E JIR[L) 
if  and only i f ,  for ai ,--- .ak G L, x < Ci V • • •  V implies x < Ui for some i  
{ l<i< k).  
: '-i--, J f  f  1. .  •» 
xiic ivin-fvvlii^ oixcuxciii piuviuca a j.cyiCJ5CiiL<xijitju LUCUiCUl. iur UiJiti'iUULiiVt:; id-lllC€S 
which have the DCP [4l. 
Theorem 2.21 Let L he a distributive latt ice satisfying the DCP. Then for every a € 
L.  there exists an irredundant decomposition of a as a f inite join of  join-irreducible 
elements in L (that is a — ?)i V • • • V /)_. vihere h: G -JIRiL), cip.d none of the 6; 
can be removed).  Furthermore, i f  bi  V • •  •  V bn = ci V • • •  V are two irredundant 
decompositions of a as joins of join-irreducibles.  then n =• m and b: = c: (I  < i  < 
77. — «tiy. UP to TCHUTTLLJC'RITCG,  
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Proof: Let a ^ L.  If a € JIR{L).  then trivially c is an irredundant decouiposition of 
a as a finite join of join-irreducibles. So, suppose that a ^ J1R{L). Then there exist 
Ci- a2 E L, such that a = Ci V G2 and Oi, 02 < a. If ai,a2 G JIR[L), then we are done. 
Otherwise (if gi ,  02 or both are not join-irreducible), there exist ci,  co, (i i ,  c?2 € L. 
such that Oi = Ci V C2, a2 — d^M d2- Now, Ci,C2 < Ci < a and d\,d2 < 02 < a. 
Hence, a = ci v 02 V di V d2. Continuing in this manner, we obtain a decomposition 
of a as a join of join irreducible elements, and since L has the DCP, this join must 
be finite. It can be easily verified that the smallest such decompositioa for a will be 
an irredundant one. 
Now suppose that 61 V 62 V • • • V 6n = Ci V 02 V • • • V = a be irredundant 
decompositions of a as joins of elements in JIR[L). Assume, without loss of generality, 
that n <m. Since L is distributive, we can write; 
61 = 61 A (ci V C2 V • • • V Cm) 
= (61 A ci) V • • • V (61 A c~). 
But, since 61 G J!R{L),  6; — bi A c^-, for some k (1 < k < m). Hence, h-i  < c^. By 
a similar arsument. we can conclude that < b;, for some / (1 ^ ^ ^ Hence, 
^ However, since 61 V • • • V bn is an irredundant decomposition of a. it 
must be the case that / = 1. Therefore. bi — Ck- By reordering, we can assum.e that 
k — I and so 61 = cj. 
Continuing in this way, we have: 
'•^1 ^1? ^2 ^2? ' * * 7 ^Ti ' 
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Hence. 
a = 6i V • • • V On 
=  6 i  v - - - v 6 n v c , . + i  v - - - v c ^ , .  
Now. by the irredundancy of ci V • • • V we can conclude that n = m. which 
establishes the theorem. I 
In the ca^e of finite distributive lattices we have a stronger representation result 
with which we end our discussion of lattices. 
Definition 2.22 Let P be an ordered set and Q Q P. Q is a down-set (or order 
ideal) of P if, whenever x E. Q, y ^ P-, and y < x, we have y ^ Q. We denote the 
family of all down-sets of P by 0{P).  
Note that 0{P) is itself a lattice partially ordered by C. The following theorem 
is known as Birkhoff's Representation Theorem for Finite Distributive Lattices [4]. 
n n  1  O  O  O  T I T 1 c  t .  T .  t  I '  T •  7 ' / * 7  I  •  •  r  1 7  • r  T 
xncutcii i  IJCL LJ  UC A fc/ t tcc tatt tcc.  I ICTA ±j ACMNUULIVT t j  (UKJ OTILV IJ  H 
isomorphic to 0{J1R{L)).  
Proof: First suppose that L is a finite distributive lattice. We show that the map 
T^-.L-r G{JIR{L)) defined by 
rj 'ya' j  — c JL-TCIY-L / j  j X ^ a'f  JI  a) 
is an isomorphism of L onto 0{JIR[L)).  
By transitivity of <, it is immediate that 7/(a) 6 0{JIR(L)).  By Lemma 2.10. 
we only need to show that vj is an order-isomorphism. It is easy to verify that a < b 
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implies r/(a) C 77(6). To show that 77(a) C Ti{h) implies a < b. we can use Lemma 2.21 
to obtain 
a = V vi^) ^ V '/(^) — b. 
Finally, we need to show that t] is onto. Let U = {ci,  02, • • • ,  fin} € 0{J1R[L)),  and 
let a = ai V • • • V a^. We show that U = T](a). Suppose that x G C'. So, x = a.; for 
some 2(1 < z < ^)- Then x is join-irreducible and x < a, and hence x € 7/(a). On 
the other hand, if x 6 77(0), then x < a = ai V • • • V and by Lemma 2.19 we have 
X < Ci, for some i .  Since U is an ideal and ai 6 U, we have x G U. 
The other direction of this theorem follows from the fact that Oi JlRiL)) is 
always distributive (details omitted here), and hence L must also be distributive. I 
2.3 Lattices and Fixpoints 
In this section we study fixpoints of mappings defined on lattices. Our interest 
in fixpoints arises from the fact that the declarative semantics of logic programs can 
be characterized by llxpomts ot mappings defined over the lattice of interpretations. 
J.XJ.1S cri^rs.cv/iii oc gisci^sscg iii SuOssq^uCHv sccLriOnS. 
Definition 2.24 Let Z be a complete lattice and p : i —> L a mapping. Then a £ L 
is a fixpoint of o if 6(c) = a. The element a is a least fixpoint of 0 if it is a fixpoint 
^ -li -C, L -r ^ 1 ^ I . r . i . i r. . • / r . • \ji. y <xu.vA ivi <xii viiivo VI y, nave u 2;^ y. ilic iiuiiuii 'Ji ci'i jixpvmi ui 1:5 
defined dually. The least iixpoint of d is denoted by Ifpio) and the greatest fixpoint 
of p is denoted by gfp[6).  
The following result is due to Tarski [53] and generalizes an earlier result due to 
Knaster and Tarski. 
Theorem 2.25 Let L be a complete latt ice and o : L ^  L a monotonic mapping. 
Then 6 has a least fixpoint and a greatest fixpoint. Furthermore, lfp{o) = a{^ 1 
p(x) = x} = /\{x I <p{x) < x} and gfp[6) — \l{x | o{x) = x} = \/{x | <?(x) < x}. 
Proof: Let 5 = {x | ^ (x) < x} and g = /\S.  Note that ^ < x for all i € 5. So by 
monotonicity of o we have 0{g) < <p(x), for ail x € 5. Thus. 6[g) < x, for all x G 5. 
and hence oig) < g. Hence, g S. Now, to show that <7 is a fixpoint. it only remains 
to show- that g < 6{g). Note that o[g) < g implies that d){0{g)) < o[g), which in 
t u r n  i m p l i e s  t h a t  0 { g )  G  5 .  H e n c e ,  g  <  4 > { g )  a n d  s o  ^  i s  a  f i x p o i n t  o f  0 .  
Now let g' = f\{x \ ©(x) = x}. Since g is a. fixpoint we have g' < g. On the other 
hand, {x | o{x) = x} C S and so g < g'. Hence, g = g' and the proof is complete for 
lfp{0). The proof for glb{6) is similar. B 
Theorem 2.26 Let L be a complete latt ice and 0  :  L L a monotonic mapping. 
Suppose that a ^  L and a < 0(a). Then there exists a f ixpoint a'  of  0 such that 
a < a' .  Similarly,  i f  b E L and 0 ( 6 )  <  b, then there exists a f ixpoint b'  of  6 such that 
b'  < b. 
Proof: Let a' — gfp{0) and b' = lfp{o) and then use Theorem 2.25. B 
Vve can now define the notion of ordinal powers of 6. 
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Definition 2.27 Let L be a complete lattice and 6 •. L L zt. monotonic mapping. 
x *»v- v-tv-lixxc 
p 10 = ± 
o T a = o[g I (a — 1)), if a is a successor ordinal 
d T a = \ /{6  T i ,5 < a}, if a is a limit ordinal 
A I n — T 9 ^ v — 
o i  a — o(o i  {a — 1)), if a is a successor ordinal 
6 i a — Aid i 3 \ 3 < al. if a is a limit ordinal. 
The following result is a well-known characterization of l fp{o) and gfpy o) in terms 
of ordinal powers of p. We state it without proof (see [37]). 
Theorem 2.28 Let L he a complete latt ice and p : L —>• L a monotonic mapping. 
Then, for any ordinal a,  p ^ a < lfp{p) and p i  a > gfp{p).  Furthermore, there 
exists ordinals 3i  and /32 such that 71 > /3i  implies o t  7i = 72 ^  32 
7  •  ' 1  r / ' \ 
cniyicco v 4, /2 — 
Definition 2.29 Let S be an ordered set and A C S. Then A is said to be a directed 
set  if every finite subset of A has an upper bound in A. 
Definition 2.30 Let L and P be two complete lattices. A mapping 0 '. L —>• P is 
continuous,  if for every directed set D of L. q{\J[D)) — \J{0{D)).  
The least ordinal a such that 6 f a = l fp{p) is called the closure ordinal of 
p. The fcIlovVing theorem shows ^hat under certain conditions, nanieiy when o is 
continuous, the CiOsure ordinai Oi o is al mosi u.'. 
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Theorem 2.31 Let L be a complete latt ice and 6 : L L a continuous mapping. 
xutu ^Jj^yO) — O \ uj .  
Proof; By Theorem 2.28, we only need to show that 6 t is a fixpoint. Note that 
5 = {d t ^ I is directed, since 6 is continuous and hence monotonic. Thus. 
p(o t = ^{\jt " i < ^'}) — \j{4>[o t ") i " < = o t 
using continuity of o. 1 
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CHAPTER 3. LOGIC PROGRAMMING BACKGROUND 
In this section we will provide some background material about logic program­
ming which we need in our subsequent developments. This material is not intended 
to be a tutorial, but to provide a frame of reference with respect to which we can 
discuss extensions and generalizations of some of the standaxd notions. For most of 
our discussion in this section, we adopt the notation and definitions used by Lloyd 
in [37]. 
The main ideas behind logic programming emerged from the realization that 
logic can be used as a programming language. This discovery has been, for the m.ost 
part, attributed to Kowalski [28]. The effectiveness of logic as a specification and 
declarative language has been known and studied for a long time. What Kowalski 
showed, however, was that logic also had a procedural interpretation, based on its 
proof theory, v;hich mxade it effective as a programming language. 
As is the case with any formal system, when studying logic programming lan­
guages, we m.ust consider the syntax and semantics of the language. There are two 
separate but related notions of semantics which must be considered in this context. 
One IS the declarative semantics which is derived from the model theory of the un­
derlying logic, and the other is the procedural or operational semantics which derived 
from the logic s proof theory, it is tne latter Vv'hicu defines the computational model 
of the logic programs. The soundness and completeness of such formal systems are 
generally obtained by verifying the correspondence between the declarative and the 
procedural semantics. 
3.1 Syntcix for Standard Logic Programming 
A f irst  order language consists of an alphabet and the set of all formulas defined 
over that alphabet. The alphabet consists of the following classes of symbols: 
1. variables,  usually denoted by x. y.  z .  u.  v.  • • •:  
2. constants,  usually denoted by a.b.c.d,-  • 
3. function symbols,  usually denoted by f .g,  h,-  • 
4. predicate [relation) symbols,  usually denoted by p.q,r,  • •  •;  
5. connectives (negation), A (conjunction), V (disjunction), —> (implication), 
and <->• (equivalence); 
6. quantif iers 3 (there exists) and V (for all); and 
7. punctuation symbols "(",")", and 'V^ 
So the set of connectives, quantifiers, and punctuation symbols are fixed. Usually, 
the set of variables, constants, function symbols, and predicate symbols vary from 
language to language. We assume, however, that the set of variables is infinite and 
fixed. Each function and predicate symbol has a fixed arity. Constant symbols can 
be viewed as function symbols of arity 0. Furthermore, we assum.e the existence of 
two sDecial constants, called vrowsitional constants. These are true and false. 
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Definition 3.1 The class of terms is defined inductively as follows. 
1. a variable is a term; 
2. a constant is a term; 
3. if / is an n-ary function and ti.---,tn are terms, then so is /(ii, • • •,tn). 
Definition 3.2 The class of formulas is defined as follows. 
1. if p is an n-ary predicate symbol and ti, • • •, are terms, then p{ti ,  • • •, in) is 
a formula (also called an atomic formula or an atom). 
2. The prepositional constantstrue and false are formulas; 
3. if F and G are formulas, then so are -^F, F A G-, F V G, F G, and F G. 
The formula F —»• G is sometimes written G ^  F] 
4. if F is a formula and x is a variable, then 3xF and VzjP are formulas. The 
scope of Vx and 3x is the formula F. An occurrence of x is said to be bound if 
it t 1 T-» f o c: r- r\-r\a /-\-f o mi i-rr-t T-r»^H t o f ^fz-v ifc K c 
free.  
A closed formula is a formula with no free occurrences of any variables. If F 
is a quantifier-free formula with variables zi, • • •, Xr,, we write Vi^ for Vori • • • ^Xr,F 
and 3F for Bxi • • • Bx^F, called the universal closure and the existential closure of 
F. respectively. Formulas of the form VF are called universal formulas and those of 
the form. 3F are called existential  formulas.  
Definition 3.3 A l i teral is either an atom or the negation of an atom. A posit ive 
- •" ^ -v- j w w i, » «, v^s. '  ^s. 'q w. .ok ^ v '*"*"*'* 
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Definition 3.4 A clause is a formula of the form 
va:i • • • vx„(ii v • • • v 
where Li.  - • • are literals and Xi, • • •,x„ are variables occurring in Li M Lm-
Since logic programs are generally expressed as a collection of clauses, it will be 
convenient to adopt a special notation, called the clausal notation. In general. >ve 
will write the formula Vxi • • • Vxn(ii V • • • V Lm) in clausal form as 
.4i, • • •,^ Bi, - • •  ,Bs.  
where Ai,--- ,Ak is the list of all positive literals among Li,  • • •, Lm- called con­
clusions, and are the remaining (negative) literals without the negation 
symbol, called premises. Note that in clausal form all variables are assumed to be uni­
versally quantified. The commas ia Bi, • • •, Bs denote conjunctions and the commas 
in Ai, • • • ,Ak denote disjunctions. 
If a clause has only one conclusion {k = 1), then it is called a definite clause.  
In ihai case ihe conclusion is called the head of the clause and the list of premises 
's body 0^ If c. cls,u.s6 lis,s HO premises (5 — 0), tiien it is s. 
ciiid. 3.S *—. A c^5.uso Vi'itb. no conclusions s^nd. no promises 
is called the empty clause and is denoted by -. The empty clause is interpreted as 
a contradiction. Informally, a definite clause A <— B;, • • •, is interpreted as "for 
each assignment of each variable, if Bi. • • •. B^ is true, then A is true". 
Definition 3.5 A general logic program is a set of clauses. A logic program or definite 
prGgram is a set of definiie clauses. In a logic program, the set of all clauses with the 
same predicate syniool p in tiic ncaci is caiieci tne aejinit iou oi p. 
Definition 3.6 A goal is a clause of the form 
In other words, a goal is a clause with no conclusions. Each B, {i  — 1, • • •, 5) is called 
a subgoal of the goal. 
If ^1, • • • , 2/r are the variables occurring in the goal <— B;, • • •, B^- then the goal is the 
clausal notation for the formula 
v2/1 • • • vi/r(-'5i v • • • v ^b,), 
or equivalently. 
-^3YI  • • • 3YR{BI  a • • • a B,) .  
Definition 3.7 A Horn clause is either a definite clause or a goal. 
3.2 Declarative Semantics of Logic Programs 
In order to be able to cuusiuci luc liatu ot idisiiy oi lomiuias in any iirsi-order 
language, we must first attach some meaning to all the symbols appearing in such 
formulas. Of course, the quantifiers and connectives have a fixed meaning, however, 
the meaning attached to constants, function symbols, and predicate symbols can 
vary. The assignment of meaning to these symbols is accomplished by means of an 
interpretation. We are specially interested in interpretations for which the formula 
expresses a true statement m that interpretation. Such an interpretation is called a 
model of the form.ula. The main objective in study of interpretations is to find some 
distinguished interpretation, called the intended interpretation, which provides the 
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"desired" meaning for formulas. We now make these notions precise. The following 
definitions are given in the context of a particular first-order language C. 
Definition 3.8 An interpretaiion of £ consists of the following components: 
1. a non empty set D called the domain of discourse (or simply the domain),  
2. for each constant in £, an assignment of an element in D. 
3. for each n-ary function symbol, an assignment of a mapping from £>" to D, 
4. for each n-ary predicate symbol in £, the assignment of a mapping from D" to 
the set {true,false}. 
Definition 3.9 Let I  be an interpretation of C. A variable assignment with respect 
to I is an eissignment .of an element in the domain of I to each variable. 
Definition 3.10 Let I  be an interpretation of C and let be a variable assignment. 
The term assignment with respect to I and v of the terms in £ is defined as follows: 
1 • 1. ' i .  • j i .  1. vaiiauic lo ^xvcu no aooi^uiiiciio lu u ^  
2. each constant is given its assignment according to I .  
3. if t'l, • • •, are term assignments of terms ti, • • •. in with respect to I  and v and 
/' is the assignment of the function symbol /, then /'(i'l. • • •, t'„) is the term 
f r / . . \ • . !  r  1  p CCT CTTI T /—.I T X T .  . . .  T  I  \ * r i T r »  T  r s  I  » /  
s/j. ^ 71J i cbxi.va. .  
Definition 3.11 Let I  be an interpretation of £ with the domain D and let i/ be a 
variable assignment. Then a formula is given a truth value with respect to /  and i /  
as follows. 
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1. If the formula is an atom p{ti, • • • ,tn)- then the truth value is obtained by 
evaluating • • • .  <'_J. where p' is the mapping assigned to p by /  and t[ ,  - •  • ,  
are term assignments of ti, • • •, with respect to / and u. 
2. If the formula is of the form FAG. FvG^ F G, or F G. then the truth 
value is given according to the standard truth tables for logical connectives. 
3. If the formula is of the form 3xF. then the formula has the truth value true if 
there exists & d ^ D such that F has the truth value true with respect I and 
u[xl<l\. where t/[x/(f] is the same as v with d assigned to x; otherwise the truth 
value is false. 
4. If the formula is of the form VxF, then the formula has the truth value true if 
for all d ^ D such that F has the truth value true with respect I and i/[x/(i]: 
otherwise the truth value is false. 
Note that the truth value of a closed formula does not depend on any variable 
assignments. This m.eans that we can unam.biguously speak about the truth value of 
a closed formula with respect to an interpretation. 
Definition 3.12 Let I  be an interpretation of C and let F be a closed formula. The 
interpretation / is called a modd for F if the truth value of F with respect to 1 is 
true. If 5 is a set of closed formulas, then / is a model for S if it is a model for each 
F € 5. 
Definition 3.13 Let 5 be a set of closed formulas. Then a closed formula F is a 
logical consequtT„ce of 5 if every model for 5 is also a model for F. .Alternatively, we 
5PV th-^.t F follows Sd-'^notwd. bv S — ^• 
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\We sometimes write S |= G for an arbitrary- formula G to mean that S [= V(G). 
The following well-known result provides the declarative basis for the methodol­
ogy used in the procedural semantics in standard logic programming systems. This 
methodology is often referred to as refutation mechanism and will be discussed later. 
Theorem 3.14 Let S be a set  of  formulas and F a closed formula of the f irst-order 
language C. Then F is a logical consequence of S if  and only i f  S U {-•F} has no 
model.  
Since logic programs are basically a set of Horn clauses, the basic problem of 
logic programming is verifying that a given goal (usually an atom) A, is the logical 
consequence of a program P. As the above theorem suggests, this problem reduces to 
the problem of showing that PU{-'A} has no models. In other words, the system must 
prove that every interpretation of P U {"'A} is not a model. Fortunately, it turns out 
that only a small subclass of interpretations called Herbrand interpretations needs to 
be investigated, thus qualitatively reducing the complexity of the above task. We now 
coiisidci Iiciuiduvl lulciuiclaLiuub diiu lucir i'ulc lu iiic stiiiiiaiUjics Oi iogic programs. 
Definition 3.2.5 1. A ^Touud tcTTn, is  s, tcrrri m 'vvliicu no vdriablGS occur. 
2. A ground atom is an atom in which no variables occur. 
3. A ground instance of a clause C is a clause obtained from. C by removing all 
the quantifiers and replacing each variable in C by a ground term. 
4. The Herbrand universe L'c is the set of all ground terms. 
5. The Herbrand base Br is the set of ail ground atoms. 
39 
Definition 3.16 An interpretation / for £ is a Herbrand interpretation if it satisfies 
the following conditions: 
1. The domain of I  is the Herbrand universe Uc; 
2. constant in £ are assigned to themselves in Uc-
3. if / is an n-ary function symbol in £, then / is assigned to the mapping from 
{UcY' to Uc defined by (ti, • • • /(ii, • • •, f„). 
Note that no restriction is placed on the assignment of predicate symbols in 
C. and thus different assienments of oredicate svmbols can sive rise to different 
x v o 
interpretations. Furthermore, it is convenient to identify a Herbrand interpretation 
by the set of all ground atoms which are true with respect to the interpretation. 
This is possible, since for Herbrand interpretations, the assignment of constants and 
function symbols is fixed. Thus we can identify Herbrand interpretations as subsets 
of the Herbrand base. 
Definition 3.17 A Herbrand model for a set of closed form-ulas 5 of £ is a Herbrand 
interpretation of C which is a model of S. 
It is the following well-known result which verifies that when considering the se­
mantics of logic programs, we need only be concerned with Herbrand interpretations. 
Theorem 3.18 Let S he a set  of  clauses.  Then S has a model i f  and only i f  S has 
a Herbrand model.  
For convenience, when considering Herbrand interpretations of a set of formulas 
5. we often restrict our attention to constants, function symbols, and predicate sym.-
bols that aooear in S rather than the underlving nrst-order language. In this case, we 
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may refer to the Herbrand universe Us and Herbrand base Bs of 5 and identify the 
Herbrand interpretations of 5 with subsets of the Herbrand base of 5. In particular, 
for a program P, we can now consider the Herbrand universe Up and the Herbrand 
base Bp of P. 
We can observe that for a program P. the power set of Bp. V{Bp).  which is 
the set of all Herbrand interpretations of P. is a complete lattice under set inclusion 
C. The top element of the lattice is Bp and the bottom elem^ent is 0. Hence, the 
least upper bound of any set of Herbrand interpretations is the union of all Herbrand 
interpretations in the set. This union is, of course, itself a Herbrand interpretation. 
The greatest lower bound of the set is the intersection of Herbrand interpretations. 
As discussed earlier, we are interested in a particular model, called the intended 
model, which is regarded as the canonical interpretation of a program. The intended 
model, in standard logic programming is taken to be the least Herbrand model. Let 
us now formalize these notions [37]. 
Theorem 3.19 Let P he a program and be a non-empty set  of  Herbrand 
models for P.  Then is a Herbrand model for P.  
Definition 3.20 Let P be a program. Suppose that P has a Herbrand model and 
let be the set of all Herbrand models for P. Then Uie/M,- is called the least  
Herbrand model for P, denoted by Mp. 
Theorem 3.21 Let P be a definite program..  Then Mp = {A £ Bp [ P 1= .4}. 
In order to capture the notion of computation within the declarative semantics 
for logic programs, it is necessary to give a characterization of the least Herbrand 
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model based on the concept of fixpoints. This characterization is called the f ixpoint 
semantics.  
Definition 3.22 Let P be a definite program. The mapping Tp ; V{Bp) V{Bp) 
is defined as follows. Let I be an Herbrand interpretation. Then Tp{I) = {A G 
Bp I A <— Ai, • • •, An is a ground instance of a clause in P and {Ai- • • •, An} C /}. 
The Tp operator provides a link between the declarative and the procedural 
semantics for logic programs. Note that Tp is a monotonic mapping. Furthermore, it 
can be easily shown that Tp is continuous (see [37]). Hence, as indicated earlier in our 
discussion of lattices, Tp has a least fi.xpoint and a greatest fixpoint, and furthermore, 
the least fixpoint can be reached in u; steps. In fact, the Herbrand interpretations 
that are models can be characterized in terms of Tp. 
Theorem 3.23 Let P be a definite program and I  a Herbrand interpretation of P.  
Then I is a (Herbrand) model for P if and only if Tp{I) C /. 
1 : j: i-i. . c ^ . r i i . 
*» *T lA utwiu.iil^ IjLiC lUVUUiliC k^IKXl iVJJLi Ui CiiC 
least Herbrand model. Both this and the aforem.entioned result are originally due to 
van Emden and Kowalski [56]. 
Theorem 3.24 Let P be a definite program. Then Mp = lfp{Tp] = Tp t w. 
Before discussing the procedural semantics of logic programs we present some of 
the preliminary concepts that we will need in subsequent developments. 
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3.3 Substitutions and Unification 
In logic programming variables are assigned values by means of substitutions, 
and if viewed procedurally, special type of substitutions called unifiers provide the 
primary mechanism for parameter passing. Substitutions, renamings, composition of 
substitutions, unifiers, and most general unifiers are defined in the standard manner 
as detailed in [37]. 
Definition 3.25 A substi tution 0 is a mapping from variables to terms such that 
vd ^ V for only finitely many v. Every substitution is uniquely represented by a 
finite set of the form {vi/ii, • • •, v^ltn}, where each Vi is a variable, each ti is a term 
distinct from Ui, and the variables ui, • • •, are distinct. Each element Vi/ti is called 
a binding for tv. The empty substitution is called the identity substitution and is 
denoted by £. 9 is ground if each t i  is a ground term, and it  is variable-pure if each t i  
is a variable. 9 in injective if t,- ^ tj whenever i ^ j. The domain of 9 is {ui, • • •. 
and is denoted by dom{9). The set of variables occurring in the range of 9, i.e.. 
J.O I XX IT/Y V I » 
Definition 3.26 .A.n expression is either a term or a formula. A simple expression 
is either a term or an atom. For an expression E, vars{E) denotes the set of all 
variables that occur in E. 
i-'snnition v.z t A suDstitution " is lurtiier extended to a mappiiig trom the set ot 
expressions into itself in the following way: Let 9 = (ui/ti, • • •, Vr.jtA and let E be 
an expression. Then E9, the instance of E by 9.  is the expression obtained from E 
by simultaneously replacing each occurrence of the variable u.- in E by the term t i .  
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i  = 1. • • • ,n. For a set 5 of expressions, Sd = {EO |  E € 5}. For two expressions 
El and E^. we write Ei < Eo. if Eo = Eia for some siibstitution cr. If EO is ground, 
then Ed is called a ground instance of E. 
Definition 3.28 Let 9 and a be substitutions. By the composition 6(j  of 9 and a we 
mean their composition as transformations of the set of expressions in the usual sense 
of functional composition, l i  9 = {ui/$i ,  • • •  ,Um/sm} and a = {vi/ t i ,  - • • .Vn/tn},  
then the representation of Oa is obtained from the set 
{ui/5ic7, • • • , Um/5m<7, i'l/ii, • • • , Vn/t-n} 
by deleting any binding mlSicr for which Ui = Sia and deleting any binding Vj/tj for 
each Vj G {ui, • • • ,Um]-
Definition 3.29 Let a = {t'l/ij,..., be a substitution and U a set of vari­
ables. 
1. au = ..., where {vij,... = t/ n dom{(j) .  
2. (J—Jj — ^(dom(c) — U]-
Let a and r be substitutions and E an expression. 
3- — '^vaTs(E)i  ^—E — '^—varslE)-! 
4. O'T ^dom{T)j ^—r — ^—domyr)-.  
5. (  Application) a o r  — {crr)^^; 
Note that for any set U of variables, 
rr — Ij-I  ^" 
^ ^ — c ? 
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where W denotes disjoint union. In particular, a — CT -E for every expression E. 
and (J — (Jr 'i' <^-r for every substitution r. Note also that the usual composition of 
substitutions can be expressed in terms of application as follows: 
err — a o T ^ 
Let .4 be a set of substitutions and r any substitution. Then TA  =  { r a  \ a ^ A ]  
and AT — {ar | a € A}. The following theorem states some of the well-known 
elementary properties of substitutions. We state it without proof [37]. 
Theorem 3.30 Let 0,  a,  and 7 be substi tutions.  Then 
1 .  e z ^ e 6  =  e .  
2.  {Ed)a = E{6a).  for all  expressions E.  
3.  [duYf = Q{a'i) .  
The first part of the above theorem illustrates that c acts as the left and right 
identity tor composition, ir'urthermore, the associativity of substitutions allows us to 
oiilio pdrcixi-iicscs v/ncn VyTiting a cOixiposiLion ^1^2'''^n suuSiiLuiions. 
Definition 3.31 Let 0 and 77 be substitutions. 
1. 0 is an instance of 77, in symbols n < 9, If  9 = rja for some substitution a. In 
this case we say that 9 is an instance of r] by a.  
2. Let U be a set of variables. We say that 0 is a variant of  rj  with respect to U 
if there are instances 9' and r;' of 9 and n, respectively, such that Ou — and 
_ n/ 
' lU — 
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3. We say that 0 is a variants of T J ,  in symbols 6 = rj.  if it is a variant of rj  
with respect to the set of all variables, i.e.. if each is 9,11 msts-iicc o£ tb.c otiicr 
(t]  < 0 and 0 < t]).  
It is easy to see that < is a preordering on substitutions and = is an equivalence 
relation. In particular it is symmetric, so that ^ is a variant of T] w.r.t U iff 77 is a 
variant of 6 w.r.t. U. We say that 0 is a variant of rj w.r.t. a given expression E if 
0 is a variant of rj w.r.t. vars{E), i.e.. if E9 = Erj' and Erj = E9' for some 9' and T]' 
such that 0 < 0' and rj  < rj ' .  
The key feature of the variant relation is the fact that, given any expression E. 
any substitution 9, and any finite set V of variables, there is a variant rj  oi  6 w.r.t.  E 
such that vars{En) n V = 0. For substitutions that are variants in the absolute sense 
we can be even more explicit about their connection using the notion of a renaming. 
Definition 3.32 Let U be a set of variables. A substitution a is a renaming w.r. t .  
U if a is injective and variable-pure, and 
vrange{a) Pi {U — dom{a)) — 0. 
Definition 3.33 A substitution 0 is a renaming of substitution v.  denoted by ri  <- 6.  
— 7?a. where a is some renaming with resoect to vranoeiri) .  Wantina: to be soecific, 
we sometimes say that rj <T 9 via a. Thus, rj <T 6 li and only if for some injective. 
variable pure substitution a, 
1. Tj <9 via a, and 
2. vrange{a) H {vrangeirj)  — dom[a)) — 0. 
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We write 9 =r V just when 6 <r rj  and r/ <r 0. 
In fact, the notions of =r and = are equivalent, as we shall prove in the following 
lemma. First, we need to make some easily verified observations about substitutions. 
Definition 3.34 Let ^ be a substitution. The discriminant of 9, denoted by D{9),  
is the set of variables 
D[0) — dom{0) — vrangeyB).  
Let 9. Tj.  and 7 be substitutions such that 9 = 777. We have the following facts; 
A. Without loss of generality we may assume that dom{'f  ) H D{rj) — 0 (or else we 
may choose f'Q-y that also satisfies 9 = 777' and does not have this property). 
B. vrangeij])  — dom{-y) C vrange{9).  
C. D{~i) n vrange{ri)  n vrange{9) — 0. 
D. 0 = 6-f if and only if dom{'f)  C D{9).  
Lemma 3.35 Let 9 and 77 be substi tutions.  Then 9 = rj i f  and only i f  9 =R T].  
Proof: obviously, 9 < R  T ] (9 = R  T ] )  implies 9 < rj[9 = 77). In the following we will 
prove that 0 = 77 implies 0 =- 77. 
Suppose that 9 = rj.  By fact A. let a and 3 be substitutions such that 9 = 
Tj = 93. and dom{a) m D{ri) = 0 = dom{3) H D{9). Thus, 9 — rja — a{3a)~ and 
rj  — 93 = rj(a,3).  
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By fact D, dom{3a) C D{9) and dom{ad) C D{r}).  Hence, 
dom{,3 o a) C doTn{,d) n dom{da) 
C dom{ 3 } r \D{e) 
= 0, 
and similarly. dom{ao^) = 0. These imply that ao3 = jSoa — a and so a and 3 must 
be variable-pure and one-to-one. Moreover, it  is immediate that dom{a) — vrangt{3) 
and dom{3) — vrange{a).  
It remains to show that a and 3 are renamings with respect to vrange{rj)  and 
vrange{6), respectively. In other words, we have to argue that 
vrange{a) fl [vrangt [ T } )  — dom[a)) — 0, and 
vrange{l3) r\ {vrangt[0) — dom{^)) = 0. 
Indeed, given facts C and D, vv-e have 
vrange[Q.) H [vrangt{r]) — dom[a)) 
— I i^Tnn r\  \ i  i '<Tnr\ r inTni > M \  V » / - \ '  /  ^  \  I J  ;  J /  "  
--  {dom{3) n (vrangeiv) — vrange(3])) D vrange{9) 
— r){ T) np( r)\ C) oiTn-nncf 
\ r / • • - • 
— 0 (since r] - 63). 
The second claim is proved similarly. • 
In the sequel we often use the expression "0 is a renaming of rj" as a synonym 
for "9 is a variant of rj". Also, when v.'e say that a substitution a is "unique up to 
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Definition 3.36 A substitution 9 is idempotent if 99 = 9. 
The class of idempotent substitutions exhibits some interesting properties which 
have been extensively studied [32, 38, 13]. In particular, it can be easily verified that 
(7 is an idempotent substitution if and only if dom{cr) D vrange{cr) = 0. 
We also use the standard notion of unification due originally to Herbrand [25] 
and later to Robinson [45]. See also [37], 
Definition 3.37 Let S be a finite set of simple expressions. A substitution 9 is 
called a unifier for 5 if S9 is a singleton. A unifier 0 of 5 is called a most general 
unifier [mgu) ioi S \i 9 < a for each unifier u of 5. The set S is called unifiable if it 
has a unifier. 
The following algorithm, called the unification algorithm, takes a finite set of 
simple expressions as input and outputs an mgu if the set is unifiable. If the set 
is not unifiable, then the algorithm reports failure. Before giving the unification 
algorithm we need to define the notion of the disagreement set of a set of expressions. 
Dcfiriivion 3.3S S be s. fiiiits set of simple expressions. 'Xb.e disd^vctTntTit s^i  
of S IS defined 3.$ follows. Locate th.e leftinost symbol position BX wbich. not 3.11 
expressions in 5 have the same symbol and extract frcrn. each expression in 5 the 
subexpression beginning at that oosition. The set of all such leftmost subexoressions 
is the disagreement set for 5. 
In the unification algorithm, S denotes a finite set of simple expressions: 
1. Let k = 0 and UQ — s.  
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2. If Suk is a singleton, then stop and output Uk as an mgu of S. Otherwise, find 
the disagrecinent set Dk Sck-
3. If there exists a variable v and a term t  in Dk such that v does not occur in t .  
then let <7^+1 = ak{v/t}: increment k and go back to step 2. Otherwise, stop: 
S is not unifiable. 
The above algorithm is non-determjnistic since there may be several choices of v 
and t in step 3. But, the application of two mgu's to an expression leads to expressions 
that are variants. It is easy to see that the algorithm terminates since 5 contains 
finitely many variables and each pass through step 3 eliminates one variable. It is also 
easy to verify that each mgu produced by the unification algorithm is idempotent. 
The following result, which is due to R.obinson [45], guarantees the existence of 
an mgu, if a set of expressions is unifiable. 
Theorem 3.39 (Unification Theorem) Lets be a f inite set  of  simple expressions.  
I f  S is unifiable.  then the unif ication algorithm terminates and gives an mgu for S.  
If  S is not unifiable,  then the unification algorithm terminates and reports failure.  
3.4 Procedural Semantics for Logic Programs 
The procedural semantics of logic programs is rooted in the proof theory of the 
imderlvini?' first-order language, It pro'^'ides the means of transforming a set cf Hern 
clauses into an executable program. There are several approaches for characterizing 
the operational semantics of logic programs. Most commonly, they are based on 
the resolution principle originally introduced by Robinson [45], in the more general 
coniext of nrst-order logic. Later, Kowalski [28] employed ihese notions along with a 
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procedural interpretation of Horn clauses to provide the basis of what is now known 
as logic programming. In general, resolution theorem provers are refutation systems. 
In order to prove a formula, the negation of the formula is added to the set of axioms 
(or, in the context of logic programming, to the program) and an attempt is made to 
derive a contradiction. Recall that a in a logic programming system, a goal is defined 
to be the negation of an existential formula. From a programming point of view, 
given an existential formula -'3yi • • • 3yr{Bi A • • • A B,), we are not only interested 
in proving that it is a logical consequence of a program, but also, in constructively 
obtaining bindings for the variable yi,---,yn which result from such computation. 
The refutation procedure which is commonly used in logic programming is based on 
SLD-resolution first introduced by Kowalski [28]. We now study these concepts more 
closely. First we define the notion of SLD-refutation. 
Definition 3.40 Let G be the goal •(— Ai, • • •, Am, • • •,-4^ and let C be a clause 
A •(— Then G' is derived from G and C using mgu 6 if the following 
conditions hold: 
1. Am is an atom, called the selected atom, in G; 
O ^ 1 c ^ T-* T>~i rcr y A A ' 
w* XO ^X.  A ^T7L ^ a.* 
3. G '  is the goal ^ (Ai, • • • , Am-i- Bi, • • •, B r -A m + i ,  •  •  • ,  A k ) 6 .  G '  is called the 
T^SOlvdTlt of G  8.22 d C .  
Definition 3.41 Let P  be a definite program and G  a definite goal. An S L D -
d s r i v a t i o n  o l  P  U  { u }  c o n s i s t s  o f  a  ( f i n i t e  o r  i n f i n i t e )  s e q u e n c e  G o  =  G ,  G i , - -  -  o f  
goals, a sequence Ci,C2,--' of variants of program clauses of P and a sequence 
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di-Oo. - • • of mgu's such that for each i  > 0, G,+i is derived from Gi and Ct+i using 
In the above definition, the Ci are taken to be suitable variants of program 
clause so that C, does not have any variables appearing in the derivation up to G,-. 
This process is called standardizing variables apart. It is necessary to avoid variable 
conflicts when unifying the subgoals with heads of clauses. 
Definition 3.42 An SLD-refutation of P u {G} is a finite SLD-derivation of P u {G} 
which has the empty clause • as the last goal in the derivation. 
Clearly, it is possible that an SLD-derivation is infinite. Finite, (SLD-)derivations 
may be successful or failed. A successful derivation is simply an SLD-refutation and 
a failed derivation is one that ends in a subgoal which does not unify with the head 
of any clause. The success set of a program P is the set of all A € Bp such that 
PU {<— .4} has a successful derivation. The notion of the success set is the procedural 
counterpart of the least Herbrand model. In fact we have the following well-known 
result [37]. 
Theorem 3.43 The success set  of  a definite program is contained in i ts  least  Her­
brand model.  
We a.lso havp the followiTig notion of a computed answer v.'hich represents the 
binding for variables of the goal obtained in the derivation. 
Definition 3.44 Let P be a definite program and G a definiie goal. A computed 
ansiver 9 for P u {G} is the substitution obtained by restricting the composition 
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&102 - • • to the variables of G, where 6i ,  - • • .9^  is the sequence of mgu's used in an 
SLD-refutation of P 'J {G}. 
When considering SLD-refutations for a program, the system must be able to 
choose the selected atom in a deterministic fashion. This goal is obtained by what 
is called the computation rule. For example, the computation rule used in the pro­
gramming language Prolog is to take the leftmost atom in the body of a subgoal as 
the selected atom (the one to be unified with the head of some clause). 
The search space (possible computation paths) in an SLD-refutation can be 
viewed as a tree called the SLD-tree. Each branch of the SLD-tree represents a 
derivation of P U {(?}, for a program P and a goal G. For example [37], consider the 
program P with the following three clauses: 
1. p{x,z)  <- q{x.y) ,p{y.z)  
2. p{x,  x)  •(— 
3. q{a.  b)  •(— 
and the goal p{x/b) .  Figure 3.1 depicts an SLD-tree for for this program and 
goal. The computation rule used for the derivations represented by the tree is the 
"leftmost" computation rule described above. Note that  the tree has two success  
branches corresponding the computed answers [xja] and [xjb]. The tree in this 
example also has a failure branch. A different choice of computation ruie would 
result in a different SLD-tree. although, it can be shown that all such trees will have 
two success branches corresponding to the above computed answers. 
We end this section with the statements of the Soundness and Completeness 
theorems for SLD-resolution. These results establish the c 
i. ~ ' ~ 
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-p(x,b) 
. q(x,y),p(y,b) 
3. 
-p(b,b) 
• q(b,u),p(u,b) 
failure • success 
{xlaj 
Figure 3.1: An SLD-tree 
• 
success 
{x/b} 
declarative and procedural semantics of logic programs. The proofs can be found, 
,  t  1  •  r r w  — t  UlUCi pidCCS., lU [0 1 J. 
TiisorGm 3.4o (Souiidnsss of SL/jD-rssolution) JLti  P  ht  a  dt j iui tc  progrcLTn cLP.d 
G a def ini te  goal .  I f  9  is  a  computed answer for  P U {G}, then GO is  a  logical  
consequence of  P .  
Theorem 3.46 (Completeness of SLD-resolution) Let  P be a  def ini te  program 
and G a def ini te  goal .  I f  GO is  a  logical  consequence of  P .  then Pu{G} has an SLD-
refutat ion with the computed answer a  such that  for  some subst i tut ion 7 ,  GO = Gaf .  
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3.5 The Role of Negation in Logic Programming 
SLD-resolution only applies to sets of Horn clauses with exactly one goal clause. 
Since only positive information can be a logical consequence of a program, it is not 
possible to deduce negative information using SLD-resolution. The problem is that 
if P is a definite program, and A E Bp. then we cannot prove that ->.4 is a logical 
consequence of P since P U A} has a model, namely Bp itself. It is therefore 
necessary to invoke special rules of inference which allow for the deduction of negative 
information. The most well-known and commonly used of these rules are the Closed 
World Assumption (CWA) and its procedural counterpart, the Negation as Finite 
Failure (or simply Negation as Failure) rule. 
The Closed World Assumption, introduced by Reiter [43], is a special rule of 
inference stating that if a ground atom A is not a logical consequence of a program, 
then infer To introduce the Negation as Failure rule, we first need to define the 
notion of the finite failure set of a program. 
the set of all atoms A G Bp for which there exists a finitely failed SLD-tree for 
P {J {•t— .4}, that is, one which is finite and contains no 
Clearly, if A is in the finite failure set of P, then A is not a logical consequence 
of P. This means that every SLD-tree for P U A} contains only infinite or 
failure branches. The Negation as Failure rule , originally introduced by Clark [S], 
states that if A is in the finite failure set of P, then infer ^A. Procedurally, this is 
accomplished by starting with the goal ^ A. If the system can construct a finitely 
failed SLD-t to^ f Vl ot- l  f 
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possible that every SLD-tree has at least one infinite branch, in which case (in the 
absence of a mechanism for detecting infinite branches), the system will never be 
able to infer -•.4, eventhough A may, in fact, not be a logical consequence of the 
program. Hence, the finite failure set is a subset of the complement of the success 
set, indicating that Negation as Failure rule is less powerful than the CWA. 
The above mechanism suggests that we can extend SLD-resolution to be able 
to deal with negated subgoals, in the context of programs which may have negation 
in the body of their clauses. The procedural semantics obtained by combining SLD-
resolution with the Negation as Failure rule is called SLDNF-resolution. It works 
essentially as follows: If during the derivation a negated subgoal is reached, 
the system will try the goal •e— A. If •(— A succeeds (using SLDNF-resolution), then 
<— -".4 fails, and if it fails, then ^ -'A. succeeds. If the program is definite (does not 
contain negation in the body of its clauses), then SLDNF-resolution simply reduces 
to SLD-resolution. 
SLDNF-resolution allows us to extend the notion of a program so that the clause 
A ui ^  1 : vcvij. x xxio ic vav^oii.a.UiC l^C^^a.U.SC. ILL UiUbilclillb 
often lack the necessary expressive power in many contexts. For example, consider 
the following two clauses: 
1. 77lC77lbCT^yZ ^ ^ ^  TTiCTnbcT^Z  ^  y  j  
"? T  7/^  ^— —iTn Pmhf>r4 7- mfrnhpr^ rr 7 / ' \  
-  =  ^ ^  ^  .  ^ ^  , ,   ^  ^ J 
Given appropriate definition for the predicate nitTTihcr ,  the above clauses define vvnen 
two sets are different. Without the use of negation it would be difficult to capture 
the intuitive declarative meaning of this relation in a logic program. 
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The following example illustrates the use of SLDNF-resolution. Consider the 
following program P. 
1. p{x)  •«— q{x} . -^r{x)  
2. q{a)  ^  
3. r(a) <— 
Suppose that we are interested in establishing that p{a)  is not a logical conse­
quence of P. This is in fact verified using SLDNF-resolution, since starting with the 
goal <— p{a], we can construct a finitely failed derivation. This derivation is depicted 
in Figure 3.2. The dotted line pointing from •(— -^(0) to •(— r(a) indicates that upon 
reaching the negated subgoal, the system will attempt an independent evaluation of 
its positive component. Since <— r{a) succeeds, the derivation for •(— p{a) fails finitely. 
It is worth noting that if we add a new clause, p{a) , to P, then we can no longer 
deduce p(a), since in that case not all branches of the SLDNF-tree for P U {<— p(a)} 
will be finitely failed. 
Unfortunately, as soon as negation is introduced into the body of program 
clauses, certain semantic problems arise. In particular, Negation as Failure is not 
sound with respect to classical semantics of first-order logic. For example, consider 
a program P = {p •(— -•?}. Given this program, the goal <— q fails, and so using 
Negation as Failure, p succeeds. However, p is not a logical consequence of the 
program P. This situation is reflected in different characterizations of the declara­
tive semantics for logic programs. For instance, note that the Herbrand m.odels of 
P are lo, ol. (ol. and (ol. Hence. P has no minimal models, which could be taken 
3.S ib.G intdicicd. rnod.cl for th.6 oro^r^m. When tb.^ 
0( 
-p(a)  
1. {x!a} 
.q(a) ,  -^r(a)  •*-r(a)  
3. 
• 
- / SUCC£SS 
failure 
Figure 3.2: Example of SLDNF-resolution 
logic programs, the difficulty with negation is reflected in the fact that the semantic 
operator Tp of a program P is not monotonic in general. Thus, the existence of a 
least fixpoint can no longer be guaranteed. 
The SLDNF-resolution also suffers from a lack of completeness. This is because 
it cannot in general deal with non-ground negative subgoais. For example, given a 
goal •(— p{x), the formjuia to be proved as a logical consequence of the program is 
actually the existential formula 3p{x). So the goal •t— -'p(x) is actually taken to 
mean ^ 3-^p(x). Now. if the goal <— 3p(x) succeeds, it is not in general sound to 
allow <— 3-'p(a:) to fail (both 3p(a;) and 3-'p(:c) may be logical consequences of the 
program). This is why in SLDNF-resolution, Negation as Failure is only allowed on 
ground negative subgoais. 
Another problem with SLDNF-resolution is that the choice of the computation 
rule may affect the behavior of programs. In SLD-resolution, if a goal succeeds with 
answer 6 using one computation rule, then it does so using any other computation 
rule. This is no longer the case with SLDNF-resolution. For example, consider the 
program: 
1 .  p ^ p . q  
2. r ^ -^p 
The goal r  succeeds if we use the "rightmost literal rule", but it will fail if the 
"leftmost literal rule" is taken as the computation rule. These examples illustrate the 
difficulty of finding a sufficiently simple declarative semantics with respect to which 
Negation as Failure is sound and yet it is complete. 
The task of providing appropriate semantics for negation has been subject of 
considerable research and study in logic programming. There have been many at-
tem^pts to provide declarative semantics with respect to which Negation as Failure 
is sound. Some of ihese approaches involve replacing a program P with another 
program obtained bv applying some transformation to P. The idea behind such a 
transformation, is that w'hen a program P is given, it should be taken as a shorthand 
notation for another set of formulas. Examples of these approaches include the notion 
of completed programs oi Clark [8], and Reiter's Closed World Assumption. 
Another approach involves redefining the notion of logical consequence with re­
spect to some non-classical logic. Examples of these are logic programming systems 
based on three-valued logics [31, 14, 2S, 30], Autoepistemic logics [20, 39, 42], and 
linear logics [7]. 
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Yet another approach of dealing with semantics of negation interprets the notion 
of logical consequence not as being true in all models of a program P, but only in 
models of certain kind. Examples of such specialized or restricted models include 
minimal models [36. 49, 6]. perfect models [41, 40], well-founded models [46, 55]. 
and stable models [21]. 
A detailed study of these approaches is outside the scope of this thesis. The 
interested reader is referred to [49, 50]. As discussed in the introduction, part of the 
motivation behind this work, and especially, Section 6, is to give semantics for logic 
programming based on multi-valued logics, which can adequately and effectively deal 
with negation within programs. 
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CHAPTER 4. A THEORY OF BILATTICES 
The idea of constructing multi-valued logics by choosing truth values assigned 
to statements from a partially ordered set of truth values is not a new one. Some 
examples include approaches by Scott [48] and Sandewall [47]. Scott, for instance, 
condsidered the idea of partially ordering statements according to their truth or 
falsi ty,  where the truth values assigned to these statements come from a latt ice L 
with an ordering relation <t. In fact, the classical two valued logic itself can be 
considered to be based on a two element set of truth values, namely, {true,false}, 
with the ordering <t, where false <t true. 
In his approach, Sandewall suggested ordering the truth values, not based on 
truth or falsity, but rather based on the amount of inforxnaticn or knowledge thcv 
represent. Specifically, he suggested allowing truth values to be subsets of the unit 
interval [0. li indicating thai ihe probability that a given statement is true, is known 
to fall within the associated interval. 
Ginsberg [23, 24] pointed out that the partial order given to truth values based 
cn degrees of knov/Icdgc is conccptually difTcicn^/ irom onc On mc 
of truth. In the case of the knowledge-based ordering on the set of truth values 
(denoting the ordering relation by <a:), one can informally interpret p <k q to mean 
tnat m.ore is knovv'n about a statement Vvith a truth value q than one with a truth 
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value p. Accordingly, Ginsberg introduced and algebraic structure called a bilat t ice ,  
in order to combine the two types of orderings on a set of truth values. 
4.1 Definitions and Motivation 
Bilattices were considered as the basis for a family of m.ulti-valued logics with 
certain desirable algebraic properties suitable for combining the notions of truth and 
knowledge. A bilattice is a space of generalized truth values with two lattice orderings, 
one measuring degrees of truth, and the other measuring degrees of knowledge. The 
relationships between the two separate orderings could be captured in several ways. 
For example, as we will see below, a negation operator can provide a strong connection 
between the two orderings. We will now discuss these notions more formally. The 
reader is cautioned that the definitions presented below are similar but not identical 
to those introduced elsewhere in the literature. In particular, our notion of a bilattice 
always includes a negation operator which, in the context of logics based on bilattices. 
has the properties of classical negation. 
1 ^ 4 .  /17 ^  ^  \  ^  : - i . :  _ f .  -XJV^V _2; K / tt Vi Or liVilCiil U LJ>' OCt b V> U uai tlCli 
orderings, <; and <k on B. If <j is a lattice ordering, let true and false denote the 
top and bottom elements, a and v the meet and join, and A and V tlie infinitary 
meet and join (if they exist). Similarly, if <k is a lattice ordering, the corresponding 
notions are denoted respectively by T, J_, 0, ©, J], and Note that a and v are 
monotonic with respect to <£ and 0 and S are monotonic with respect to <k. 
Definition 4.1 A pre-bi lat t ics  is a structure {B,<i,<k ) consisting of a nonempty 
set B and partial orderings <, and <k, each of which gives B the structure of a 
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complete lattice. Moreover. ® and © are both monotonic with respect to <j, and A 
and V are both monotonic with respect to <«, that  is .  for al l  x.y .z  € B.  
1. ^ y X 'Zy ^ y ^ ^ and X z  y ^  
2. X <k y => X y  z  <k y y  z  and x f \  z  <k y f \  z .  
The monotonicity conditions in the definition of a pre-bilattice are called the 
interlacing conditions [18]. For a pre-bilattice, the interlacing conditions provide the 
connection between the two orderings. This connection can be made stronger by 
adding negalion. 
Definition 4.2 A bilat t ice  is a structure {B,  <t, <h, consisting of a non-empty set 
B. partial orderings <; and <«, and a mapping : B B, such that: 
1- {B.  <t, ) is a pre-bilattice: 
2. X <t  y  -^y  <t  -ix. for all x,y  E B:  
5. X <k y  =?-  -ix ->2/, for ail x.y  E 5:  
*4. —'—'X ^ X. for &.I1 X ^ 13. 
In the above definitions, represents the truth ordering and the knowledge 
ordering. Informally, we interpret p q to mean that the evidence underlying an 
assignment of the truth value p is subsumed by the evidence underlying an assignment 
of q. The lattice operations for the <t ordering are natural generalizations of the 
familiar classical ones. Xote that ~ reverses the ^{-orQering, like classical negation, 
but preserves the <i-ordering. Thus it is an automorphism of the lattice {B.<f; ). 
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Furthermore, De Morgan laws hold for V and A, while @ and 0 are self-dual under 
negation. The last condition means that if a and b are elements of the bilattice. then 
-'{a © 6) = ->a © ->6 and -i(a 0 6) = -la ® ->6. 
Belnap's four-valued logic [3] is an example of a logic based on the simplest non-
trivial bilattice. It will serve as the basis and the setting for the logic presented in the 
next section. The underlying bilattice for this logic, called TOWK. consists of the 
four truth values true, false, ±, T. The bilattice J-OWR, is depicted in Figure 4.1. 
In the <f ordering, if A.V, and -• are restricted to the two classical truth values 
true and false, then they will behave according to the usual two-valued truth table 
semantics. If they are restricted to the truth values false, true, and ±, then the 
behavior is that of Kleene's strong three-valued logic [14, 27]. In the <k ordering, 0 
represents the consensus operator which takes the most information consistent with 
the two arguments. For example true 0 false = ±. Similarly, © represents the 
accept everything operator. For instance, false © true = T. 
Reiter's default logic [44] can also be represented as a logic based on a pre-
blidttlCC. In clcid.ltiGIl to tb.C trutb. ValllcS xa.j.5€:. T". diiu _L. Wc uO'w' iidVc 
new truth values. These are dt  (true by default), df  (false by default), and d (which 
is assigned to statements that are both true and false by default). The pre-bilattice 
for the default logic is depicted in Figure 4.2. 
Note that the truth values true, false, T, and X are present in both J^OUTZ 
and the pie-bilcttiCc ul the delauli, logic. In fact, any pre-bila^iice will share inese 
same distinguished elements as they represent the maximal and minimal elements in 
each of the orderings. In general we have the following result. 
Theorem 4.3 Let  B be a  vre-bi iat t ice .  Then 
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k 
"T K 
false true 
± 
Figure 4.1: The bilattice J-OUTZ 
1.  true 0 false = T and true 0 false = ±. 
2.  T V ± = true and T A ± = false. 
Proof: Since T is the largest element of B under the <jt-ordering, a © T = T. 
for all a ^ B. Now, since 0 is a pre-bilattice and since false <t T, we have 
a 0 false <f a 0 T. Hence, 
Similarly, since true is the largest element under the <;-orderiiig; T <- true, and 
thus, for any a ^ B, a Q T <t a Q true. Now, 
T = false ©T <j false © true. 
The other parts of the theorem are proved using similar arguments. B 
true © false <t true © T = T. 
other SZ.Y d f o/J »*-» 4.3. This 
true false 
d 
dt df  
1 
t 
Figure 4.2: The pre-bilattice for default logic 
is an example of a pre-bilattice which does not have a negation operator a^ requireded 
in the definition of a bilattice. However, one may note that, aside from the last condi­
tion of the bilattice definition (i.e., that -'-'x = x, for all x), the other three conditions 
hold in SXA! for a negation operator defined by = T, = _L, ~'X2.1se ~ true, 
-itrue = false, = T, and -'J_ = ±. This provides a motivation for the following 
deuuition. 
v aOi a  4.4 pTt'Oildicicc xiiofi iccdh Vit^atiOTi is <x structure '/ con­
sisting of a non-empty set B, partial orderings <£ and <K . and a mapping ^ : S  ^  B.  
such that: 
1- {B, <£, ) is a pre-bilattice; 
2. X <t y implies - 'y  <t  -<x. for ail x.y  ^  B: 
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3. X <k y implies -^x  <k -ly, for all x,y  £  B.  
A stronger type of negation operator may exist in some pre-bilattices. which is 
stronger than the weak negation, but not quite as strong as the classical one. This 
is sometimes referred to as the intuitionistic negation [19]. 
Definition 4,5 A pre-bilattice B has intui t ionis t ic  negat ion,  if: 
1. 5 is a pre-bilattice with a weak negation 
2. -^ -<X  <T  X .  for all x € 5. 
It is easy to verify that SXX does not have intuitionistic negation, however, 
there are many interesting examples of pre-bilattices which, while not having classical 
negation, do satisfy the requirements for an intuitionistic negation operator. We will 
look at one such example in the following section. 
There are many other interesting non-classical logics that can be represented 
using bilattices or pre-bilattices. Examples include probabilistic logics [57], Kripke's 
intuitionistic logic model [19], and modal logics based on the many-worlds seman­
tics [24]. ror a more detailed discussion see [19, 24, i, i2j. 
nPu T.ZI-.x x : : J ^ J. iiC o^cviai uistiiuucivc pic-uiidtLiccs die pcii iicuiaiiv iuipui laut ILL ucvci-
oping semantics for logic programming. There are twelve distributive laws associated 
with the four operations A, V, ©, and ®, for example: 
a V ( 6 ® c )  =  ( a V 6 ) ® ( a V c ) ,  a n d  
a ® ( 6 V c )  =  ( G ® 6 ) V ( a 0 c ) .  
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t 
Figure 4.3: The pre-bilattice SIX 
Definition 4.6 A pre-bilattice is distr ibut ive  if all twelve distributivity laws hold. 
A pre-bilattice satisfies the infinite distributivity condition if all of the infinitary dis­
tributive laws such as a 0 Vi b-: = V:(<2 ® b:) and a A H; bi — n:(a A 6,) hold. 
Distributivity by itself is a stronger condition than the interlacing conditions in 
the definition of pre-biialtice. in lacL. distributivity implies the inieriacing conditions. 
Suppose that 13 is a structure idenlical lo a pre-bilattice excepi wiihoui the interlacing 
conditions, but that all twelve distributivity laws hold for B. Then, for instance, we 
can argue that 
a b ^  a A c  <k b A c .  
as follows: 
a <h b <=^ a  ~b — b 
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{ a  Q b ) A c  =  b / \ c  
(a  / \  c)  Q {b A c)  = b A c  (by distributivity) 
a A c  <k b A c .  
There are many natural examples distributive pre-bilattices. For instance, the 
bilattice TOWR. is distributive. In our discussion these bilattices will serve as the ba­
sis for the logic programming semantics. Ginsberg [24] showed that every distributive 
pre-bilattice can be represented as a special kind of direct product of two lattices. We 
use this representation to characterize the join-irreducible elements of a distributive 
biiaiiice. One of our main results is that, by imposing certain iiniteness conditions on 
distributive bilattices, we can restrict our attention to the join-irreducible elements 
in the bilattice without losing any power in the procedural semantics. Let us now 
make these notions more precise. 
4.2 Construction and Representation 
As mentioned abovp; wp arp particularly interested in the class of distributive 
bilattices since they have some useful algebraic properties. The results in this section 
will provide a methodology for construction and representation of pre-bilattices based 
on the underlying lattice structures. 
Definition 4.7 Let ) and (X2,^2 ) be two lattices. Define <j and on 
Lx X L-i  by: 
1. (xi,x2) <£ if ^1 < 1  2/1 and y 2  < 2  X 2 ,  
2. { X 1 . X 2 )  < k  (j/i-J/2) if <1 J/i and X 2  <2 2/2-
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The structure {Li  x L2,  <k ) is denoted by B{Li ,  If L = Li  = L2.  define a 
mapping : L x L ^ L x L hy '^{x.y) = (y.x). In this case B(L) will denote the 
structure {L x L.  <t ,  -•) .  
The following theorem is essentially due to Ginsberg [24] and provides a method 
for construction of bilattices. 
Theorem 4.8 Let  Li  and L2 he complete  lat t ices .  Then B{Li ,L2)  is  a  pre-bi lat t ice  
and is  dis tr ibut ive  i f  Li  and L2 are dis tr ibut ive .  Furthermore,  i f  L  — Li  = L2,  then 
B{L)  is  a bi lat t ice .  
Proof: We need to show that each of the orderings (<j and <k) gives Li x L2 
the structure of a complete lattice, and that the interlacing conditions hold. It is 
straightforward to verify that the completeness conditions hold. We will verify that 
the interlacing and distributivity conditions are satisfied (we denote the ordering in 
both lattices by <, since the meaning will be clear from context, furthermore, we will 
denote the join and meet operations in both lattices by -i- and •. respectively). Let 
Ci,C2 £ Li and di,d2 £ 1/2- It is easy to check that the following identities hold. 
(Cl . dl) 0 (CT; (^2) — (-1 ' ^ 2- "I ' -2) 
(c j ,  dl /  'zz;  \C2,  (a2/  — (c i  "T C2; Gi  "T <^2/  
(Ci, Ctx) A (C2, (^2/ = {Cl • C2^ dl + d2) 
We will verify that (ci-ct'i) A (02,(^2) = (ci • C2r-i -r ^2). The other identities can be 
proved similarly. By the properties of meet and join, it is clear that ci • C2 < Ci,C2 
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and d-i. d2 ^ di d2. and hence 
(ci • C2, <ii  + 0/2} (ci ,  (i i) ,  (C2, <i2)• 
Furthermore, let (03,^3) <t (ci, di), (co, dj). Clearly C3 < Ci-C2 and di + d2 < d^. Thus 
(ci • C2.di + <^2) is the greatest lower bound of (ci, di) and (c2,0^2) in the <t-ordering, 
proving the above identity. 
Now, let X  = { c i , d i ) , y  = (02,(^2)1 and ^ = (03,013). Assume that x  < t  y .  Hence. 
{ci.di) <t (02,(^2) which by the definition implies that Ci < C2 and c?2 < di. Thus. 
X (E) z = ( c i . d i )  0 (c3, d : } )  
— (ci • C3,di  •  ds)  
<t  {C2- Cz,d2-dz)  
= (C2, d2)  ® (C3, dz)  
= 2/ 0 
The case with 3 is shown similarly. 
(02.(^2) vvhich by the definition implies that ci < C2 and d i  < c?2- Thus. 
xAz = {ci .di)  A {C3,d3} 
— (ci • C3, (fi + (is) 
- _L j-J _ \ 
- IK 1 ^^>3/ 
— (02^^12) A \C3.d3)  
—  y  ^  z .  
The case with V is shown simiiarlv. 
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It is easy to verify that the distributivitv conditions hold. We will prove the 
following case; the other cases are proved similarly. 
a V ( 6 0 c )  =  ( g i ,  C 2 )  V  ( ( 6 1 ,  6 0 )  ©  ( c i ,  C 2 ) )  
= (ai,a2) V (61 • Ci, 62 • C2) 
= (GI + (^1 • Ci),a2 • (62 • C2)) 
= ((ai -r bi) • (cti  + Ci),  (a2 " ^2) '  (<^2 '  C2)) 
= (Ci + 5i, 02 • ^2) ® (Ol + Ci, 02 • C2) 
= (a V 6) © (a V c). 
It remains to show that \ i  L — Li  = L2 then B{L) is a bilattice. Let -> : 
B{L) —> B{L) be defined by -^{c,d) = (cf, c). We will only check the condition that 
if 2: <t y, then -^y <t ^x. The other conditions are proved similarly. Suppose that 
(ci,(fi) <t {c2.d2). Then, Ci < C2 and <^2 < di. Clearly, (0^2, C2) <f {di.Ci). Hence. 
^y <t --x. I 
The next lemma [ISj will be used in the following representation theorem. 
Lemma 4.9 Lei  B be a  dis ir ibui ive  pre-bi iat t ice ,  then for  every x  E.  B  .  
X  =  ( x  A ±) e ( x  V ±) 
Pivof; W'e use the distiibuliviLv and the absorption laws for lattices. 
( x A ± ) e ( x V ^ )  =  [ a : © ( x  V l j ]  A  [ ± 6 ( x  V ± ) ]  
=  [ i x  © x) V i x  8 J-)l A f(± e x) V [1 e ±)] 
— f ^  A /  ^  \  / | \  
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= X A (x V ±) 
= X. I 
The following result [24. 18] suggests a representation method for distributive 
pre-bilattices. 
Theorem 4.10 Let  B be a  dis tr ibut ive  pre-bi lat t ice .  Then there exis t  complete  dis­
tr ibut ive  lat t ices  Li  and 1-2 such that  B is  isomorphic  to  B[Li ,L2)-
Proof: Let Zi = {xV±|x€'i?} with an ordering <i defined by x <i j/ if and 
only if X <« y. Also, lei L2 = {x j\ A. \ x ^ B \ with the ordering <2 defined by: 
2; <2 y if a-iid only if y <{ x. Using the distributivity laws it is easy to verify that 
Li and L2 are closed under A, V, ©, and (gi. Thus, Li is a sublattice of {B, <t ) and 
L2 is a sublattice of {B,<t )• The completeness of Li and L2 follow immediately. 
Furthermore,  the distributivity of Li and L2 follow from the distributivity of B. 
Next, we must show that there exists an order-preserving bijection from B to 
B{Li,L2). Define a mapping o : B ^ B{Li,L2), defined by: 
d(x) = (x V ±,X A ±). 
The fact that o is one-to-one is an immediate consequence of Lemma 4.9. To show 
that o is onto, suppose that (a V ±, 6 A J_) G B{Li, L2), and let c = (6 A ±) © (a V J_). 
By definition of 6, 6(c) = (c V ±, c A J.). Consider the first component of this pair: 
c V ±  =  [ ( 6  A  ± )  ©  ( a V  ± ) ]  V  ±  
= [(6 A J.) V Ij © (a V J_ V ±) 
=  ± © ( a V ± )  
= a V J_. 
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Similarly, we can show that c A ± = 6 A J_. Hence, ( p i c )  = (a V ±, 6 A ±). 
Next we would like to show that for x , y  E  Xi, x <f y if and only if x  < k  y .  
and that for x.y ^ Lo, x <t y if and only if y <k x. Since the proofs are similar, 
we show the second equivalence. Let x = a A ± and y = b A ±. and suppose that 
a A ± 6 A ±. Then aA± = aA6A±. But, ± a A J_ and so we have: 
b A l . < k b / \ a A J -  =  a A ± .  
Now, suppose that 6 A ± a A ±. In this case, a A b A L  <fc aAJ_. Since, ±  < k  b  A  L .  
we can conclude that a A 1. <K a A b A ±. Hence, we have GA± = aA6AJ_ and 
hence a A J. <( 6 A ±. 
Finally, to show that o is order-preserving, suppose that a  < k  b .  Then a  A  ±  < k  
5  V  ±  a n d  h e n c e ,  6  A  ±  < t  a  A  ± .  T h e r e f o r e ,  a  A  ±  < 2  6  A  _ L .  A l s o ,  a V  ±  < k  b y  
and so a V ± <t 6 A'±. Hence, a V 1 <1 6 V 1. Thus, 4>{a) <k o{b). Conversely, 
suppose that o(a) <f; o{b). Then a V ± <„ 6 V ± and a A ± </; 6 A ±. Therefore, by 
Lemma 4.9, we have: 
^  /  f  L  ^  \  ^  / t  \  '  i  \  7 -
Hence, we conclude that a </; 6 if and only if o { a )  < k  0(6). In a similar manner, we 
can show that a b if and only if o(a) <t 0(6).' B 
One can think of the components x  and j/ of a pair (x, y )  as summarizing the 
evidence for and the evidence against an assertion, respectively. In general, the pair 
{x.y) is codifying two independent judgments regarding the truth or falsity of some 
statement. Since the corresponding lattices need not be the same, these judgments 
can be measured in different ways. 
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Belnap's four-valued logic, for instance, can be represented by the above con­
struction if one takes both Li and £2 to be the 2-element lattice {0,1}. The prob­
abilistic bilattice can formed by taking, for both lattices, the interval [0,1]. In the 
latter logic, each truth value can represent the degrees of belief and doubt. 
.A. S  shown by Ginsberg, the notion of Kripke models, for the possible worlds 
semantics of modal logics, can also be obtained using the above construction. One 
can think of the set of possible worlds in which a formula is true as the evidence for 
the statement represented by the formula, and the set of possible worlds in which 
the formula is false, as evidence against it. In this case, given the Kripke model with 
W as the set of possible worlds, we can use the power set lattice P = {V{W)^ C ) to 
construct the bilattice B{P, P). A truth value relative to this Kripke model would be 
a pair (F, A), where F.AQ W. Based on the above construction, it is easy to see that 
{Fi.Ai) <t (^2,^2) if Fi C F2 and A2 C Ai. Similarly, {Fi,Ai) <k (^2,^2) if Fi C 
F2 and Ai C Ao. Furthermore, in the resulting bilattice we have false = (0,W), 
that  is ,  no evidence for but total  evidence against .  Analogously,  t rue = {W.Ji i ) ,  
I  — / I I /  11 /  \  a  T> I  — /  in  ( / l \  I  "k  o  •»c '  l - v '  -  —/  /  \  — /  A r7* \  
—  \  1  :  —  \  " r  > -  /  y x  w  x /  ;  —  a s  j .  / .  
For another example, consider the probabilistic logic obtained by using as the 
underlying lattice, the interval [0,1] of reals with the usual ordering < of reals. The 
resulting bilattice, then would be the structure i5([0, ll, [0,1]). A probabilistic logic 
based on the lattice [0.1] was considered by van Emden in [57]. Logics based on 
Ij, [U, Ij), however, have the additional machinary to naturally accommodate 
conflicting probabilistic information. 
An interesting family of pre-bilattices can be obtained from, the topological spaces 
arising from the Kripke intuitionistic logic models [16]. Let T be a topological space. 
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The family 0 of open sets is a complete lattice under C. In this case, join will be 
the union, and meet will be the interior of the intersection. Also, the farriily C of 
closed sets is a complete lattice under C. The resulting bilattice will be obtained by 
considering the structure B{0, C). Note that this is an example of a pre-bilattice in 
which the two underlying lattices are different, and hence it does not have classical 
negation. However, for such a bilattice, if we take -i{o,c), where o is an open set 
and c is a closed set, to be [iruerior{c), closureyo)), then we can get an intuitionistic 
negation. 
As a final example, note that the pre-bilattice SIX described above (see Fig­
ure 4.3), can be represented by the structure where L is the lattice {0,1} 
and K is the lattice {0,1,2}, each w^ith the usual ordering. In this case the truth 
value a in Figure 4.3 would be represented by the pair (0,1), b would be represented 
by (1,1). Again, SIX does not have classical negation, but it does have a weak 
negation operator defined earlier. Incidentally, according to the above representation 
theorem, this construction verifies that SIX is in fact a distributive pre-bilattice. 
Bciure leavii's i nis secf'on. we Tippn ?.l$o consider another v/av to construct pre-
bilattices, namely the one form.ed by taking the set of all maps from a set to a 
pre-bilattice. 
Definition 4.11 Suppose 5 is a pre-bilattice and 5 is any set. Let B^^^ denote 
the set of all mappings from 5 to B, with the induced orderings <k and <t defined 
coordinatewise on B^^\ In other words, for f.g G B^^\ f g, if /(a) gi<^)^ for 
all a G 5, and similarly for <j. Furthermore, ii B is a bilattice (has the negation 
operator), then a negation operator is correspondingly induced on B^^^ by = 
J \  / 
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Theorem 4.12 ([19]) Let  B be a pre-hi lat t ice  and le t  S  be any set .  Then B 
a pr^ 'bi lat t ice .  In  addi t ion,  i f  S  is  a  bi lat t ice ,  then is  a  bi l fx t i icz .  
In the above theorem, the operations on o^'^' are determined in a coordinatewise 
manner. For example, (/ ® g){a) = /(a) 0 g{a). The importance of this kind of 
construction will become clear when we discuss the fixpoint semantics of bilattice-
based logic programs. Specifically, the space of interpretations mapping form.ulas to 
truth values (elements of a bilattice), will itself become a bilattice. 
4  ^  r ?  J c ' * * * E l c m c r i v S  
In this section, we extend the concept of join-irreducible elements of lattices to 
the realm of bilattices. This will allow us, under certain conditions, to concentrate on 
a small representative set of bilattice elements with a rich set of algebraic properties. 
Based on these notions, we will introduce an alternative procedural semantics for 
logic programs in Chapter 7. 
Detinition 4.13 Let B — {B,<t ,<k ) be a pre-bilattice, and let a € . We say 
that a is k-jOin-irreducihle [t-jGin-irreduciuie) if a is jom-irreducible in the <^-ordering 
\  .  X <xii rw-jvxii-ij .jLCUu^wiUiC CiCiiiCULSt Ui IS U^UOlGU. OV J irik\0 )  ^  
and the set of all t-jOin-irreQucioie elements oi i? is denoted by j .  
Siiice in d bilaliice ^ is an aulomorphism of "he knowledge ia:tice, -b  Vv 'iil be 
k-join-irreducible vvhenever 6 is k-join-irreducible. 
The following lemma provides a characterization of the k-join-irreducible ele­
ments of a bilattice of the form o(Xi, L2) in terms of the join-irreducible elements of 
( (  
the underlying lattice structures. The bottom elements of Li and L2 will be denoted 
by ±1 and ±2: but we will drop the subscripts when they are clear from context. 
Lemma 4.14 Let B — B{Lx, L2) — {Li x L2, <t, <k) oe a pre-bilattice, where (Z,.-. <,-
,+,•) is a complete lattice, for i  = 1,2.  Then 
JIRk{B ) = {(ai,±),(J.,a2) | a. e JlR{L , ) , i  ^  1.2) .  
Proof: Let a = (01,02) € B .  Suppose that oi 7^ ± and 02 4" -L- Since 
(ci, J_) © (±, 02) = (oi + -L, J_ + ai) = (oi, 02) = c. 
we have a ^ JIRk{B ). Conversely, let (ci, ±) 6 B , such that ai € JIR{Li) ,  and 
suppose that (gi, J.) = (61, 62) © (ci, C2). Then ai = bi + ci and ± = 62 + C2. Clearly, 
b2 — C2 = 1. Since gi € JIR{Li). either Ci = bi or ci = Ci. In either case. 
(ai .±) € JlRk(B ) .  
Using a similar argument, we can conclude that (.1,02) G JIRk{B ). i 
Tills aliuws us 10 a classify ihe join-irreducibie eiem.ents in the knowledge order­
ing. -A-s we shall see later, the follov-'ing classification will shed light on the behavior 
of bilattice-based loe;ic Droe:ra.ms. 0 ^ 0  
Definition 4.15 Let B — B{Li,L2) be a pre-bilattice. An element c ^ B is a 
positive k-join-irreducible element if  c  G JIRyiB) and c = (ci ,  _L) ,  where p JfR{Li)-
c is a TiSydtive k-jOiTL-ivreducihle element if c G JIR^yB^j and c — (j_.C2), wnere 
C2 6 JIR{L2). The set of all positive k-join-irreducible elements of B is denoted by 
JlRt{B). and the set of all negative k-ioin-irreducible elements of B is denoted by 
jTD-in\  
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Clearly, by the previous lemma, we have: 
JlRk{B) = U JIRliB) .  
To illustrate the above concepts, consider the bilattice MXA'S. depicted in Fig­
ure 4.4. This bilattice can be constructed by taking the set P = {0,6,1} with the 
ordering 0 < 6 < 1, and obtaining the structure B{P,P). Then 
JIRt  = {(0.0) ,  (6 ,0) ,  (1 ,0)},  
and 
JIR^iA'IA^S) = {(0,0),(0,6),(0,1)}. 
Note that in this bilattice, (0,1) represents false while (1,0) represents true. In fact, 
in any pre-bilattice B, the elements false and true are among the k-join-irreducible 
elements (false € J1R'^[B) and true £ JIR^[B)), if the top element in both of the 
underlying lattices is join-irreducible. Furthermore, note that in XXXS and in fact 
in any bilattice B, we have: 
-^[JIRt{B))  = JIR;{B) and ^{JIR;{B))  = JIRt{B).  
TVip follnwino" lpmm;a nmvirlpc ^ Kp q i c  "rnr ir»i-n-irror? t:/~iKlo 
tics def.ned in Chapter T. 
T A Ta r  n  — TZ( T .  r  .  \  — / r  ^r .<-
where (-L-;, <;>+. •)  i s  a  complete  dis tr ibut ive  lat t ice ,  for i  — 1,2. Sup-pose that  a .b  E.  
B  and let  c  G J lRh{B).  Then:  
1 .  I f  c  ^  JIR'^[B);  then a V b >k c  i f  and only  i f  a  >f;  c  or  b>-^ c;  
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<l,i> 
<o,i> 
<1,D> <0,1> 
<0.b> 
<0,0> 
<1,0> 
Figure 4.4: The bilattice .\fZXS 
2.  I f  c  ^  J1RJ{B).  then a / \b>k c  i f  and only  i f  a>k c and b >k c;  
3 .  I f  c  ^  JIRk {B) ,  then a y  b >k c  i f  and only  i f  a >fc c and b >k c;  
/• .  H c  E J  IP-  [B],  then a Ab c i f  and onlv  i f  a  c  ov b  ^  ^  c .  T  J  ^  K  \  F  '  — —  ' • V  I 7  J  —  ' >  
Proof: Let a = (01,02) and b = {bi .b2) ,  and note that 
aV6= (ai. a2)V(6i, 62) = (ai-fJ'i, G2-^'2)i andaAb = (gi, 02) A(5i, 62) = ^2+62) 
1. Suppose that c = (c-,. J_). Now we have; 
a V 6 > i . c  i f f  ( a - ' - r  b - .  a - ^  •  
so 
iff oi + bi >1 Ci and 02 • ^2 >2 -L 
iff ai + bi >1 Ci 
iff ai >i Ci or hi >1 Ci (by Lemma 2.19) 
iff (01,02) >k (ci.X) or (61,62) >k (Ci,-L) 
i f f  a  > k  c  0 1  b  > k  c .  
2. Suppose that c = ( C T .  ±). Now we have; 
a A b > k C  iff (01-61,02 + 62) > k  (ci,±) 
iff ot • 6i Ci and <12 + ^2 ^2 -L 
iff oi • 6i ^1 Ci 
iff Ci >1 Ci and 61 >1 ci 
iff (01,02) >k (ci,±) and (61,62) (ci,l) 
iff a  > k  c  and 6 > k  c .  
3. Suppose that c = (-L,C2). Now we have: 
a v b > k C  i f f  ( O i  +  ( J i , a 2  •  6 2 ;  > / c  ( l . , C 2 )  
iff oi + 6i >1 -L and 02 • 62 >2 C2 
iff 02 • 62 ^2 C2 
in 02 ^2 ^2 and 62 ^2 ^2 
/^. ^.\ / I ..-J /J. 2- \ \ / . , \ 
a a . i .  \ — "  - ' 2 /  
iff a  > k  c  and 6 >A; C. 
4. Suppose that c = (j_,C2). Now we have; 
Cl A 6 >!; C iff (0- • 6i ,  G; — 62) ( i . .  C2) 
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iff Ci • 61 >1 ± and 02 -r &2 >2 ^2 
iff c 
iff (22 >2 -2 o- ^2 ^2 ^2 bv Lemma 2.19) 
iff (01,02) >k (±,C2) or (61,62) >h (-L.C2) 
iff a >k c OT b >h c. I 
The above results provide the basis and the motivation behind the join-irreducibie 
procedural semantics presented in subsequent sections. To make to correspondence 
more clear, we presented the following reformulation of above lemma and the corre­
sponding results for the knowledge operators. 
Corollary 4.17 Let B = ) be a distributive pre-bilattice. Suppose that 
a.b.c ^ B. 
1. If  c ^ JIRk{B). then 
(o-) c <K a @ b if  and only if  c <k a or c <k b: 
(b) c <k a 0 b if  and only if  c <k a and c <k b (this is,  in fact,  true for any 
c e B); 
2 .  I f c e  J I R t i B  ) ,  t h e n  
((^ ) c <;c a V 6 if  and only if  c <k aQ b; 
(b) c ^ b if  and only if  c a ^  6,* 
3 .  I f c  e  J I R T A B  t h e n  
 ^ er. \ / • 
fai c <1: aM b if  and only if  c <1- a 0 h: 
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(^)  c  <k a  A h  i f  and only  i f  c  <k a  S  b.  
Proof: The proof is immediate from Lemmas 4.16, 2.19. I 
We will also find the following lemmas useful in the proofs of the main results 
in subsequent chapters. The next lemma is simply a reformulation of Lemma 2.19. 
Lemma 4.18 Let  3  = {B,<t ,<k ) oe  a  pre-bi la t t ice .  Ci ,C2.  •  •  • :  Cp.  G B,  and le t  
c  G JIRhiB) .  Then Ci  0  C2 9  • •  •  ©  c„  > / ;  c  i f  and only  i f  c j  >k c  for  some j  
( 1 < J <  n ) .  
Lemma 4.19 Let  B  = B{Li ,L2)  = {Li  x L2,  <k)  be a  pre-bi la t t ice ,  where  {Li ,  <•:  
•  + , • )  i s  a  complete  la t t ice ,  for  i  = 1,2.  Let  b .c^  JIRk{B) .  
1 .  I f  c  €  JIRl iB)  and c  >fc  b .  then b  €  JIR^iB) .  
2 .  I f  c  G JIR'^{B)  and c  >« b,  then b  G JIR^iB) .  
rroof; Suppose ihai c t and c >k b.  Then c = (ci, J_). where Ci G 
\0'.v b - b = /b-  ' \  r.T h  -  / t h^ \  h .  ^  TTT^i  T . \  ^ _ 1 -T 
3ut, b — s^nc^ otb.0rwis6 c b implies tlidt (-^'^2); v/iiich. is 
impossible because b ^  L.  Hence b = {hi ,  L)  £ JIRl{B) .  
The case when c G JIR'^{B)  is proved similarly. H 
CHAPTER 5. UNIFICATION AND SUBSTITUTION UNIFIERS 
Our procedural semantics uses an AND- and OR-parallel interpretation model 
(see [52, 9, 10]), in which the AND-parallel component is independent. In an indepen­
dent AND-parallel model, even when subgoals share variables, they are solved inde­
pendently. After termination, however, answer substitutions obtained independently 
for shared variables are tested for consistency. We use the notion of substitution 
unification to ensure the consistency of bindings obtained for shared variables during 
the computation. In 'this section we introduce the notions of substitution unification 
and substitution unifiers, and we prove several results which are useful in proving the 
completeness results in the subsequent sections. Many of these results may also be 
of independent interest in unification theory. 
We begin by extending the notion of unification to substitutions themselves. 
The notion of unifiable substitutions has been used in concurrent logic programming 
systems which use A.ND-parallelism [26, 38]. These substitutions also play an essential 
role in our procedural semantics. 
Definition 5.1 Let 5 be a set of substitutions. Then a substitution 7 is called a 
substiiuiion unifier (s-unifier) of S, if 57 is a singleton. If such a substitution 7 exists, 
then we say that  S is  uni f iable .  An s-unif ier  7  of 5  is a  most  general  subst i tu t ion 
unif.sr (mgsu) of S if 7 < S for every s-unifier S of 5. We denote the set of all 
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s-unifiers of 5 by 5u(5) and the set of all most general s-unifiers of 5 by mgsu{S) .  
That mgsu{S)  exists whenever S is unifiable follows from the easily verified fact 
that mgsu{S) = mgu{S'') for some finite set S' of atomic form-ulas. 
Definition 5.2 Let 5 be a unifiable set of substitutions. A substitution <5 is a sub­
stitution unification of 5, if <5 = <77, for some 7 € mgsu{S) and some a E S. The set 
of ail substitution unifications of 5, is denoted by QS. Clearly, for any cr € 5: 
05 — {err  I r G mgsu{S)}  
— (7 mgsu{S) .  
When dealing with a pair of substitutions a and r, we often use a shorthand no­
tation and denote the set of s-unifiers and the set of mgsu's of a and r by su{a. r) and 
mgsu{a,T). respectively. Similarly, we denote the set of all substitution unifications 
of a and r by a 3 r. 
It follows from Lemma 3.35 that mgu's  and mgsu's  are unique up to renam-
L'*'' '* ' * ^ XXX »J\ /XXX'^ \JXXXX\YII  OLX^I^^XY cu.v ctiavi vii.10 i.<xvc liv.cx't 
mgu(Ei ,  £2)-  where Ei  and are expressions, as a function returning a unique 
mgu. In other words, we interpret the equahty 7 = mgu(Ei, E2) to mean equality 
up to renaming. We'll adopt the same convention for mgsu's. It follows that the 
substitution unification cti © 0-2 of any pair of substitutions o"i and a2 is also unique 
up to renaming. In the sequel we sometimes interpret Ci O <^2 as a function returning 
a unique substitution unification of Ci and (72 up to renaming. 
Substitution unifications are useful in parallel evaluation of queries, since they 
provide a mechanism for ensuring consistency of the bindings obtained concurrently 
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during the derivation process. Furthermore, they display certain algebraic character­
istics which may be of independent interest in unification theory. Here we present 
some of the properties of substitution unifiers. 
Lemma 5.3 L e t  9 .  t j i ,  t / t.  Ti- 72 b e  s u b s t i t u t i o n s .  T h e n :  
1 .  5^(771.7/2) =  5u(7i,72) i f f  m g s u { r i i , r i 2 )  =  m g s u { - f i , j 2 ) -
2.  5^(771,7/2) C SU{6T]i ,$ t i2) .  
3 .  I f  d o m { T ] i )  U d o m { r ] 2 )  C v r a n g e { 6 )  t h e n  s u { r / i . T ] 2 )  =  su(07/i, 07/2). 
Proof: 1 and 2 are easy. We will prove part 3. According to 2 it suffices to show 
that 5u(07/i, ^7/2) C 5^(771,772). Let 7 £ 5u(07/i, ^ 7/2). We first show that dom{T]i^) = 
dom{T]2'~/). Supposes G dom{T]i'f) — dom{T]2'y). If x ^ vrange{d) then, by assumption, 
X ^  dom{T}i)  U dom{r]2) .  However,  s ince x G dom{ri i^) ,  we must  have x 6 dom{~f) .  
But this im.plies that x £ dom{rj2'f), contradicting the choice of x. By symmetry. 
( io77z(77i7)  = dom{r}2 ' i ) .  
It remains to show that 7717 and 7/27 have the same bindings. Let x G dom{T]i j )  =  
domiT]2^f) such that x/ci G 7717 and xjC2 G 7/27. We will show that Ci = 62- Suppose 
thai ti ^ 62- If X g vrange{6) then x dom[Tii) U dom[Tj2)- This implies that 
x / e i , x / e 2  G 7  and  hence  e i  = 6 2 ,  cont rad ic t ing  the  assumpt ion .  I f  x  G vrange{6] ,  
then ^7/i7 ^ ^7727, contradicting the choice of 7. Hence, ei = 62 and the proof is 
complete. E 
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Corollary 5.4 LetO.r j i . r i z  be  subst i tu t ions  such that  dom{T]i) .  dom{T]2)  C vrange{6) .  
Then.  
mgsu{Ti i ,T}2)  =  mgsui9r] i ,dT]2) .  
Proof: Follows from parts 1 and 3 of the previous lemma. • 
Corollary 5.5 Let  0 .  r j i .  and t]2  be  subst i tu t ions  such that  dom{T]i)  C vrange{9) .  
Then 
d(Vi O V2) = Om G OT]2. 
Proof: 
0 { v i 0 v 2 )  =  m g s u { T } i , ' q 2 )  
— 6t]I  mgsu{dTji,0ri2) by Corollary 5.4 
= Om 0 Ot]2- h 
. o m r v > ^  I  1 ^ .  —  A r t  ^ O T v w  [ I I Z K  
1.  T 5u((7ir, (72 7') ^ SU[0' i ,a '2)^  
2 .  For  every  a  €  cTi' 0 c t o t  and for  every  5 € <7i 0 < ^ 2 ,  3 < a.  
Proof: Part 1 is easy. For part 2, first note that by definition, a = (TI T S  and 
3 = cip, for some S € mgsii'yO-ir, c-2r) and p £ mgsii{a-i, <r2)- Then, by part 1, 
rS ^ T [mgsu[criT.(j2r)) C su{(Ji,c-2). Hence, a = airS = <71/57 — S-;, for some 
substitution 7. 1 
Lemma 5.7 (Left-invariance of <) Let  a  and r  be subst i tu t ions .  Then 
<7 < r for  a l l  tt.  -a  < ttt.  
Proof; (4=)'. Trivial. 
(=^): 
a < T ^  3(5io"(5 = Tj 
<i=^> 3^V7r[7rcr(5 = TTT] 
=> = 7rr] 
V7r[7r(j < Trr]. H 
Lemma 5.8 Let  a  and r  be subst i tu t ions .  
1 .  a  is  idempotent  => a{a Q r)  = a O r .  
2 .  T i s  idempotent  -(c 0 T)  = C 0 r. 
Jr'rooi: We prove part 1: part 2 is proved in a similar manner. We have: 
o"((7 Q r) — (7( j[mgsu{cr .r ) )  
— cr{mgsu{a,T))  (since o" is idempotent) 
-  a  Q r .  B  
^ J  FJK,  o utyoccc U'OcO >(.o. 
i. //(T idempotent .  then a  < "f  => cr~f  =  7. 
//0" and r are both  idempotent .  and c . r  < 7. then c  and r  are  uni f i  
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Proof: (1) Let 7 = ' jb .  Then (77 = (J( t6  =  (j6  =  7.  
( 2 )  B y  p a r t  ( 1 ) .  < 7 7  —  7 and -7  = 7.  So. 7 is a substitution unifier of a and r. ! 
We can now prove the following weak distributivity result for G-
Lemma 5.10 Let  6 ,T] i ,  and 772 be subst i tu t ions ,  where  r j i  and 772 are  uni f iable .  Then 
Orji O < 0{rii G 7/2)-
Proof; We know that 6rii{mgsu{rji,r]2)) — Orj2{mgsu{rji,r]2)). Hence, Tngsu{r}i.rj2) is 
a unifier of 6r]i and 6rj2 and so; 
mgsu{9rj i ,dr j2)  <  mgsu{r i i , r i2) .  
Now, by Lemma 5.7. 
0Ti i{mgsu{9T]i ,er i2))  <  Br]i{mgsu{r] i^r]2)) .  
Hence, 
9r]i G Ori2 < 6{T]I G 7/2)- ® 
Lemma 5.11 Let  cr  and r  he uni f i .able  subst i tu t ions .  Then,  
1. a < cr Q r  and r  < Q r .  
2 .  I f  (7  and r  are  idempotent .  then,  for  every  subst i tu t ion 7.  
0", r < 7 => cr G T < 7.  
89 
Proof: 
1. cr 0 r = a{ mgsu{a.  r ) )  — r(mgsu{o- .  r ) ) .  
2 .  Suppose c r . T  <  7.  Then, by Lemma 5.9, 7 is a substitution unifier of a  and r .  
Hence, mgsu{a,T) < 7 and so: 
cr 0 r — a { T n g s u { c r . T ) )  
< a-f (by Lemma 5.7) 
— 7 (by Lemma 5.9). 5 
Lemma 5.12 Let  a i .  U2.  r/i. and 7/2 be  subst i tu t ions  such that :  
1 -  ^ V i ;  ^  —  I: "-.' ^nd 
2 .  (7i  and ao are  idempotent .  and 
3 .  T]i  and 7/2 are  uni f iable .  
Then (Ji and <72 are  uni f iable  and a i  0 i7"2 < 7/1 0 772. 
Proof: Bv Lemma 5.11 anrl assniTrntion 1 wp ViavA-
G t ]2 ,  for i  — 1,2. 
Now, by Lemma 5.9 (taking -y = rji (j 772), ai and <72 are unifiable. The second part 
follows immediatel}' from Lemina 5.11. 5 
Coroilary 5.13 Let  a i .  U2.  ?7i. V2-  and 9  be  subst i tu t ions  such that :  
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1.  a .  < 9ri i ,  for  i  =  1,2, and 
2 .  (7i and cto are  idempotent .  and 
3 .  T]i  and T]2  are  uni f iable .  
Then Ui  and (72 are  uni f iable  and Ci  Q a2 < 9{qi  0 r i2) .  
Proof: Since r/j and 7j2 are unifiable. then so are 9rji and 9ti2. Hence, by Lemma 5.1 
and Lemma 5.10, Ui and <72 are unifiable and 
(Tl O (72 < Orji O 07?2 < 9irti 0 772). I 
Lemma 5.14 5u((j, r) C 5u((7r, To-). 
Proof: Let a 6 5ti((7, r). Then era = ra and hence, 
(<7- i±i c7_t-) 0 a l±) a-^ = (tj, 1+) r_cr) 0 a l±l a--, 
wrncn imnlips f n;^f. (T_ O O' o CV 't' ~ r} a  'i' — 'i' "—/ • binc 
domia-) = dom{Tcr), and because of the disjointness of substitutions on each side, w 
have a- 0 a — 0 a. Hence, 
(j.a = (7- 0 a i±i a_(<7.) — 0 a W O-(rcr) -
1 tv% y-», r"\ t ( ^  ^ 
aaaa»-'at.li_xk« v--4. o cc i v./ * 1^1. 
Lemma 5.15 Suvpose  that  dom[( j )  -  dom{r) .  Let  a  be any  suhst i tu t ion.  Ther  
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iiToof: Suppose that c r  o  a  =  r  o  a .  We have: 
aa = cr 0 a y a_^ 
= r 0 a 1+) a-r 
= ra. 
The other direction follows from the proof of Lemma 5.14. I 
Vt c  can also show the associalivity of 0 under certain conditions. First we need 
the following lemjua. 
Lemma 5.16 Let  cr .r .p  be  uni f iable  subst i tu t ions ,  wi th  cr  idempotent .  Then 
cr { ( A  0 T )G p)  =  [cr  © r) © p.  
Proof: 
o"(((j 0 T )  0 p)  = c r [ [ a - T n g s u [ c r ,  r)) © p\  
=  a\[aTngsu[a- ,  T))[mgsu{crmgsu{a.  r), /s))] 
=  { a m g s u { a ,  r ) ) { m g s u { c r m g s u { a .  r ) .  p ) )  
— {amgsu { A , T ) )  Q p 
- (cr © r) © p.  I  
Lemma 5.17 Let  cr .r .p  be  uni f iable  and idempotent  subst i tu t ions .  Then 
(cr© r) © p =  ©{(j.r.p}. 
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Proof: Let a £ mgsu{a,  r ,  p]  and 3 G mgsv.{a- ,r )  be idempotent. Then 3 < a  and 
h e n c e ,  b y  L e m m a  5 . 9 .  3 a  —  o t .  T h u s ,  a d o .  =  e r a  =  p a .  i m p l y i n g  t h a t  a  6  s u { c r 3 ,  p ) .  
Then 
mgsu{a Q T,  p)  — mgsu{a '3 .p)  
< Q G mgsu{a,  r .  p] ,  
and hence, by Lemma 5.7, 
{cr  Q T )  Q p — pTngsu { A  Q T ,  p)  
<  pa 
6  pmgsu{a,  r ,  p]  
= G{cr,r,/)}. 
On the other hand, by Lemma 5.16, {cr  O r)  Q p E su{cr . T .p}  so  a  < {a 0 r) G p.  
This, by Lemmas 5.7 and 5.16, implies that 
'. W /n* r" n K — ^ / /t O. t- i <0 n ^ — / /-r O' ^ O r, 
^  r  J  —  ' w -  ^  r ;  ^  '  j  ^  
w^'C^ P^stiss tlic p^oox m 
In a similar m.anner we can prove that 
<j O ( -  O p)  =  G{a,  - ,  p]  
resulting in the following associativity result. 
Lemma 5.18 Let  a .r .p  be uni f iable  and idempotcTi t  subst i tu t ions .  Then 
icr  QT )  0 p  =  A  0 ( T  0 p ) .  
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The main results of this chapter are the following technical lemmas which are 
used in the proof of the Completeness Theorem. 
Lemma 5.19 Let  G he.  an  express ion and a  and r  be subst i tu t ions  such that :  
1 .  dom{<j)  C vars[G);  
2 .  vrange{a)  fl vars{G)  = 0; 
3.  vrange{cr)  H dom{r)  = 0; and 
Gc ^  Gt .  
Then cr <  r .  
Proof: Note that assumptions 1 and 2 together imply that cr is idempotent. Now. 
by assumptions 4 and 1 we have: 
c  = ac ^  Tci  
and so, by Lemma 5.9 (since a is idempotent j, 
arc  -  TQ.  
Hence, 
T — l+l -r ^ 
— crrc'd T-Q 
- (c7 0 T)Q y i±J T—Q 
= (7 W [T-cr)c  'ii ~-G- (by assumption 2) 
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= cr 1+) {r-cr)c  W (by assumption 1) 
= cr l±) T_^ 
= cr 0 r y T_^, (by assumption 3) 
= ar. 
which implies that a < r. I 
Lemma 5.20 Let  Gi  and G2 be express ions  and cr i ,  T]: ,  and 9  be  subst i tu t ions ,  for  
i  = 1.2. such that :  
1 .  dom{ai)  C vars{Gi);  i  = 1-2; 
2.  vrange{ai)  H vars{Gi)  =  0, i  = 1,2; 
3.  vrange{(7-)  fl dom{9r) i )  — 0, i  = 1,2; 
4-  Gia^  < Gidrj . ,  i  =  1 ,2 , -  and 
•5.  r j i  and rio  are  uni j iable .  
Then (71 ana are  umfiable  and o ' l  3  <72 ^  ^\J l i  
Proof: By Lemma 5.19 (taking r. = Ori i . i  — 1,2), we have that cr,- < Orj i ,  i  -  1,2. 
Now by Lemma 5.13, both conclusions follow immediately. 1 
Lemma 5.21 Let  Gi  and G2 be express ions  and a ,  r j ,  a .  and 9  be  subst i tu t ions  such 
that :  
1. domic)  C vars iGi);  
2 .  Gi9T]  — Giaa;  
3 .  v r a n g e i a )  fi F = 0; 
4-  dom{a)  n y = 0; 
•where  Y  — vars iG2)  — vars iGi) .  Def ine  •,•  =  a  y  Then G. .9r i  — GxCr' - , .  for  
I  =  L 2 .  
Proof; For i  =  1, by the deRnition of Y and by assumption 3, vars{Gi(7) fl F = 0, 
and hence, 
Gia- f  = Gicria  l+l {6r])Y)  =  Giaa = GiOrj .  
Let i  = 2. Define X = vars{Gi)  fl vars{G2)-  Since X C vars{Gi) ,  by the previous 
case, (<77).v = Also. 
ia- f )Y  = ( 0 - 0  7 ) y  l ± l  ( c 7 - _ ^ ) y  
= ((7_o-)y (since dom{( j  n y = 8) 
= I'Y 
— {9v)y (by the definition of 7). 
Hence, 
— r'jia^\^ 1,1 1 
^ 2 ^ ' /  —  ^ 2 \ , \ ^ ' T ) X  \ . ^ ' I I Y \  
= G2[{c~i)x W (o"7)y] 
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CHAPTER 6. KNOWLEDGE-BASED LOGIC PROGRAMMING 
We now present a fonr-vaiued knowledge-based logic programming system based 
on the bilattice TOWK. Later we will extend ideas presented in the subsequent 
sections to logics based on arbitrary distributive bilattices. The special four-valued 
case, however, is important on its merits and deserves detailed study. It provides the 
motivation behind the results presented in the sections on generalized knowledge-
based logic programming. Furthermore, the notion of Closed World Assumption, 
which we discussed earlier, has a natural and useful counterpart in the context of the 
four-valued knowledge-based logic programs. Those results are presented in the last 
section of this chapter. 
6.1 Logic Programming Syntax 
Our logic programming language, denoted by £, will have the bilattice TOWR. 
as the underlying space of truth values. The alphabet of C consists of the usual sets of 
variables, constants, predicate symbols, and function symbols, similar to conventional 
logic programming.  There is  also an inunite  number of new constants ,  cal led generic  
constants, that are distinct from the regular constants in the sense that they may not 
appear in any clause of a program over C. In addition. £ includes the connectives . 
A, V, 3, and 0. A and V represent the meet and join operations of the bilattice 
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in the truth ordering and 0 and 9 represent the meet and join in the knowledge 
ordering. The "quantifiers" HiZl represent the infinitary meet and join operations 
of the bilattice in the knowledge ordering. 
The notions of term and ground term are defined in the usual way; they may 
contain generic constants. The set O'c of all ground terms in a language C is called 
the Herbrand universe of £ [37]. An atom is either one of the constants true or false 
or an expression of the form pUi. • • •. i-). where p is an n-ary predicate symbol and 
^1, • • •. tr, are terms. An atom in which there are no occurrences of variables is called 
a  ground a tom.  
Formulas  are either atoms or expressions of the form ->.4, AQ B,  B,  A/ \  B,  
or A V B, where A and B are formulas. A complex formula is a formula which is 
not an atom. A normalized formula is a formula in which the operator 0 does not 
occur. An expression is either a term or a formula. A sim.ple expression is either a 
term or an atom. For an expression E, vars{E) denotes the set of all variables that 
occur in E.  
"vvhere .4 is an atom other tiian true and false. G is a formula. are 
variables occurring in A. and (/i - • • •, are variables occurring in G. but not in .4. 
.4 is called the head and G is called the body of the clause. Normally, we drop the 
quantifiers from the clauses and simply write A <— G. where the variables occurring 
in the head of the clause are implicitly quantified by []• ^.nd the variables occurring 
in the clause body and not in the clause head are quantified by Y.- This convention is 
a standard practice in logic programming. Of course, in classical logic programming 
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the quantifiers are the truth quantifiers V and 3 which are assumed to impHcitly 
quantify a clause. The choice of quantifiers [] JZ is motivated by our interest in 
the knowledge content of statements rather than their truth content. 
Note that in conventional Prolog, a clause of the form A <— is taken to stand for 
A <— true. So the empty clause body is the equivalent of a truth constant. In our 
language we designate symbols representing each element of the bilattice (with the 
exception of T and ±). Kence, the above definition of atomic formulas includes the 
constants true and false. As usual, a program is a finite set of clauses. A goal is 
simply a formula. 
Definition 6.1 A clause A •(— G is normal ized if G is a normalized formula and 
either vars{A) C vars{G), or G € {true,false }. A program is normalized if all of 
its clauses are normalized. 
The Herbrand Base  of a program. P,  denoted Bp.  is the set of all ground atoms 
using only function or predicate symbols occurring in P, and constants that either 
The e.xtension of the language by these generic constants is done for technical 
reasons which will become clear in the proof of our Completeness Theorem. We now 
define the notion of a generic constant substituion which we will also need in the 
proof the Completeness Theorem. 
Definition 6.2 A substitution 6 is  a.  gener ic  constant  subst i tu t ion or simply a gc-
substitution if it is of the form 
{xi/ai, X2/a2. •Xr . /ar .} :  
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where are distinct generic constants. If E is an expression, then ^ is a 
g-subst i tu t ion for  E .  if dom{8)  =  vars{E) .  
The following technical lemma connecting gc-substitutions and the most general 
unifier will be used in the proof of the Completeness Theorem. 
Lemma 6.3 Let  A  and B  be a toms such that  vaTs{A)  n vars{B)  = 0 and nei ther  
A  nor  B  contains  a  generic  constant .  Let  6  be  a  gc-subst i tu t ion for  A .  Assume 
AS and B  are  uni f iable  and rj  =  mgu{A5.  B) .  Then A and B  are  uni f iable ,  and i f  
/ i  =  mgu{A,B) ,  then 
1 .  ST ]  -  ,  -where  R i s  a  gc-subst i tu t ion for  BFX,  and 
2 .  f iA i s  in jec t ive  and variable-pure .  
Proof: vars{A)  fl vars{B)  = 0 implies B6 = B.  So 77 = mgu{A6.  BS) ,  and hence 
6 T]  unif ies  .4  and B. Let F I  = mgu{A,  B) .  Then ST J  = j ir  for  some r .  Since S 
is a gc-substitution for .4. we have AS = ASrj. Thus AS — ASrj = Afir. Now 
dom{S) = vars{A) and all constants of S are generic. Thus, since .4 and B do not 
contain any generic constants and JJ. is their mgu, cannot contain generic constants. 
But XfiT — xS. which is generic, for every x € varsyA). This implies that must be 
•l. 1 _ j • 1. 1 *— • i* • ^ . j . t,,i rii r 
variauic-yure, auu it inusu aiso oe iujeciive since v is injeciive. il cnen loiiows irom 
the equality AS = Ajir that r is a gc-substitution for Ap. and hence also for B^ . h 
We further extend the notion of unification to substitutions themselves. The 
notion of unifiable substitutions has been used in concurrent logic programming sys­
tems which use AND-parailelism [26j. These substitutions also play an essential role 
in our procedural semantics. 
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6.2 Fixpoint Semantics 
In the classical two-valued logic programming, a single step operator on interpre­
tations, denoted Tp, is associated with a program. In the absence of negation, this 
operator is monotonic and has a natural least fixpoint. It is this fixpoint which serves 
as the denotational meaning of the program. However, in the presence of negation 
in the clause bodies, the Tp operator is no longer monotonic and may not have a 
fixpoint. The idea of eissociating such an operator with programs carries over in a 
natural way to logic programming languages with a distributive bilattice as the space 
of truth values. However, the ordering in which the least fixpoint is evaluated is the 
knowledge ordering {<k) and not the truth ordering (<f). Since, knowledge operators 
are self-dual under negation in the <A-ordering, presence of negation in the body of 
a program clause does 'not pose any of the problems associated with classical logic 
programming. The fixpoint semantics presented in this section is essentially due to 
Fitting [18]. 
a A 
1. .A.n ivdtrpretat ion for a program P is a mapping I  :  Bp —TOUV^.  
2. We extend the interpretation / to ground formulas as follows: 
1[^A)  = 
i [ A i t p A 2 )  ~  l { A i )  @  1 { A 2 ) :  
/(.4i0A2) = /(Ai) 0/(/i2); 
l { A i  A A 2  ) = A /(A2); 
I ( A I V A 2  )  =  I [ A i } y  l { A z ) .  
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3. We further extend the interpretation I  to nonground formulas. For a nonground 
formula 6': 
= Y[{i{Gcr) I (J is a ground substitution for the variables of G}. 
The following lemma is an easy consequence of the definitions involved. 
Lemma 6.5 Let  I i  and I2  be  two in terpretat ions  for  a  program P and le t  a  and r 
be subst i tu t ions .  
1 .  I i {Ga)  <k h iGr)  for  every  formula G i f  and only  i f  I i {A( t )  <k l2[Ar)  for  
every  a tom A.  
2 .  I i (G(j )  =  hiGr)  for  every  formula G i f  and only  i f  I i {Acr)  =  hiAr)  for  every  
a tom A.  
Proof: The implication from left to right in part 1 is trivial. The opposite implication 
is proved by an easy induction on the structure of G. using the fact that the operations 
•0. 0, A, and V are monotone with respect to <k-
Pan 2 is an immediate consequence of part 1. 1 
Definition 6.6 The in i t ia l  in terpretat ion Iq  of a program P is defined as follov/s. 
For any atom A £ Bp:  
true if A = true 
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Note that for any atomic formula G, if Io(G)  >k true (or Io{G)  >k false), then 
G — true (respectively G = false). Now we can associate a semantic operator with 
each program. 
Definition 6.7 Let P be a program and let A 6 Bp.  The semant ic  operator  is 
a function mapping interpretations to interpretations, defined as follows: 
$ P ( / ) ( A )  =  
I 
true if A = true 
false if .4 = false 
y . i l (Ga)  \ A '  ^r— G ^  P and A = A'a\  otherwise 
Pointwise partial orderings are also defined on interpretations in the following 
manner; 
1- h  h  if A(-4) < k  h { A ) ,  for every ground atom A G Bp.  
ii <t h  if A(A) <t h { A ) ,  for every ground atom A € B p .  
Lsing this pointwise ordering, the space of interpretations itself becomes a dis­
tributive biiattice [18], Furthermore, the ^p operator is monotonic with respect to 
the knowledge ordering [IS]: 
L <u h  <•.  
and hence, bv the Knaster-TarsWi t.heor'^ni [53], has a least fixT>oint. It is this 
least uxpoint which provides the denotational meaning of the program P. In order 
to approximate the least fixpoint of the operator we use the following notion of 
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Definition 6.8 The upward i terat ion of is defined as follows: 
c 
lo  if a = 0 
Ct>p T a = 9p(®p f (a — 1)) if a is a successor ordinal 
t ,<5 1 < Q:} if Q; is a limit ordinal 
The smallest ordinal at which this sequence gives the least fixpoint of is 
called the closure ordinal. In TOWK and in fact in any bilattice which satisfies the 
infinitary distributivity conditions, is continuous and its closure ordinal is at most 
^ [18]. 
The following lemma shows that generic constants behave semantically like vari­
ables. 
Lemma 6.9 For every  formula G and any gc-subst i tu t ion cr  for  G.  
{ ^ P  T  r L ) { G a )  =  ( $ p  t  n ) { G ) ,  f o r  e v e r y  n  <  
Proof: Consider the following property of an interpretation 1 .  
l [ G < j )  = /(G), for every formula G  and gc-substitution a  for G .  (6.1) 
We firsi prove that, for every interpretation /, if I  has the property (6.1), then 
so does <?p(/). Note that, to show ^p{i) has the property, it suffices to prove that 
^p{l)\Gc) <k ^p{I){G6), every ground substitution 6. Furthermore, by Lemma 6.5, 
we can assume G is an atom. 
Assume I  in an arbitrary interpretation such that (6.1) holds and G is an atom 
.4. $p( /)( .4c7) is  the join of  al l  elements of  B of the form I{G'T)  such that  A.cr  = BR 
for some clause S •«— G' of P and some ground substitution r. Let Xn be the 
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variables of A so that AA = A(xi(7 x„cr) = BT.  Since the constants XIA, .... x„cr 
are distinct and do not occur in B. there is a substitution r' such that A. = Br'. 
Since Aa = Br'a. we can assume rV = r. We also have AS = 5r'(5 and hence 
I{G'T'8) is one of the set of elements of J^OUTZ whose join defines ^p{I){A8). But 
1[G'T] — l{G'r'cr) — <K l{G'r'S)-, the second equality holds because of our 
assumption that I  has the property (6.1). Thus (6.1) is preserved under $p. 
The conclusion of ihe lemma now follows by an easy induction on n and the fact 
that lo clearly has the property (6.1). I 
Using the distributivity and infinitarv distributivity properties of the bilattice 
J-OUTZ we can establish the semantic equivalence of ordinary and normalized pro-
grams. 
Theorem 6.10 Let  P  he a  program over  the  language C.  There  ex is ts  a  normal ized 
program P'  over  a  poss ib ly  larger  language C  with  the  property  that  for  every  A  £  Bp,  
(  ^  .  A f  A  \  / / f v  . \ f  A  \  \ ^ ^  I W M -n. ; \ ^ h" ! W M -T. J. 
Proof: Since we have distributivity, every clause in the program P can be written as 
.4 Gi © • • • e G-. 
where each G; is a normalized formula (the infinitarv distributivity conditions are 
needed since the clauses in the program body may contain variables which are im­
plicitly quantified). P' is formed by first replacing each clause in the above form by 
the set of n clauses: 
A -I .  A .  r< 
"^Tl '  
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For each i ,  if either vars{A)  C vars{G.:)  or Gi G { true, false }, then the clause .4 <— 
G. is not further iransformed: otherwise ii is replaced by A G,- 0 E{xi,... .x„), 
•vvnere is a uevv' predicate s^vmbol and {xi,... — vursyA}} — vars[Gi). In this 
event the two clauses E(xi,... ,Xn) <— true and E{xi,. ..,Xn) ^ false are also 
added. Obviously, the transformed program P' is a normalized program. Further­
more, it should be clear from the definition of that, for every interpretation /, 
..., tn)) = T for all terms ii,..., tn- It is easy to check that for every 
.4 G Bp, every interpretation /, and any extension /' of I to Bpi. we have 
$P($P(/))(A) = $pK^P'(/'))(A). 
Thus, ($p t = ("^P' T Q;)(A), for any .4 6 Bp and every a > 2. 1 
Since, according to the above theorem, ordinary programs and normalized pro­
grams are equivalent, we will, from now on, consider only normahzed programs. 
Interpretations over distributive bilattices exhibit some interesting algebraic prop-
i ' . T  r *  ^  r  ^  ^  f  f  
ciuicS. ill pdiiiCuiai. Vvc ildvc iOuuu iiic njiiUwin^ iciiuuo^i lU lllC pruOiS? Ui OUI 
the Soundness and Comoleteness Theorems. 
Lemma 6.11 Let  I  be  an  in terpretat ion,  G a formula,  and 6 ,  rj  subs t i tu t ions .  Sup­
pose  that  9  i s  a  var iant  o f  T] w .r . t .  G.  Then l{Gd)  — l{Grj) .  
Proof; The result follows immediately from the definitions of interpretation and 
variant. I 
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Lemma 6.12 Let  Gi  and G2 be formulas ,  and suppose  I  i s  an  in terpretat ion.  Then 
for  •  E {0.0.  A.V},.  we have 
/ ( G i D G 2 ) > f c  / ( G i )  • / ( G 2 ) .  
Proof: 
I{Gi  •  G2) — •  G2)O'  \  a  is  a  ground subst i tu t ion }  
=  I[G2cr)  \ a  i s  a  ground subst i tu t ion }  
>/; n{-''^(G'i7) /(G2<5) j ' j . v  are  ground subsi i iu i ions  }  
=  n { - ^ ( G i 7 )  1  7  i s  ground }  •  n { - f ( G 2 < 5 )  ]  8  i s  ground }  
=  I{Gi)  • /(G2). H 
Lemma 6.13 Let  a .  and 3  be subst i tu t ions ,  le t  I  be  an  in terpretat ion,  and le t  F  be 
a  formula.  
1 .  I f  a  < 3 .  then I  {Fa)  I{F^) .  
2 .  I { F a ) < k I [ F a 3 ) .  
Proof: (1) The proof is straightforward from the definitions of interpretation and 
properties of H • Assume a < 3, i.e.. a<7 = 3 for some substitution c. Then 
I [ F a )  = n{ I { F o l 8 ) \ 8  a ground substitution for F a )  
<k TT{ I{Faa-S) \S  a ground substitution for FaS }  
=  I{Facr)  
T /  J-*  N 
— 1  y r  O ) .  
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Part (2) is an immediate consequence of (1). H 
Corollary 6.14 Lei  9 i  and 62 oe  uni j iahle  subst i tu t ions ,  le t  I  be  an  in terpretat ion,  
and let  F be a formula.  Then I{F{9i  0 ^ 2)) i{F9i) ,  for i  = 1,2. 
Proof: Since 9i  and 02 are unifiable, O ^2 = where 7 is an mgsu of 61 and 62.  
Now use Lemma 6.13. E 
Lemma 6.15 Let  A  G ^  P.  Then for  every  in terpretat ion I  and every  subst i tu­
t ion 9 ,  
^P{I){A9)  >fc  I {G9) .  
Proof: Recall that the interpretation of a nonground formula is defined to be the 
greatest lower bound in the knowledge ordering of the interpretations of all ground 
subst i tut ion instances of  the formula.  Hence,  i t  suff ices to show that  ^p(I ) (A96)  >k 
I{G66] for every ground substitution 6. But 
^P(I){A9S)  = Y.{  ^ iG'a)  lA^G'eP and A9S = Aa) .  
Taking A •<— G for A'  ^  G'  and 95 for a,  we see that I[G96)  is actually a member of 
the set whose least upper bound is $p(/)( A05). 9 
Lemma 6.16 Lei  A  G E. P-  Then for  any  subst i tu t ion 9 ,  
r . .M Aa\  >. t . . \ ina\  i —n: IT '  I 
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Proof: It foiiow from the last lemma by an easy induction on n that f n){AO) > k 
\^p t (ri i))(G(?) for all n > 1. Using this fact we have 
{$F T u.-)( .40) =  ^{($pTn)(-40) I 1  <^<^-}  
Hi (^P T (" - 1))(G6') I 1 < n < w} 
= T n){Gd) i n < u,' } 
= ($p T^')(G0)- • 
6.3 Procedural Semantics 
Fitting has proposed a bilattice-based procedural model [17. 18] based on a 
version of Sm.ullyan style semantic tableaux [51]. Fitting's extension of semantic 
tableaux to bilattices (in this case J-OUTZ) involves using signed formulas of the 
form FX and TX, where X is a formula. Informally, FX (respectively, TX) says 
that X is either false or _L (respectively, true or ±). Since tableaux are refutation 
a r g u m e n t s  ( a s  i n  r e s o l u t i o n ) ,  i f  o n e  a r r i v e s  a t  a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  b y  s t a r t i n g  w i t h  F X .  
it follows that X is either true or T, in other words, X is at leasi true. Simuiarly, 
a contradiction deriving from TX will mean that X is at least false. Finally, if 
contradictions foiiow from both FX and JA", then X is T, and if contradictions 
follow from neither then X is ±. 
In contrast, we use a resolution-based procedural semantics which will allow us to 
start with any formula as a goal and within a uniform framework derive both negative 
and positive information about that goal. In the context of the bilattice TOWR. this 
means that if the derivation from a soal .4 leads to success, then A is at least true. 
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and if it leads to failure, then ,4 is at least false. Informally, if a derivation from A 
is  successful ,  we say that  A has a  proof ,  and if  the derivat ion is  fai led,  we say that  A 
has a refutation. Note that we do not use the notion of refutation in the same way 
as it is used in resolution-based m^ethods. Also, our notions of successful and failed 
derivations are quite different from those used in such methods. 
The procedural model we propose is essentially an extension of the well-known 
operational semantics known as SLDNF-resolution which is based on SLD-resolution [28, 
2] augmented with the negation as failure rule [8]. Negation as Failure uses the notion 
of fi-niip fmlTiTf to if ti^^ of 2, £3,ilsci Fcr 2. prO^rclxXl 
P, the f in i te  fa i lure  se t  of P,  is the set of all ground atoms A for which there exists 
a finitely failed resolution tree for P U {A}, that is, one which is finite and contains 
no success branches. A failure branch in such a tree, is one whose leaf node cannot 
unify with the head of any clause in P.  
Our procedural model, called SLDPF-resolut ion (PF stands for Partial Failure) 
does not require that a finitely failed derivation tree have no success branches. In 
our approach, t!ie notions oi iailure and success are treated in exactly the sam.e 
saSTI'*S.'olOIj. ^xCC. VvixlCu. WC Call clju. x •c-/ cc cl vcii quai, C^ii 
v o.xasa O i 1 v C,, V1V-/J-1. .2 CXiiU. JJiUUiS^ 
of that goal. This feature, which v;e call Xegat ion as  Part ia l  Fai lure ,  is one of the 
consequences of shifting our emphasis from truth to knowledge. In our derivation 
trees, for every subtree rooted at an internal node labeled by some atom, say A. each 
direct descendant of A corresponds to a clause whose head unifies with A. Each such 
clause is seen as contributing to the information the system has about the truth or 
falsity of A. All clauses with the same head can be combined using the 3 operator 
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which, as we explained earlier, is self-dual under negation. In the classical logic 
programming approach, clauses with the same head are combined using V, and since 
the dual of V under negation is A, a failed subgoal is one whose derivation tree has 
no success branches. In our approach, e.xistence of only one failed branch is sufficient 
for failure. Thus, we may have goals whose SLDPF-tree has both success and failure 
branches. 
One of the problems in dealing with negation in SLDNF-resolution is that in 
order to ensure soundness, only ground negative literals can be selected for resolution. 
This is sometimes referred to as the safeness condition [371. The reason for this 
problem is that once a negative literal is reached during the derivation, the system 
must attempt to prove its positive component. This positive literal will be universally 
quantified, since 3 will change to V when negation is taken outside to establish a 
derivation for the positive counterpart of the subgoal. However, the system will 
actually attempt to prove an existentially quantified subgoal, since 3 is implicitly 
assumed. On the other hand, we interpret free variables in the body of a clause 
as bciu^ quauiiueu by which is iis own dual under negaiion. Therefore, our 
procedural semantics will remain sound even in the presence of non-ground negative 
subgoals. 
SLDPF-resolution also extends the treatment of to the operators A, V, and 2. 
In other words, if during the derivation a subgoal is reached which contains one of 
these operators, then an attempt is made to establish appropriate derivations for the 
two operands based on the way these operators, viewed as lattice operations, act on 
the elements of the bilattice. This is precisely the point at which we need the notion 
of substitution unifiers. S-unifiers will ensure that the answer substitutions obtained 
I l l  
from the derivation trees of each operand will not contradict each other once they 
are finally applied to the formula itself. 
I^otc that negative information can be derived through the explicit use of clauses 
of the form A <— false. This allows us to treat success and failure in a completely 
symmetrical manner. Later we will describe how we can extend Negation as Partial 
Failure to incorporate the Closed W'orld Assumption with only minor modifications 
to our procedural and fixpoint semantics. We now present the details formally in the 
following definitions. 
Definition 6.17 An SLDPF-tree  for  P  U {A}, where P is a normalized program and 
A is an atom, is a (possibly infinite) tree satisfying the following conditions: 
1. The root of the tree is A. 
2. Let G be a nonleaf node. Then G is an atom and for each clause G' <— G" €  P ,  
i f  G and G' are unif iable,  then the node has a  child G"^.  where 7  = mgu{G.  G') .  
Vve say that  7  is  the subst i tu t ion associated  wi th  the  edge between G and G"^.  
3. Let G be a leaf node. Then either G is an atom which does not unify with the 
head of any clause (in particular, G can be true or false), or G is a complex 
formula. 
Let E be an expression and let a be a substitution. Recall that the restriction 
of <7 with respect to E (or, more precisely, to the variables of E) is denoted by <T£. 
Definition 6.18 Let P be a normalized program and G a normalized goal. Then 
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1. G has a proof of rank 0 with answer 6 ii G = true and 0 is the identity 
substitution £. G has a refutation of rank 0 with answer 6 ii G = false and 6 
IS the idcntitj '  substitution c.  
2. G has a proof of rank k + 1 with answer 9 if: 
(a) G is an atom different from both true and false, and P U {G} has an 
SLDPF-tree with at least one leaf node G', such that G' has a proof of 
rank k with answer 6'. and 9 = (ai • • • where cri.---.an are the 
substitutions associated with edges along the path from G to G'] or 
(b) G = —G', and G' has a refutation of rank k with answer 6\ or 
(c) G = Gi ® Go or G = Gi A G2 , and Gi and G2 have proofs of ranks ki and 
k2 with answers 9i and $2, respectively, k = max[ki, k2). and 6 = {d[Q9'2)G-
where 9'. is a variant of 9i w.r.t G,- {i = 1,2); or 
(d) G = Gi V G2 , and at least one of Gi or G2 has a proof of rank k with 
5.nswcr 
o 77 i '-iz. n '  r 
•J' Has a- rCjUi^uclOTl Oj rCLurC /v -p x Wicu CLJlSWtT C7 111 
(a) G is an atom different from both true and false, and P U {G} has an 
SLDPF-tree with at least one leaf node G' such that G' has a refutation 
of idiik h \Yilh ansv/er 7', and $ — - • • cr„5')G, where "1, • • •, <7„ are the 
substitutions associated with edges along the path from G to G'; or 
(b) G = -^G', and G' has a proof of rank k. with answer 9-. or 
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(c) G = Gi S G2 or G = Gi V G2 , and Gi and G2 have refutations of ranks 
k i  a n d  / c o  w i t h  a n s w e r s  9 i  a n d  $ 2 ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  k  =  T n a x { k i ,  k 2 ) ,  a n d  6  =  
0 ^ 2)0- where 6'- is a variant of 6: w.r.t. G-; {i = 1,2); or 
(d) G = Gi A G2 , and at least one of Gi or G2 has a refutation of rank k with 
answer 6. 
Definition 6.19 Let P be a normalized program and G a normalized goal. Then G 
has a proof (respectively, a refutation) with answer if G has a proof (respectively, 
a  r e f u t a t i o n )  o f  r a n k  k ,  w i t h  a n s w e r  f o r  s o m e  k  > 0 .  
In parts 2(c) and 3(c) of the above definition, the reason for allowing variants 
of answers before taking their substituion unification (e.g., 9[ © 62), is to assure 
that variables do not conflict in independent derivations associated with complex 
subgoals. In order to select the appropriate variant, we can compose the answers 
with especial renaming substitutions which repalce that variables in the vrange of 
answers by variables which have not occurred in the derivation up to that point. The 
additional bindings which result from the composition ensure that the relationships 
between variables of independent derivations are preserved. 
We also adopt the standard practice of assuming that suitable variants of pro­
gram clauses are used at each step of a proof or refutation. This is to ensure that the 
variables used for the derivation do not already occur in the derivation up to that 
point. We will refer to this assumption as the unique renaming assumption. 
Before proving the Soundness and Completeness Theorems for our knowledge-
based logic programming system, let us illustrate the procedural semantics by an 
Vy *V l lOi iiidilZcU. 1 . 
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1. p{u) ^ q{f{u)) 
2. q ( y )  ^  r { y )  2  s { y )  
3. r(^) <- ^i(-) 
4. s { f { a ) )  f— false 
5. <— false 
6. r { f { a ) )  <— false 
7. p { b )  true 
8. T { f { b ) )  <— false 
and the goal p { x ) .  The process of computation of this goal using SLDPF-resolution 
is depicted in Figure 6.1. Once again the dotted lines represent start of an in­
dependent computation for a subgoal. So. for example the dotted lines from the 
subgoal r{f{u)) 0 s{f{u]) to each of r{f{u)) and s{fiu)) represent the fact that, 
according to the procedural semantics, in order to establish a proof (refutation) for 
flu)) 0 •?( fiu)). the svstem must trv to construct proofs (refutations) for each of 
v  • *  \  /  '  v v v / / /  v  v  i  \  /  
the operands. The situation is similar for the subgoal -'f(/(u)). Note that the in 
the latter case (when the operator is -i), the computation follows a similar process 
to that of SLDNF-resolution. 
Xote that the subgoal r(/(u)) has refutations vvith answers [ u j a ]  and [ u j h ] .  On 
the other hand, the subgoal s{f[u)) has a refutation with answer {uja]. In this case, 
the substitution unification process v/ill onlv accept the consistent bindings obtained 
N-zj. o u . a. ixcti b . yj yU J J cy J J J li<Xi d 
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false 
{ym} 
true 
T{f{u)) ® S<J(U)) 
rifiu)) 
r.. /L) X 
"(f(u)) 
t(f(u)) 
false 
s(f(u)) 
{u/a} 
falsa 
{ulb} 
Figure 6.1; An Example of SLDPF-resolution 
refutation with answer { u j a } .  It can be seen that the goal p { x )  has both a refutation 
(with answer {x/a}) and a proof (with answer {x/6}). 
6.4 Basic Results 
In this section we present the soundness and completeness results for Negation as 
Partial Failure. These theorems establish the correspondence between the procedural 
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and the hxpoint semantics. For the purpose of these theorems we will denote the 
ordering in the knowledge lattice by 
Theorem 6.20 (Soundness) Let P he a normalized program, G a normalized goal, 
and 9 a substitution for the variables of G. 
1. If G has a proof with answer 6, then (^p T u;)(G0) ^ true. 
2. If G has a refutation with answer 9, then ($p f LJ){G9) ^ false. 
T> r. /"o,. 7,\ X iUUl. l^iJV iUUUdlUii Uii J 
Basis: (A: = 0) Suppose G has a proof of rank 0 with answer 9. Then G = true and 
9 — e. Now, /o(true) = true, and since is monotonic, ($p f uj){G9) ^ true. 
Similarly, if G has a refutation of rank 0 with answer 9, then ($p T u){G9) ^ false. 
Induction: Assume the result holds for proofs and refutations of rank k, and suppose 
that G has a proof of rank k + 1 with answer 9. There are five cases to consider: 
1. G iti an uloni: Tlieil F <J nas an rF-fwir n ar on<= 
which has a proof of rank k with answer 9', such that 9 — • c7„0')g:. where 
ai, • • •, cTn are the mgu's associated with the edges along the path from G to F 
in the tree. Now, the result is proved by performing a secondary induction on 
the length n of this path. 
The result is vacuously true if n = 0, since in this case the only atoms with 
SLDPF-trees are true and false which do not have proofs of positive rank. 
Now, suppose the result holds for SLDPF-trees with success branches of depth 
n > 0, and consider one of depth n t- 1. In this case. P must have a clause 
117 
G' <— Gi such that Ui = mgu{G,G') and GiCi has an SLDPF-tree with a 
success branch of depth n. Then it is easy to see that GiCTi  has a proof of raniv 
k with answer 9i such that $ = {(7i9i)c- By the secondary induction hypothesis. 
($P t ^'){Gio-i6i) ^ true. Then, 
($P t '^'){G9) = {^p t ij;){Gai9i) since Gd = Gcri9i 
— t '^'){G'cri9i) since ai = mgu{G,G') 
^ (^»P t u;)(GiO"i0i) by Lemma 6.16 
b true by the secondary ind. hyp. 
G is ^G': Then G' must have a refutation of rank k with answer 6. By the 
inductive hypothesis, ($p t u;) {G'9) ^ false. Hence, 
= -(«5p T (G'0) 
^ true. 
G  i s  Gi 0 Go : Then G; has a proof of rank k :  with answer O i -  svich that 0  = 
{6[ 0 0'2)GI where 9'. is a variant of 9; w.r.t. Gi. Furthermore, k •- max[ki, k2)-
By the inductive h^vpothesis, ($p | u;) (Gi^j) ^ true for i = 1,2. Hence, 
($p 1" u) ([Gi 0 G2 ]^) — ($p T ^') iGi9 ^ G29 ) 
^  ($P 1" u )  ( G i 9 )  0 ($p t (G2&)- by Lemma 6.12 
= ($P T ^') © ^2)) ® i ^ P  T { G 2 { 9 [  0 9',]} 
y ($P T ^') {Gi9[) 0 ($p I cj) (G2^2)f by Corollary 6.14 
=: f D T (([r-t 0-1 ) (^ (^ p T T om-rr-.p^ 6 ^ ^ 
^ true, by the inductive hypothesis and properties of 0 . 
l i s  
4. G is Gi A Go This case, for proofs, is identical to the case for Gi 0 Go • 
5. G is G'l V G't ; Then one of Gi and G2 (say Gi) has a proof of rank k with 
answer d. Hence, 
T i [ G i  V G2 ] 9 )  = ($p T w) V G2^) 
^ t ^ ') { G \ 6 )  V ($p t w) (G2^), by Lemma 6.12 
^ true. by the inductive hypothesis and properties of V . 
Finally, the induction part is proved in a similar fashion for the case when G has 
a refutation of rank k -r I. i 
The key to the proof of the Completeness Theorem is the following Lifting 
Lemma. It generalizes the Lifting Lemma which is used in establishing the com­
pleteness of SLD-resolution (see [37]). 
Lemma 6.21 (Lifting Lemma) Let P be a normalized program. G a normalized 
goal, and 0 a substitution without generic constants for the variables of G. Suppose 
that GO has a proof (respectively, refutation) unth ans'^er T]. Then G has a proof 
fresvectively, rpfvAo-tioP.) with answer cr. such that GOtj — for some substitiition 
'•y ^ 
Proof: (By induction on k) 
Basis: [k = 0) 
Suppose that G6 has a proof of rank 0 with answer n. Then GO = true, and hence. 
G — true and rj = But G = true has a proof of rank 0 with answer c. Clearly. 
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9 r j  — Oe = d = eO. Now, take a — e and let ~f = 6. By a similar argument, if G6 has 
a refutation of rank 0, then G has a refutation of rank 0 v.'ith answer C7, such that 
a  — e  and - j  =  9 .  
Induction: Assume the result holds for proofs and refutations of rank k. We present 
the argument for proofs of rank Ar-fl; the argument for refutations is similar. Suppose 
that G9 has a proof of rank A; + 1 with answer 77. We have to consider the following 
cases; 
1. G is an atom A: Then P U {A9} has an SLDPF-tree with at least one success 
br<inch. PurthermorCj tlio corresponding Iccifnodc F h.s,s s, proof of rs-nk k 
with answer p, such that 77 = (o"i • • • where are the mgu's 
associated with the edges along the path in the tree from A9 to F. The result 
is proved by a secondary induction on the length n of this path similar to the 
proof of the Lifting Lemma for SLD-resolution. 
If n = 0, then the result holds vacuously, since in that case, A6 = true and it 
only has a proof of rank A: = 0. 
For the induction step, assume that n > 0. Then there exists a clause .6 Gi G 
P, such that (7i = mgu{A.9.B). We consider two cases. If vars{B) % vavs{G\). 
then it must be the case that G\ — true and thus n = 1. Now, Gi has a proof 
of rank 0 with answer and i] — ((7i).49. Since A9 and B are unifiabie via 
(Ti, by the unique renaming assumption. A and B are unifiabie via Scti. Let 
r = mgu[A.,B). Then dci — r-j for some substitution 7. But, Git — true 
has a proof of rank 0 with answer c. Hence, A hcis a proof of rank 1 with 
answer a. where a is the restriction of r to 'JczrsfA). Furthermore, we have 
A0„ — AA^. — A-~. — 
/ . 
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On the other hand, if vars{ B )  C vars{Gi), then n must be greater than 1. In 
this case. ai = mgu{A6, B) and Gicfi has an SLDPF-tree with a success branch 
of length n whose associated mgu's are C72, • • •, <7„+i, and whose leafnode F has a 
proof of rank k with answer /?. Moreover, TJ = {ai • • • AN+I3)A$, and GiCi has a 
proof of rank fc+1 with answer p = ((72 • • • (Tn+ii^)Giai • Now, since AB and B are 
unifiable via (j\. by the unique renaming assumption, A and B are unifiable via 
9ai. Let r = mgu[A.B) and let 6 be a substitution such that Bai = T8. Using 
the unique renaming assumption again, we have Gicri = Gidai — GIT6. Thus, 
GITS has a proof of rank fc + l with answer p. Now, recall that the SLDPF-tree 
with the root node Gi'S — G\cri has a success branch of length n, as described 
above. Hence, by the secondary inductive hypothesis, GIT has a proof of rank 
it + 1 with answer a, such that GivSp = Gira-f for some substitution 7. 
Now, let a = (qi • • • anO)cir, where the a^s are the mgu's on the success branch 
of the SLDPF-tree of GIT whose leafnode has a proof of rank k with answer o. 
Then, by the definitions of SLDPF-tree and proof, A has a proof of rank A: -r 1 
with answer a = {roi • • • a„©).4. Furthermore, we have: 
Aa — AtQi • • • QriO 
= Brai • • • cxjiO 
= Briai-• • Cind)BT 
= BT[CX.I • • • anO)ciT [smcQ vars{B) C vars[Gi)) 
- -  B r a  
— A^TOi. 
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Hence, a = (•ra).4. Now, 
A6T] = AOai • • • (7n+i3 
— A.T6<72 ' ' ' (Tn+lS 
= BTS{cr2 - • • 0'r.+l3)BrS 
= BT6{(J2-• • <YN+LI3)GIT5 
= BT6{cT2---(Jn+l^)G^Ci 
— BrSp 
= BT{OP)BT 
= BT{dp)c,r 
= BT{a'f)a,r 
=: BT{cc'i)Br 
= BTQ^I 
— Araf 
— /ic'v. 
Thus, we have shown that A has a proof of rank k  - r l  with answer c  such that 
Adr} = Acr-j. 
2. G is -^G': Then G '9 has a refutation of rank k with answer t/. By the inductive 
hypothesis, G' has a refutation of rank k with answer cr, such that G'OTJ — G 'a-y, 
for some substitution 7. Kence. G — -G' has a proof of rank a-f-1 with answer 
17 and G9v, = Gc-. 
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•3. G is Gi © G2 : Then GiO has a proof of rank with answer rji and G26 has a 
proof of rank .^2 "'ith ansv/er 7/2, k = max[ki,k2), and v = G rQae, "where 
T]'- is a variant of t?; w.r.t. 0:9 {i — 1,2). Now, by the inductive hypothesis, 
for i = 1,2, Gi has a proof of rank ki with answer C7,-, such that GiOr]-: --
Giai'fi, for some substitution 7,-. Let a'; be variants of the answers ai w.r.t. 
Gi, i = 1,2, such that vars{Giai) is disjoint from vars{G) and from dom[dr][), 
and so that dom{a[) C vars{Gi). So vrange{a^) is also disjoint from vars{G) 
and from dom[9r]'-). Thus all the conditions of Lermna 5.20 are satisfied. It 
follows that cr{ 0 CTj exists and, furthermore, there is a substitution 7 such that 
^(^71 G ^2) — (^1 G •^2)7- Let <7 = (c7^ O (72)g- Then G has a proof of rank k + 1 
with answer a such that G9T] — Gcrf. 
i. G is Gi A G2 : This case is similar to the case for Gi 0 G2 . 
5. G is Gi V G2 : Then G9 — Gi9 V G29 has a proof of rank A: + 1 with answer 
Tj and hence, Gi9 or G29 (say Gi9) has proof of rank k with answer TJ. By 
the liiuUCtiVt: liv uuLuesiS. has a nrooT of ranV k wit n n- th?.t 
GI9T] = Giaa, for some substitution a. By the unique renaming assumption, 
a and q can be chosen to satisfy the condition that vrangeia) d y = 0 and 
dom{a) N Y = 0, where Y — vars{G2) — vars{Gi). By Lemma 5.21, there is a 
substitution 7 such that = Giaf, for i = 1,2. Thus, by the definition of 
proci, X13.S cL prooi oi rs-HK. /c -p i Vv'itii ansvv'cr cr. 5 
Theorem 6.22 (Completeness) Let P he a normalized program and G a normal­
ized goal. Suppose 6 is a subsiiiution for the variables of G that has no generic 
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constants. Then, 
1. If {^p T u;) {G9) > true, then G has a proof with answer a, such that 06 = 
Gcx'f. for some substitution 7; 
2. // ($p f u^) {G6) ^ false, then G has a refutation with answer a, such that 
GO — Gcr~f, for some substitution 7. 
Proof: We prove that the conclusions of both parts of the theorem hold by induction 
on n < u.', where ($p f n){G9) ^ true or (4>p f n){G9) h false. 
Basis: (n = 0) 
Suppose that (<^p f 0)(G^) = Io{G9) ^ true. We prove the result by a secondary 
induction on the structure of G: 
1. G is an atom: Then for any ground substitution 6, Io{G96) = true, and hence. 
G96 = G = true. So G has a proof of rank 0 with answer a = e. Clearly, 
9 = ee. 
2. G is -'G': Then Io{G'9) X false, and so by the secondary inductive hypothesis 
G' has a refutation with answer a. such thai Go — Ga~f, for some substitution 
7. Hence, G — -^G' has a proof with answer a. 
3. G is Gi ® G2 : Since Io{Gi © G2 )0 h true, we have Io{Gi0S 0 G20<5) ^ true 
f/^T- ^, k ^  ; JT C T 1 O 1 T N C \  
xvi. v_i.ij.v_i o u, tiv-'ti -L iVi C YV C lidVC 2 Q'y ;'«/C J ^ 
true for every ground S, and hence Io{Gt&) ^ true for i — 1.2. Then, by the 
secondary induction hypothesis, for z = 1,2, G;- has a proof with answer cr-: such 
mat Gi9 — GiC,"/;, lor some su&stitution 7:- I-et (7; be a variant of c.' w.r.t. Gi, 
such that, for z = 1,2, vars{Gi(T-) and hence also vrange[cr\) are disjoint from 
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vars{G) and from d o m { 9 ) .  and d o m { a i )  C  vars{Gi). Hence, by Lemma 5.20, 
- ^2 there is a substitution 7 such that 9 = {cr[ S ^2)7- ^^t 
a = (Ui Gfojc- It follows that G has a proof with answer a such that GO = Go-^;. 
4. G is GI V G2 •' Since /O(G'i V GI )9 ^ true, we have 1Q{GI96 V G295) ^ true 
for every ground substitution 5. Therefore, for each ground S, IO{GI9S) ^ true 
for at least one i = 1.2. Now, let (5 be a gc-substitution for GO. Assume, 
without loss of generality, that IO(GI9S) ^ true. Then IQ{GI9) ^ true by 
Lemma 6.9. Hence, by the secondary induction hypothesis, Gi has a proof 
with answer a such that G16 — Gicra for some substitution a. By the unique 
renaming assumption, a and a can be chosen to satisfy vrange{a) fl K = 0 and 
dom{a) n Y = 0, where Y' — vars{G2) — vars{GI). By Lemma 5.21, there is a 
substitution 7 such that GO = GA^ and, by the definition of proof, <7 is a proof 
of G. 
5. G  i s  G i  A G 2  ' •  This case is similar to the case for G  =  G i ®  G 2  •  
The case where IQ{CG) ^ false is proved in a similar manner. 
Induction; Assume the result holds for the nth iteration of and that (^p T n + I) 
[GO) ^ true. The result is, again, proved by a secondary induction on the structure 
of G. 
1. G is an atom A: By assumption we have 
($P T n + 1) (.40) = t n) ] {A.0) ^ true. 
1 
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Hence, for every ground substitution 6, f n) ] (AOS) ^ true, which 
implies; 
2Z{(®P T ") {FTJ)  \ AJ ^ F <E P and TJ -  TNGU{A^06, A/)} ^ true. 
Let ^ be a gc-substitution for A9. It follows that P must contain a clause 
A '  F  s u c h  t h a t  r j  =  m g u (  A 9 6 ,  A ' )  a n d  ( $ p  f  n )  [ F t ] )  ^  t r u e .  N e i t h e r  A 9  
nor A' contains a generic constant, and, by the unique renaming a^sumptiou. 
vars{A9) H {var${A') U vars{F)) = 0. Thus, by Lemma 6.3, A9 and A' are 
unifiable and, if /j. — Tngu{A9, A'), then fXAe is injective and variable-pure, and 
6t] = fiT. where r is a gc-substitution for A'fx. Thus, since doTn{6)r\ vars{F) = 0 
(because dom{6) = vars{G)), we get FFIR = FST]  = FTJ. So ($p ] n){Ffir) ^ 
true, and hence ($p f n){Ffi) ^ true by Lemma 6.9. By the induction 
hypothesis, Fhas a proof with answer c', where c' is injective and variable-
pure. Hence A9 has a proof with answer note that is injective 
and variable-pure since fiAe and e' both are. By the Lifting Lemma we conclude 
th?t /\ nas 3. oroof ?.ii5wpr (T si^ch. th.st .A.0~ for seme substitution 
p. Since {fj.e')Ae is injective and variable-pure, there is a fi' such that AOfie'iJ.' = 
h /i t i. f 4 /I < • ^ 
.1(7. i^eL ~ f  —  p f i  .  men .ic; = .1(77 as requirea. 
G is -^G': Then ($p T n -h 1) [-^G'9) — -i(^p F ^ true. So. we 
have (<^p T 72 + 1) {G'6) b false. Now, by the secondary inductive hypothesis. 
G' has a refutation with answer a such that G9 = Gcr^. for some substitution 
7- Hence, G — ~G' has a proof with answer <7. 
G is Gi 0 G2 or Gi A G2 or Gi V G2 Each of t '^3,'^cs s.ro proved in 
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The result for the case where (^p f n + 1) {G9) ^ false is proved in a similar 
manner. Finally, we observe that, since the induction establishes the result for all 
n < it also holds for w. H 
6.5 Incorporating Closed World Assumption 
In this section we will present a modified version of Negation cis Partial Fail­
ure which incorporates a version of the Closed World (CW) Assumption. The CW 
Assumption is essentially an inference rule stating that if a ground atom A is not a 
logical consequence of a program, then infer -'A. Thus, the CW Assumption provides 
a mechanism for deducing negative information. This inference rule, introduced by 
Reiter [43], is often a natural rule in the context of database applications. 
We incorporate the CW Assumption into our logic by modifying the fixpoint se­
mantics of Section 6. Atoms which do not unify with the head of any clause will now 
be interpreted as false rather than _L. The closed world procedural semantics is the 
ouLdiucu by iiiDuiryuig iiie procedural semantics of Section 6 to compensate for tne 
CW Assumption in the new fixpoint sem^a-ntics. This is accomplished by implicitly 
adding to the program a clause of the form A <— false for each atom .4 which does 
not unify with the head of any clause in the original program. In this way, a subgoal 
which does not unify with the head of any clause in the original program will have 
a refutation with respect to the extended program. We will establish soundness and 
completeness results for the new notions of cw-proof and cw-refutation that match 
almost exactly the corresponding results of Section 6. This method of modeling the 
cw-fixpoint sem.antics procedurally is however not entirely satisfactory since, as we 
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shall see, it effectively involves computation over an infinite program. It is an interest­
ing open problem whether or not there exists another cw-procedural semantics that 
has both the desirable computational and completeness properties of the procedural 
semantics of Section 6. 
We begin by describing in detail the changes that are needed in our fixpoint 
semantics to incorporate the CW Assumption. The primary difference with our 
original fixpoint semantics is in the definition of the initial interpretation. 
Definition 6.23 The initial interpretation of a program P is defined as follows. 
- i A  ^ 7D . X any aiKjiii n ^ up. 
Now, with each program P, we associate a new semantic operator denoted by 
which is defined as follows. 
Definition 6.24 Let P be a program and let .4 6 Bp. The closed irorld .semantic 
operator is a function mapping interpretations to interpretations, defined 
follows: 
true if A = true: 
otherwise. 
( 
j true 
j false if A ^ true and A does 
not unify with the «?'(/) (.4) = { 
head of any clause in P: 
<±>p" T Q = < 
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Definition 6.25 The upward iteration of is defined as follows: 
( 
IQ '^' if a = 0; 
]" (a — 1)) if a is a successor ordinal; 
] i3 \ i3 < ex.] if a is a limit ordinal. 
We shall see below that cw-fixpoint semantics can be reduced to the fixpoint 
semantics of Section 6. For this purpose we extend the notions of semantic operator 
and upward iteration (as defined originally for normalized programs) to apply to 
infinite normalized programs. It is easy to verify that such an extension causes no 
semantic difficulty. 
We now define a special CICLSS of programs which provide the technical tool for 
specifying the relationship between our original semantics and the closed world se­
mantics of normalized programs. 
Definition 6.26 Let P be a normalized program. Then the normalized extension of 
P. denoted P'^. is a possibly infinite program defined as follows. 
1 7 ^ ^ r-«_L X. 1 ui cVci'v Cidu5C u C -T , Kz I' ' . 
2. For every atom .4 ^ {true,false} which does not unify with the head of any 
clause in P. the clause A false £ P"*". 
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of the definitions. 
Lemma 6.27 Let P be a (normalized) program and let P^ be its normalized exten­
sion. Then for every interpretation I and for every A € Bp such that A unifies with 
the head of some clause in P. 
^ p { ^ ] \ A )  -  ^p + { r ) { A )  -
The next lemma establishes the relationship between the fixpoint semantics for 
extended normalized program.s and the cw-fixpoint semantics for normalized pro­
grams. 
Lemma 6.28 Let P be a normalized program and G a normalized goal. Then: 
T ^^)[G) = ($p+ T ^){G). 
Proof: We will use induction to show that for every n < u and every formula G, 
T ")(G) = T n')(G), 
where n '  6 { n ,  n + 1}. By Lemma 6.5, it suffices to show this equality holds for every 
.4 G Bp. Let n = 0. If .4 € {true,false}, then the equality follows immediately 
with n' — 0. If A 0 {true, false} and A does not unify with the head of any 
clause in P. then on the one hand t 0)(^) = false, and on the other hand 
.4 ^ false e P^ and so 
(4*0+ T T 0)( .A) 
=  Z U o i G ' f )  \ A '  ^ G e  P + , A  =  A ' 7 }  
= ^{false} (since G = false) 
— false. 
If A unifies with the head of some clause in P, then, by the definition of ^'p' and 
($^TO)(A) = ± = ($p., TO)(A). 
Now suppose that the result holds for all integers smaller than n and for all 
formulas G. To show ihat ihe resuii holds for n, by Lemma 6.5. it suffices to argue 
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that it holds for all A 6 Bp. The cases when A G {true,false} follow immediately 
from the definitions. If A ^ {true, false} and A does not unify with the head of 
any clause in P. then we have t = false. On the other hand, 
($P+ t n + 1)(.4) = t n ) { A )  
=  ( n " G { n , n - l } )  
= E{(^P' T ri"){G<7) \ A' ^Ge A = A'a] 
- X^{false} 
= false. 
Finally, suppose that .4 unifies with the head of some clause in P. Then 
(^p:"Tn)(4) = T n - 1)(A) 
= T ri"){A) {n" e{n,n- 1}) 
= $p+(^>p+ I 7i")(A) (by Lemma 6.27) 
= (^>P+ T (rz'G {u,n 4-1}). H 
Definition 6.29 Let P be a normalized program and G a normalized goal. 
1. G has a closed world •proof (cw-proof) of rank 0 with answer 6 with respect 
to P if G = true and 6 is the identity substitution £. G has a closed world 
refutation (cw-refutation) of rank 0 with answer 9 with respect to P if 
(a) G = false and 9 = s. oi 
(b) G9 is an atom which does not unify with the head of any clause in P. 
2. The definitions of cw-proofs and cw-refuiations of rank A: + i are identical to 
those in parts 2 and 3 of Definition 6.18. 
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The most significant departure from the earlier notions of proof and refutation 
is in the way that a cw-refutation of rank 0 is defined. We now have a refutation, 
not only when a subgoal false is reached, but also when we reach a subgoal which 
has substitution instance which does not unify with the head of any clause in the 
program; the answers in this case are all substitutions, possibly infinitely many, that 
result in nonunification. Here the resemblance to the traditional notion of Negation 
as Failure should be clear. 
The following lemma specifies the relationship between the procedural semantics 
for extended normalized programs and the closed world procedural semantics for 
normalized programs. The proof is by straightforward induction and we omit it here. 
Lemma 6.30 Let P he a normalized program and G a normalized goal. Then G has 
a cw-proof (respectively, a cw-refutation) with answer a, with respect to F, if and 
only if G has a proof (respectively, a refutation) with answer cr, with respect to 
Now we have all we need in order to prove the Soundness and Completeness 
iUi Liic aa i diiiai ranuic vvitu liic vvui'iu n.bbUiiipLiuu. 
'  i '  ^ o >'v-* c ^ ^ c ^  ^  T d ^ O /» ^ ^ " C FM JL xxCv^x CxxA \/.OjL v_/A o c-ui V u.ii vtii c 5b ^  X L/C u /tC/M/tau>»ca ^ I GY I DNT, KJR a 
normalized goal, and 6 a substitution for the variables of G. 
1. If G has a cw-proof with answer d with respect to P, then f u ){G9) h 
true. 
2. If G has a cw-refutation with answer 9 with respect to P, then T u){G6) ^ 
f a l s e .  
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Proof: Suppose that G has a c\v-proof (respectively, a cw-refutation) with answer 
9 with respect to P. Then, by Lemma 6.30, G has a proof (respectively, a refuta­
tion) with answer 6. with respect to P'^. By the Soundness Theorem of Section 6 
(now applied to possibly infinite programs), we conclude that ($p+ T ''•^){Gd) h 
true (respectively, false). Hence, by Lemma 6.28, we have ($p" t '^){G6) ^ true 
(respectively, false). I 
Theorem 6.32 (Closed World Completeness) Let P be a normalized program, 
G a normalized goal, and 6 a substitution for the variables of G. 
1. If t LL;){G9) ^ true, then G has a cw-proof with answer a with respect to 
P such that G6 — GA'F, for some substitution 7. 
2. If ($^' T ^'){G9) ^ false, then G has a cw-refutation with answer a with 
rF.'^TlPrf. in p fhnf Clfl = fnr* Qnrr)f> 'v 
•I '* - ---- - .  .... I 7 J " • " /. 
Proof: Suppose that ('^S'' T '^)[G9) ^ true (respectively, false). Then, by Lemma 6.28. 
we have (^ipt T '^')[G9) ^ true (respectively, false). Hence, by the Completeness 
Theorem of Section 6 (now applied to possibly infinite normalized programs) G has 
a proof (respectively, a refutation) with answer <7 with respect to such that 
G9 = for some substitiition 7. Now, by Lemma 6.30, v/e conclude that G has 
a cw-proof (respective!}-, a cw-refutation) of rank k with answer c with respect to P, 
such that G9 = GC^. for some substitution 7. 3 
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CHAPTER 7. GENERALIZED SEMANTICS FOR 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED PROGRAMS 
7.1 Logic Programming Semantics and Distributive Bilattices 
We "vvill now extend the logic programming semantics presenied in the previous 
sections for the bilattice TOUIZ to arbitrary bilattices. We first present a generalized 
version of the fixpoint semantics presented earlier for knowledge-based multi-valued 
logics based on bilattices, and then we give the corresponding generalized procedural 
semantics for logic programs followed by the soundness and completeness results 
showing the correspondence between the fi.xpoint and the procedural semantics. 
Finally, we present an alternate procedural semantics based on the join irre­
ducible elements of a large class of bilattices which satisfy certain finiteness conditions 
(specihcaily, those that have the descending chain property in the knowledge order­
ing). This allows us to restrict our attention lo a relatively small subset of special 
truth values. The revised procedural sem-antics will eliminate the need for extraneous 
searches during the query evaluation process, which as we shall explain below, is a 
problem of the original generalized semantics. As it turns out, the SLDPF-resolution 
which provided the operational semantics for logic programs based on J-OWR.. is a 
special case of the generalized join-irreducible procedural semantics. The main results 
of this chapter will establish the connection between the two procedural semantics. 
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The syntax of programs is essentially identical to that presented in the previous 
chapter except now vre extend the notion of an atom to include any element of the 
underlying biiattice except ± and T, 
7.1.1 Fixpoint Semantics 
The generalized fixpoint semantics for logic programs over arbitrary bilattices 
are defined in a similar manner as in the special case of the biiattice TOWK. For 
completeness, we repeat some of the definitions given previously along with the new-
generalized definitions of the semantic and fixpoint operators. 
Definition 7.1 Let 5 be a biiattice. 
1. An interpretation for a program P is a mapping I : Bp —> S. 
2. We extend the interpretation I to ground formulas as follows: 
T /• A ^ 4 \ r /' A \ ^  T / 4 \ 
r( A ^ A \ T{ A \ "7^. T( A \' 
- V—1 C/' -^^2 V-"^2y' 
r A A A \  r / 4 \ » r / 4 \  1 /\ -12 ) = I /\ i [•^2)] 
I{Ai V A2 )  =  / (Ai)  V / (A2).  
3. We further extend the interpretation I to non-ground formulas. For a non-
ground formula G: 
1{G) — j o" is a ground substitution for the variables of G}. 
, , j ii -T. ^ {i-, T) 
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Definition 7.2 The initial interpretation /q of a program P is defined as follows. 
For any atom A 6 Bp: 
I i c R _ ^ X xx . j. 
1 otherwise. 
Note that for any atomic formula G and any c ^ B — {±, T}, if Io{G) >k c. then 
G = c. 
Now we can associate a semantic operator with each program. 
Definition 7.3 Let 5 be a distributive bilattice. Let P be a program and let A € Bp. 
The semantic operator is a function mapping interpretations to interpretations, 
defined as follows: 
\  A  i f A e B -  T} 
^P{I){A) = < . 
[ I^{/(G(7) I A' •(— G € P and A = A'cr} otherwise. 
Pointwise partial orderings are also defined on interpretations in the following 
manner; 
1 R ^ R ' C R / A \ ^ T / 4 \ R  ^  X. -ti x2 ^i^uuu aiuiii -n. c 
-• h  S t  h  if ^ i [ A )  < t  h i A ) :  for every ground atom A G Bp. 
Using this pointwise ordering, the space of interpretations itself becomes a dis­
tributive bilattice. Furthermore, the operator is monotonic with respect to the 
1 rioi. 
iiixv/*» v^x vav^x iix_^ 
h <k h ^p[.h) <k ^pyh)-: 
and hence, by the Knaster-Tarski theorem [53], has a least fixpoint. It is this 
Rxooi^t wlii^h. T)^o^*'ci^s tb.c t!b.s ^ In ord,cr 
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to approximate the least fixpoint of the operator we use the following notion of 
upward iteration. 
Definition 7.4 The upward iteration of is defined as follows: 
/o if a = 0 
T a = < 1 (a — 1)) if a is a successor ordinal 
t /5 j /? < a} if a is a limit ordinal 
The smallest ordinal at which this sequence gives the least fixpoint of $p is 
called the closure ordinal. In TOWR. and in fact in any bilattice which satisfies the 
infinitarv distributivitv conditions, is continuous and its closure ordinal is at most 
[18]. 
It can be easily verified that the results proved for the fixpoint semantics based 
on TOWR. in Chapter 6, also hold for the generalized case. We shall use these results 
in the sequel. 
7.1.2 Generalized Procedural Semantics 
In this section we present a generalized procedural semantics for logic programs 
based on arbitrary bilattices. As in the case of J-OUIZ, we use a resolution-based 
procedural semantics which will allow us to start with any formula as a goal and 
within a uniform framework derive both negative and positive information about 
that goal representing evidence for or against its truth. In the context of the bilattice 
J^OUTZ this means that if the derivation from a goal G leads to success, then G is 
at least true, and if it leads to failure, then G is at least false. More generally, if 
a derivation from. G leads to a constant b where 6 is a truth value in the underlvins: 
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This generalized procedural model is an extension of the well-known operational 
semantics in SLDNF-resolution. We call our generalized procedural semantics SLDK-
resolutiGn (K stands for Knowledge-based). In our derivation trees, each branch of 
a subtree with the root node .4, where A is an atom, corresponds to a clause whose 
head unifies with A. Each such clause is seen contributing to the information 
the system contains about the truth or falsity of A. SLDK-resolution extends the 
treatment of (under SLDNF-resolution) to the operators A, V, ©, and ®. More 
precisely, if during the derivation a subgoal is reached which is a formula containing 
one of these operators, then an attempt is made to establish appropriate derivations 
for the two operands based on the way they act on the elements of the bilattice. 
S-unifiers ensure that the answers obtained from the derivation trees of each operand 
will not contradict each other once they are finally applied to the formula itself. 
Furthermore, as in the case of the case of SLDPF-resolution which was based on 
fOUTZ, we interpret free variables in the body of a clause as being quantified by J2-
which is its own dual under negation. Thus our procedural semantics remains sound 
even in ihe presence of nonground negative subgoais. We now present tiie details 
formallv in the following definitions. 
Definition 7.5 An SLDK-tree for P U {A}, where P is a normalized program and 
A is an atom, is a (possibly infinite) tree satisfying the following conditions; 
1. The root of the tree is A. 
2. Let G be a nonleaf node. Then G is an atom and for each clause G' <— G" € P. 
if G and G' are unifiable. then the node has a child G"7, v/here 7 — mg-JyG. G'). 
Vve say ihat 7 is the subscituiion associated with the edge between G and G'S. 
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3. Let G be a leaf node. Then either G is an atom which does not unify with the 
head of any clause in P (in particular, G may be any b E S — {_L, T}), or G is 
a complex formula. 
Definition 7.6 Let 5 be a distributive bilattice and b ^ B. Let P be a normalized 
program and G a normalized goal. Then 
1. G has a b-derivation of rank 0 with answer 9 il G = c. where c E B — {±. T} ,  
b :< c. and 6 is the identity substitution t. 
2. G has a b-derivation of rank /: + 1 with answer $, if: 
(a) G is an atom .4, and P U {A} has an SLDK-tree with at least one leaf 
node G' which has a 6-derivation of rank k with answer 9' such that 9 = 
(ai • • • where ai, • • •, an are the substitutions associated with edges 
along the path from G to G'. 
(b) G is -"G', and G' has a -i6-derivation of rank k, with answer 9. 
(c) G is Gi • G2, where • G {0, V, A}, and Gi has a c-derivation of rank ki 
and G2 has a (f-derivation of rank k2 with answers 9i and 02: respectively. 
k = max[ki.k2), 9 = {9[ Q ^2)^: where 9'- is a variant of 9i w.r.t. G; 
(z = 1-2), and b = cU d. 
Definition 7.T Lei S be a distributive bilattice and b ^ B. Let P be a normalized 
program and G a normalized goal. Then G has a b-proofwith answer 9, if there exists 
an n > 1 and 61, • • •, 6^. G B. such that 
1. G" ticis 3. 6--d.^rivs.t!on. of i~: \vth. 2.iisv.'c — 1,2. • * * 7^)-
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2. 6 = 6i 0 62 3 • • • 8 6n, and 
3. e = {3{e, 1 1 < J < n})G. 
Note that, in the above definition, we distiguish between the notions of a 6-
derivation and 6-proof. This is done in order to emphasize the fact that for a given 
goal there may be many independent c-derivations (for any c E B), and all of these 
c-derivations contribute to the knowledge the system has about the goal. Thus, the 
information provided by various c-derivations is collected by taking the knowledge 
join of the c's. 
7.2 Generalized Soundness and Completeness Results 
We will now show that the generahzed semantics presented in the previous sec­
tion is sound and complete. The proofs are similar to those for the four-valued 
semantics of Chapter 6. 
Lemma 7.8 Let B be n dLstrrhntiv.p hiloJiic^ dv.d b E B. Ltt P be c, novmcLlizsd 
program, G a normalized goal, and 9 a substitution for the variables of G. If G has 
a b-derivation of rank k with answer 0, for some k > 0,, then ($p t i^){G9) ^ 6. 
Proof: (By induction on k) 
Basis: {k — 0) Suppose G has a 6-derivation of rank 0 v/ith answer 6. Then 
G = c. where b :< c E B, and 6 = s. Now, Io{G9) = /o(c) = c ^ b. Since is 
m o n o t o n i c ,  ( ^ P  T  i j ] { G 9 )  —  ( $ d  T  i o ) { c )  ^  b .  
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Induction: Assume the result holds for 6-derivations of rank k, and suppose first 
that G has a u-derivation of rank k \ with answer S. Vve have tne loiiowing cases 
to consider: 
1. G is an atom: Then P U {G} has an SLDK-tree with at least one leafnode F 
which has a 6-derivation of rank k with answer such that 9 = (cji • • • 
where cji, • • •. are the mgu's associated with the edges along the path from G 
to F in the tree. Now, the result is proved by performing a secondary induction 
on the length n of this path. 
The result is vacuously true if n = 0, since in this case atoms with SLDK-trees 
do not have 6-derivations of positive rank (the SLDK-tree of an atom G is of 
height 0 whenever G ^ B or if it does not unify with the head of any clause in 
the program, and in either case, any 6-derivation of G is of rank 0). 
Now, suppose the result holds for SLDK-trees with 6-derivation branches of 
depth n > 0, and consider one of depth n -h 1. In this case, P must have a 
r ' l  .  ^  I r ^ t \  _  1  -  _  o t  - , 1  
ovA^-'J_L vj-LCfco j CXiiU. lia.3 Clii O JLi-L/XV li CC Wllil 
a 6-derivation branch of depth n. Then, it is easy to see that G\<J\ has a b-
derivation of rank fc-1-1 with answer 6i such that 9 = By the secondary 
induction hypothesis, ($p T i^'){Gicri$i) ^ b. Then. 
i ^ P  I u j ) { G & )  = ($p T since G9 — G<7i&\ 
— ($p T u.')(GVi^i) since = mgu{G, G') 
h {^p T ^'){Gicri9i) by Lemma 6.16 
^ b bv the secondarv ind. hvp. 
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2. G is -^G': Then G' must, have a -ifc-proof of rank k with answer 9. By the 
inductive hypothesis. f u.') {G'O^ ^ ~'o. rience, 
{ ^ P ^ u ; ) { G e )  =  ( $ p T W ) ( - G ' ^ )  
= T ^') {G'e)  
h b. 
3. G is Gi • G2, where • G {0,V,A} ; G\ has a c-derivation of rank ki and G2 
has a (i-derivation of rank k2 with answers 9\ and 02, respectively, such that 
V — 3^2)^'' ^ " Tnaxyhij ^ 2); and 6 — c u. Wiiere Cj are variants 01 C; w.r.t. 
G (i = 1,2). Now 
(^P T ([Gi • G2]e) = (^p T w) {GiO • 020) 
^ ($p I u;) {Gi9) • ($p 1 io) (^2^), by Lemma 6.12 
=  ( ^ P  T  - 0  {Gi{e[ o  6',)) •  ( ^ p  T  u - O  ( G 2 ( 0 1  O  ^ ' 2 ) )  
^ ($p T u.') {Gi9[) • ($p I u) (^2^2)^ t)y Corollary 6.14 
^ (,^P j ij) [GiOi) u [<$p T u.-; [G2(^2), by Lemma 6.11 
^ c • (i, by inductive hypothesis and properties of • 
= 6. i 
Theorem 7.9 (Soundness) Let B be a distributive bilattice and b E B. Let P be 
a normalized program, G a normalized goal, and 9 a substitution for the variables of 
G. If G has a b-proof n-ith ansv:er 9. then {^p |  jj)[G9) ^ b. 
Proof: Suppose that G has oj-derivation of rank ki with ansv/er 9i {1 < i < r^), 
such that b — bi •S • • • -a ON. and 6 — (0{^i, • • •, On])G- Then by Lemma 7.8 we have 
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($p T wt.') { G d i )  h b,. for 1 < J < n. But, for each i, 09 is a substitution instance of 
G9i and hence, by Lemrna 6.13, 1 {GO} ^ y^p T '^'}{GOi) for 1 ^ z ^ n. ihus. 
b 2($p T 
h © • • • @ &n 
= b. K 
Next we present the completeness results for the generahzed semantics. As in 
the four-valued case, we will use the following Lifting Lemma in the proof of the 
n VUiiipiClCUC5>5 XUCUiClli. 
Lemma 7.10 (Lifting Lemma) Let B be a distributive bilattice and h £ B. Sup­
pose that P is a normalized program, G a normalized goal, and 9 a substitution 
without generic constants for the variables of G. Also, suppose GO has a b-derivation 
of rank k > 0 with answer rj, with respect to a program P. Then G has a b-derivation 
of  rank k  wi th  answer a ,  such that  G6T]  — Gcrj ,  for  some subst i tut ion 7 .  
Proof: (By induction on k) 
Basis: [k — 0) Suppose that G9 has a ^-derivation of rank 0 with answer rj. Then 
G9 = c where c ^ B — {.L, T}, and b :< c. Hence, G = c and rj = e. But G = c has 
a 6-derivation of rank 0 with answer £. Clearly, O-q — 8e •= 6 — e6. Now, take — z 
and . 
Induction: Assume the result holds for 6-derivations of rank k. We w^ili prove the 
induction for 6-derivations of rank ^ + 1. Suppose that GO has a 6-derivation of rank 
k + I with answer q. We have to consider the following cases. 
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1. G is an atom A: Then P'j{A9} has an SLDK-tree with at least one leafnode F 
hich has a 6-cicri^atioii Oi. rank Ic >vith ans^^er such ^havj jy — ^0*1 * * * 
where (ji. • • •, a- are the mgu's associated with the edges along the path in the 
tree from A9 to F. The result is proved by a secondary induction on the length 
n of this path. The argument is essentially the same as that in the proof of 
Lifting Lemma in the four-valued case (see Lemma 6.21). 
2. G is ^G': Then G'O has a ^6-derivation of rank k with answer rj .  By the 
inductive hypothesis, G' has a ->6-derivation of rank k with answer a. such that 
G'drj = G'a-j. for some substitution 7. Hence, G = -^G' has a 6-derivation of 
rank k + 1 with answer a, and Gdrj — Gcr^. 
3. G is Gi • G2, Ti'here • G {®,V,A} ; Then G16 • G2O has a 6-derivation 
of rank + 1. Hence, Gid has a c-derivation of rank k^ with answer rji. and 
G29 has a d-derivation of rank k2 with answer 7/2, for some c. d ^ B. such 
that b = c D d and k = max(fci, .^2), and rj = {ri[ Q 772)09, where //• are 
variaiits //•• vv.r.l. G- (i — 1.2V nv tnp inrjnrtivp hypoth*??!?, ii's a c-
derivation of rank k^ with answer ct j, such that Gi9r]i = GiO'i7i. for some 
substitution 71, and G2 has a (f-derivation of rank k2 with answer a2- such that 
G2OT12 — ^2(7272, for some substitution 72. Let (j\ be variants of answers a; w.r.t. 
G;, I — 1,2. such that vrangc{ai) is disjoint from. vars{G) and from dom{6Tj'.), 
and dom{(7\) C vars{G-). iience, aii tiie conditions oi Lemma 5.20 are sacished. 
It follows that, (j[ 0 exists, and furthermore, there is a substitution 7 such 
that 6{ri[ 0 ^ 2) = 0^2)t- Let a = (cr, Gcro)^. Then G has a 6-derivation of 
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rank k 1 with answer a such that G9T] = GCRF • . 
Lemma 7.11 Let B be a distributive bilattice and b ^ B. Let P be a normalized 
program and G a normalized goal. Suppose 6 is a substitution for the variables of 
G without generic constants. If t '•^) {GO) X b, then, for some k >0, G has a 
b-derivat ion of  rank k  wi th  answer a ,  such that  G9 = Ga^.  for  some subst i tut ion 7 .  
Proof: We prove the result by induction on n < w, where, for 6 7^ ±, ($p f n){G9) ^ 
b. For b = ±. the result is trivial. 
Basis: (n = 0) First suppose that ($p t 0)(G^^) = h{G6) ^ b. We prove the result 
by a secondary induction on the structure of G: 
1. G is an atom: Then since Io{G6) ^ 6, for any ground substitution 6, Ic,{G66) ^ 
b. Hence, it must be the case that G96 — G = b. Then G has a 6-derivation of 
rank 0 with answer a = s. Clearly, 6 — e9. 
o ^ nn . _ 7 t r\\ ^ i c y •« • '« •• •• ^ 
w. to Kj . X lie 11 :5c^^uij.udL V iuuuciivc livpoinesis Lt ndS 
a ^6-derivation of rank k > 0. with answer < t. such that G'9 = G'LY'I, for some 
substitution 7- Hence, G = -•G' has a 6-derivation of rank fc-f-1 with answer A 
and G9 — GA^. 
3. G is Gi O, G2, where • G {®, V, A) ; Since /o(Gi • G2)0 ^ 6, for every ground 
substitution 6, we have that I(j{Gi98 • G296) ^ b. Therefore, Iq{Gi98) ^ 61. 
and laiGoOd) ^ 62, for some 61,62 € S, such, that 61 • 62 = 6. Then, by the 
secondary induction hypothesis, for z = 1,2, G-: has a 6,-derivation v.'ith answer 
rr C1irV> tVtpf ^2-^ frsy + + + ^ O*- Vo p ^.-T ^ 
^ i .. I V j ^ •j "J; K/V CV » di ICCJLA. W ; 
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w.r.t Gi {i = 1/2). such that vars{Gicr[) and hence also vrange{a[) are disjoint 
from vars{G) and from. dom{9). Hence, by Lemma 5.20, Cj 3 cr!^ exists, and 
there is a substitution 7 such that 6 = Q c72)7. Let <7 = G (Jojc- It 
follows that G has a 6-derivation with answer a such that G& = Ga-f. 
Induction: Assume that the implication holds for the nth iteration of Now, 
suppose that ($p t " + 1) {GB) ^ b. The result is proved by a secondary induction 
on the structure of G: 
1. G is an atom A: By assumption we have: 
($p I n + 1) (A^) = 1" n) ] {A6) ^ b. 
Hence, for every ground substitution 6, [#p($p  f n) ] {Ad6) ^ b. Then we 
have; 
I n) [FT]) I A' <— € P and 17 = mgu{A9S, A')} ^ h. 
Let be a gc-substitution for .40. It follows that P must contain a clause 
.4'  •(— F such that 77 = Tngu[A96, A!) and ($p T {F-q) X b.  Neither AO 
nor .4' contains a generic constant, and, by the unique renaming assumption, 
vars{Ad) fi (i'ar5(A') U vars{F)) = 0. Thus, by Lemma 6.3, A0 and A! are 
unifiable, and, \i y. = mgu{A9^ A'), then is injective and variable-pure, and 
8t} = liT, where r is a gc-substitution for A'a. Thus, sinre dom[S)(^vo.'r.?(^F) = 0 
(because dom{S) — vars{G)). we get Ffir — F6rj — Fr/. So ($p  | n){Fur) X h. 
and hence ] n){F i^)  ^ b by Lemima 6.9. By the induction hypothesis. F11 
has a 6-derivation v.'ith ansv/er s'. where e' is injective and variable-pure. Hence 
has a 6-dsrivatioii v/ith answer vvmch is injeccive anu variabie-pure 
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since and e'  both are. By the Lifting Lemma we conclude that A has a b-
derivation with answer a such that A6ue' = Acrp for some substitution p. Since 
{fie')AS is injective and variable-pure, there is a fx' such that AOfie'fi' = AO. Let 
7 = pfi'. Then AO = Aa^i as required. 
2. G is -'C: Then ($p I n + 1) {-<G'0) = -'{^p f + 1) (G'O) ^ b. So, we have 
($P T + 1) h ~'b. Now, by the secondary inductive hypothesis, G' has a 
-i6-derivation of rank k, for some ^ > 0, with answer a, such that G'O = G'a~,\ 
for some substitution 7. Hence, G = ^G' has a i>-derivation of rank k + 1 with 
ansv»cr o", and GO ~ Go' /. 
3. G is Gi • G2, where • G { 0 , A ,  V } ;  The derivation of this ceise is similar to 
that of the basis case (where n = 0). except we replace 1Q with (^'p f n + 1) . 
Finally, we observe that, since the induction establishes the result for all n < u.'. 
it also holds for u;. i 
Theorem 7.12 (Completeness) Let B be a distributive bilattice and b ^ B. Let P 
be a normalized program and G a normalized goal. Suppose 0 is a substiiution for the 
variables of G without generic constants. If {^p |  uj) {G6) ^ b, then G has a b-proof 
wi th  answer a ,  such that  GO — Ga-) ' .  for  some subst i tut ion 7 .  
Proof: The proof is immediate from Lemjna 7.11 and the definition of 6-proof. 5 
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7.3 Logic Programming with Join Irreducible Elements 
Although the definition of a 6-proof provides a sound and complete procedural 
semantics for logic programming over arbitrary distributive bilattices, it has a draw­
back. For a given truth value 6, the search for a 6-derivation of a complex goal G 
may entail searches for c-derivations of the subformulas of G for a large number of 
truth values c that are only remotely related to 6; moreover, this complexity ramifies 
as we pass down the parse tree of G. It turns out that for finite distributive bilattices 
(and, more generally, bilattices with the descending chain property), we can essen­
tially restrict our attention to 6-derivations where h ranges over the relatively small 
subset of /:-join-irreducible truth-values. Moreover, in the search for a 6-derivation 
for G, we need only look for 5-derivations of the subformulas of G. 
We now present a join-irreducible operational semantics as an alternative to 
the standard one presented above. As we are concerned with the join-irreducible 
elements only in the /c-ordering, throughout this section we will drop the subscript k 
and denote the class of these bilattice elements bv JIR( V / 
* 1^ "1 Q T of H1 qI" T". i"V.'v 1 ck f ' t ' o  ^ •-s ! t i O  i - ' L O c  C. 'v». D N—xxvx xxA<ixxZv-.%.4. U, CI 
normalized program over B. Suppose that b G JIR{S). 
1. G has a b-JIR-proof of rank 0 with answer y, if G = c, where c G B — {±, T}, 
b ^ C, 2.11 d. ? — 5. 
2. G has a b-JIR-proof of rank k -t I wirh answer 0, if 
(a) G is an atom .4, and F u {A} has an SLDK-tree v/ith at least one leafnode 
G'. such that G'' has a c>-J/it-proof of rank k with answer 6'. such that 
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0 = [cTi - • • o-n9')c: whcre are the mgu's associated with the 
edges along the path form G to C'\ or 
(b) G is —C. and G' has a ^b-JlR-VTOoi of rank k with answer 9: or 
(c) b e and 
i. G — Gi y G2 , and at least one of Gi or G2 has a 6-J/i?-proof of rank 
k with answer 9: or 
ii. G = Gi A G2 or G = Gi ® G2 , and G; has a b-JIR-prooi of rank 
ki with answer 9i (z = 1,2), such that k = max{ki,k2), and 6 = 
[9[ O ^2)g: where 9'- are variants of 9i w.r.t. Gi\ or 
(d) b e JIR-{B) and 
i. G = Gi V G2 or G = Gi 0 G2 , and Gi has a b-JIR-prooi of rank 
ki with answer 9i {i = 1,2). such ihai k = ruax[ki. k2), and 9 — 
(^1 0 ^ '2)0^ where 9[ are variants of 9i w.r.t. G,-; or 
ii. G Gi A G2 , and at lea^t one of Gi or G2 has a b-JIR-piooi of rank 
k with answer 9. 
Definition 7.14 Let 5 be a distributive bilattice with the Descending Chain Prop­
erty in the knowledge ordering [DCPk)- Let a ^ B. and suppose that a = 6i0- • -S^r., 
where 61 © • • • © is an irredundant decomposition of a as a join of join-irreducible 
eleinenis of 3 in ihe knowledge ordering. Let G be a normalized iormuia and P a 
normalized program over B. Then G has an a-.///?-proof with answer 9, if G has a 
bi-JIR-VTooi with answer i9. (1 < z < n). such that 9 = • • •, ^n})G-
In the rest of this section w-e will show that for distributive bilattices v/ith the 
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descending chain property in the knowledge-ordering, the join-irreducible semantics 
2.iid. th.6 gcncrs-lizcci scmdiitics prsscntsd. scirlisr 3.r6 c^uivs-lsnt. 
Lemma 7.15 Let B bt a distributive hilattice, P be a normalized program, and G a 
normalized goal over B. Suppose that c 6 JIR[B). If G has a c-JIR-proof of rank 
k > 0 with answer 9. then G has a b-JlR-proof with answer 6 for every h •< c, where 
be J1R{B). 
Proof: Let b be an arbitrary element of JIR{B), such that b :< c. The result is proved 
U.. 7-U f U.N-LI*-*!! Vll /V. 
Basis: {k = 0) If G has a c-JIR-piooi of rank 0 with answer 9. then G = d. 
for some d E B — {±, T}, such that c :< d, and 9 = e. Since, b :< c :< d, G has a 
b-JIR-pioof of rank 0 with answer 9 = e. 
Induction: Suppose the result holds for c-J/i?-proof of rank k and assume that 
G has a c-JIR-pvooi of rank ^ -f 1 with answer 9. We need to consider the following 
cases. 
1. G is an atom: Since G has a c-JIR-pvooi of rank 1 with answ-er 9, Pu {G} 
has an SLDK-tree with at least one leafnode G' which has a c-JIR-piooi of 
rank k with answer 6'. Moreover. 9 = {ci • • • and')G: w'here are 
the substitutions associated with the edges along the path from G to G'. By 
lliti ZliUUClIVt^ nypCmSSlS, O"' ns^s a. O- J IJX-^IOOl OI rallK /c VVitil allSVvCr f/'. ijV 
definition, G has a 6-J/i?-proof of rank k + 1 with answer 9. 
2. G is ^G': Then G' has a -ic-J/H-proof of rank k with answer 6. Note that, 
since 6 :< c. we also have ^b •< -"C. By the inductive hypothesis. G' has a 
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-•b-JIR-pvoof of rank k with answer 6. Thus, by the defimtion of JIR-proof. G 
has a 6-J/i?-proof of rank k + 1 with answer 0. 
3. G is Gi A G2 • There are two subcases. 
(a) c G JIR^{B) : Then, for i = 1.2, Gi has a c-J/i?-proof of rank A:,- with 
answer 0;, such that k = max{ki,k2) and 9 = Q 62)0, w'here $'• is a 
variant of Oi w.r.t. Gi (i - 1.2). By the inductive hypothesis, Gi hats a 
b-JlR-piooi of rank ki with answer 0,-. Now, since 6 c, c G JIR'^{B) , 
and b € J1R{B), by Lemma 4.19, we conclude that b € JIR'^{B) . Then, 
by the definition of JIR-prooi, G — Gi f\ G2 also has a b-JIR-prooi of rank 
^ + 1 with answer 6. 
(b) c G J1R~{B) : Then Gi or G2 (say Gi) has a c-JIR-pvooi of rank k with 
answer 6. Hence, by the inductive hypothesis, Gi has a b-JIR-piooi of rank 
k with answer 6. Then, by the definition of J/i?-proof, G — Gi A G2 has 
a b-JIR-proof of rank ^ + 1 with answer 0. 
4. G is Gi V G2 •' This case is dual to the case when G = Gi A G2 • 
5. G is Gi 0 Go • Then, for i = 1.2, G-; has a c-.///?-prooi of rank ki with answer 
9 i .  s u c h  t h a t  k  —  m a x { k i , k 2 )  a n d  6  =  { d [  0  ^ 2 ) ^ ;  w h e r e  9 ' ,  i s  a  v a r i a n t  o f  9 i  
w.r.t. Gi {i = 1,2). By the inductive hypothesis. G,- hcis a h-JlR-piooi of rank 
ki with answer 9i. Now, by the definition of JIR-prooi. G = Gi 0 G2 has a 
6-i//it-proof of rank i -r 1 with answer 0. S 
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Lemma 7.16 Let B be a distributive bilattice with the DCPk- Let P he a normalized 
program over B and C a normalized goal. Suppose that c ^ B. For every b 6 J1R{S). 
where b ;< c. if G has a c-JlR-proof with answer 9, then G has a b-JIR-proof with 
answer a ,  such that  G6 — Ga ' f ,  for  some subst i tut ion 7 .  
Proof: Suppose that G has a c-JlR-pxoof with answer 0. Since B satisfies the DCPk, 
we can write c = ci r- • • • © c- . such that c; 6 JIR[B ), for z = 1,2, • • •, n. Further­
more. G has a C;-J/i?-proof of rank ki with answer 9i. such that 9 — (0{^i, • • •, ^n})G-
Now. b :< c — ci Q ••• Q Cn . Hence, by Lemma 4.18, for some j (1 < j < n), 
b :< Cj. Then, by Lemma 7.15, G has a b-JIR-pvool with answer 9j. Furthermore, 
note that 0{^i- • • • , 9n} = 9ja. where a = mgsu{{9i, • • •. 0„}). 
Putting things together, we have 
GO = G{'3{9ir---0n}) 
= G9,a 
- Ga-y. 
where a = 6- and 7 = 0. 1 
Lemma 7.17 Let B be a distributive bilattice with the DCPk- Let P be a normalized 
program and G a normaiized goal over B. Suppose that c £ B. IfG has a c-derivation 
of rank k, for som.e k > 0. with answer 9. then G has a c-JIR-proof with answer 6'. 
such that  G9 = G9 ' ' j .  for  some subst i tut ion 7 .  
/X3.. u\ X liiUU^ClOii on J 
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Basis {k = 0): If G has a c-derivation of rank 0 with answer 6. then G = h. for 
some b ^ B — {J., T}, such that c :< b, and 9 = e. Since B has the DCFk. we can 
write c = ci S • • • 0 Cn . where ci © • • • © c„ is an irredundant decomposition of c as 
join of join-irreducibles. i.e., c.; € JIR{B). Then c-; :< 6 for I < i < n. Now, by the 
definition of <///?-proof. G has a c.-J"/i2-proof of rank 0 with answer 6 = 6. Hence, G 
h a s  a  c - y / i ? - p r o o f  w i t h  a n s w e r  0 '  =  0 { e ,  •  •  •  , s }  =  s .  
Induction: Assume the result holds for c-derivations of rank k and consider the case 
where G has a c-derivation of rank k + 1 with answer 0. We need to consider the 
following cases. 
1. G is an atom: Then P U {G} has an SLDK-tree with at least one leafnode 
G' which has a c-derivation of rank k with answer 6. Let be the 
substitutions associated with edges along the path from G to G'. Then 9 — 
(o"! • • • (7^,(5)g- By the inductive hypothesis, G' has a c-JlR-picoof with answer S\ 
such that G'S — G'b'r, for some substitution r. Since B has the DCPk, c has an 
irredundant decomposition © • • • © 6r. ; where b: JJRJB), Furthermore, for 
each i. G' has a 6.-//i?-proof with answer S-, such that S' = • • •, K})G'-
By the definition of //it-proof, G has a 6j-//i?-proof with answer ai (1 < z < n), 
where a.; = (ui • • Then G has a c-JIM-proof with answer 0', where 
= (G{q;i. • • •, Q:n})G-
1" iii'S.i.iV,vvc liiLibL iiiiuw ins-v — '\jrL/ ' y ,  lor some suostpiHutioii y ,  i-.ct c  — 
Ci • • • Cm (hence, a, — ((76-)g:). Note that, by the unique renaming assump­
tion. aS- and a.- are idempotent, and hence, by Lemma 5.12 ^ there exists a 
^in tiie rest of this chapter we often use generalized versions (i.e., extended to sets 
of substitutions) of the properties of 0 proved in Chapter 5. 
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substitution 3 such that 
•  •  • ,  =  G Q  { a i ,  •  •  • ,  O n )  1 3 .  
Furthermore, by Lemma 5.10, there exists a substitution p such that 
©{cr^;,  • • • ,  aS'Jp = a{Q{6[,  • • • ,  
Then we have; 
GQ'Spr — G[G{0:i ,  • •  •  ,  an}]/3/3T 
= (? G •  •  •  ,o-<5^}/9r 
= G<J O ,S'^ ]pT 
= GaS'r (since vars{G(7) C vars{G'))  
= Ga6. 
Now, let 7 = 3 r .  
' )  ^  '  .  T U  _  • ' . •  i *  ' '  •  '  
vw I / V 2 • I —  ^1 iiaS a c^-ucilVdliuil Ui I'dilK K-i Willi 3.IlSWCr 
6^, such that k — maxiki, k2). c = o, A 02- and 0 = {tji 0 ri2)a: w-here rjj are 
variants of 9j w.r.t .  G,-.  By the inductive hypothesis.  G. has a Cj-JIR-pxooi 
with answer 9'^. such that G^6. — G.9';^,. for some substitution 'y: (-i  = 1 _ 2 \  >• W ^ J J ' J • IJ \S/ ' / 
Since, B has the DCPk, we can write c = 61 © • • • @ where 6, G JIR{I3). for 
i < 2 < n. Hence, 6, :< Ci A co. Now, for each 6,- we must consider the following 
cases. 
( p \  h .  i =  T r V ) + ( K \  •  \  ^  J  V ;  V A A V  J  •  
In this case by Lerania 4.16(2), 6, :< Cj, for j — 1,2, and by Lemma 7.ID, 
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Gj has a bi-JIR'-prooi with answer 9 'y Let 9'J be an idempotent variant of 9'^  
(J = 1.2) w.r.t. Gj such that the conditions of Lemma 5.20 are satisfied. 
Hence, by the definition of JIR-piooi, G = Gi A G2 has a 6,-J//?-proof with 
answer O; = (0" 0 62)0 such that 09 = G{T)I © 772) = G{9'10 02)7' = Gon'. 
for some substitution 7'. 
(b) 6. € J1R-{B) : 
In this case by Lemma 4.16. 6.; •< Cj, for j = 1 or j = 2 (assume 6; ci), 
and by Lemma 7.16, G\ has a bi-JIR-pxooi with answer 6[. Hence, by 
the definition of JlR-mooi. G — GT f\ G'> has a h^-JIR-mooi with answ-er 
O: = B [ .  
Hence, G has a c-JIR-piooi with answer 9' = (0{OI, • • •. O„})G. NOW. by 
Lemma 5.12, there exists a substitution p such that 
Go' {61, • • •, 6n]p = G Q {6" ^2,9[,92 
and. by applications of Lemma 5.12. 
r '  }P" ^  Q" Ol Ql \  q _ a" ^  Or o It ' i  O  ^ 2 :  ' 1 '  • ' ^ 2 J  r *  -  -  O '  ^ 2 ) ^  
for some substitution 3. Hence, 
G9 = G{R)I Q 7/2) 
= 
= G9'p0-t'. 
Now let 7 — p3'j'. 
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3. G is Gi S G2 : Then, for j = 1.2, Gj has a CJ-derivation of rank kj with answer 
such that aJ — TTcCixyhi-. ^2^? ^ ^ ^2: and 0 — O' '?2)g? wnerG Tjj is a 
variant of w.r.t. G-. Since, B has the DCPk-, we can write c = 6i 3 • • • 0 , 
where 6,- G JIR{B), for 1 < i < n. Hence, Ci S co. Also, by the inductive 
hypothesis, Gj has a Cj-JIR-piooi with answer 6'j. such that G^9j — GjO'pj. 
for some substitution ~ij (j — 1,2). Now, by Lemma 4.16, for each 6.-, we have 
6j Cj, for j = 1,2, and by Lemma 7.16, Gj has a 6,--J/i?-proof with answer 
Let 6'- be a variant of 9j w.r.t. Gj, such that vrange{6'-) is disjoint from vars{G) 
and from domirjj). Hence, by Lemma5.20, 0'/G^2 exists and furthermore, there 
is a substitution 7' such that © ^2 = (^1 G ^2)7'- Let 0' = {9" G ^2)0- Then 
G has a 6,-///?-proof with answer 9' such that G6 = G6'^'. Hence, by an 
argument similar to the previous case, G has a c-J/i?-proof with answer 9' such 
that G9 = G9''-j. for some substitution 7. 
4. G is Gi V G2 ". This case is the dual of the case for G = Gi A G2 . ® 
Lemma 7.18 LttB be a distributive bilattice with the DCPk- Let P be a normalized 
program over B and G a normalized goal. Suppose that c € JIR{B). If G has a 
c-JlR-proof with answer 9, then G has a c-derivation with answer 9. 
' I ' VI O •> O •• T-»/-I 1»-V /—•»> 4.1^^ ^ TTJD —^ 
— -Ik vfcA V A>./ k-'x v/ » J- «Ji vxi 1. dlO-JX r\, c' 1 J i^-/i V_/ . 
Basis: [k = 0) Suppose that G has a c-//i?-proof of rank 0 with answer 9. Then 
G — b, for some b ^ B — {±, T}, such that c :<b. and 0 = c. Now, the result follows 
immediatelv from the definition of c-derivation. 
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Induction: Assume the result holds for c-J/i?-proof of rank k and consider the 
case when G has a c-JIR-piooi of rank k + I with answer 6. We must consider the 
following cases. 
1. G is an atom: Since G has a c-J/i?-proof of rank k + I with answer 0, P U {G} 
has an SLDK-tree with at least one leafnode G' which has a c-//i?-proof of 
rank fc with answer 0'. Moreover, 0 = (ai • • • (7„0')g, where ai. - .cr^ are the 
substitutions associated with the edges along the path from G to G'. By the 
inductive hypothesis, G' has a c-derivation with answer 9'. Clearly, by the 
definition of c-derivaiion, G has a c-derivation with answer 6. 
2. G is -'G': Then G' has a b-JIR-pioof of rank k with answer 9. for some b B , 
such that -'b = c. By the inductive hypothesis, G' has a 6-derivation with 
answer 9. Clearly, by the definition. G has a c-derivation with answer 9. 
3. G is Gi A G2 : There are two subcases. 
(a) c G JlR'^iB) : Then, for i = 1,2, Gi has a c-//i?-proof of rank k, with 
answer 9i, such that k = max{ki,k2). and 9 = {9\ © 92)g-, where 9': is a 
variant of 9i w.r.t. G,-. By the inductive hypothesis, G.- has a c-derivation 
with answer 9i. Since c = c f\ c. G = Gi f\ G2 has a c-derivation with 
answer G ^2)0 = 
answer d. Hence, by ihe inductive hypothesis, Gi has a c-derivation with 
answer 9. On the other hand, G2 has a ^-derivation with answer e. Now, 
since c G JIR~{B) . c = c A J.. Kence, G = Gi A G2 has a c-derivation 
wiih answer 6. 
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4. G is Gi V G2 : This case is the dual of the case when G = Gi f\ G2 • 
5. G is G\ ® G2 : The proof of this case is similar to part 3(a). I 
We are now in a position to state our main result in this section, showing the 
correspondence between the two bilattice-based procedural semantics. 
Theorem 7.19 Let B be a distributive bilattice which has the DCPk- Let P be a 
normalized program over B and G a normalized goal. Suppose that c ^ B . 
1. If G has a c-proof with answer 9, then G has a c-JIR-proof with answer 9'. such 
. that Gd = G9'^, for some substitution 7; and 
2. If G has a c-JIR-proof with answer 6', then G has a c-proof with answer 9'. 
Proof: 
1. Suppose that G has a c-proof with answer 9. Then G has a c,-derivation of 
rank k- vvilh answer f}.-. for 1 ^ 7?, "'here c — 0 • • • 0 , and 0 = 
(0{0i, • • •, 9n})G- Then, by Lemma 7.17, for each i. G has a Ci-JIR-proof with 
answer cr,- ,  such that  G9i = G^iji ,  for some substi tution 7 ; .  
By the deiinition of .//i?-proof, for each i and for every j (1 < j < mj-), G has a 
c^-proof with answer crL such that c, = c.- © c? © - • • © 0^', where d G JIR{B ). 
and a, — (0{cr- j 1 < j < m,})G- Clearly, 
r — .C:. . . . ;:Z;  ^ /J '^n 0 w w ^ W w C-ri • 
Now, in order to obtain an irredundant representation of c we may need to 
throw out some of the c-. Hov,'ever, it can be easily verified that for any set 
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5 of unifiable idempotent substitutions and any S' C 5. OS' < QS. Hence, 
by Lemma 5.12 and by the denniiion of JIR-piooi. G has a c-JIR-piooi with 
ansv/er 6' such that, for some substitution 
Now, to complete the proof, we must show that for some substitution 7. G9 = 
oe'-r. 
First we observe that by selecting the answers <7; to be appropriate variants 
"vV.r.t. G;, we can guarantee that urungtyOi) is disjoint from varsyGi'j and from 
dom{di). Hence, by Lemma 5.20, 
• • • : ^ n} = (0{<Ti, • • • , crn])i, 
for some substitution 7'. Since by the unique renaming assumption we can 
guarantee that (j.- (z = 1, • • •, n) are idempotent, by Lemma 5.17 (associativity 
of 0), for some substitution p, 
Q{<Ti, • • •, = 0{<7i\ • • •. . (7^, • • •, 
TT 
GQ = Go {01,•••,9:.} 
= Ct(G\<7I, • • • ,  (Jn);7' 
_1 —"In 1 ' 
— o \C-1,-• • • • • ;<7i ,  • • • ,cr„,-• • ,cr„ ;p7 
= u-c? p/?7 . 
Now iei 7 = ,j/37'. 
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2. Suppose that G has a c-JIR-pxooi with answer 6'. Then G has a c,-J/i2-proof 
with answer Pj-, such that a' = • ^n})c^ and c = Ci © • • • © c„ , where 
C; £ JIR{S). Now. ky Lemma 7.18, G has a c.:-derivation of rank k, with answer 
9.. By the definition of c-proof. G has a c-proof with answer 6'. B 
Theorem 7.19 implies a completeness theorem for the join-irreducible procedural 
semantics as a corollary of the Completeness Theorem for the generalized procedural 
semantics presented earher (Theorem 7.12). 
Theorem 7.20 (Join-Irreducible Completeness) Let B be a distributive bilat-
tice with DCPk- and b ^ B. Let P he a normalized program and G a normalized goal. 
Suppose 9 is a substitution for the variables of G. If {^p |  w) {G9) ^ b, then G has 
a b-JlR-proof with answer cr. such that G9 = Ga-/. for some substitution 7. 
Proof: Suppose that ($p f JJ){G9) ^ b, then by Theorem 7.12 G has a 5-proof with 
V — v-/ I . o* u vx «,• y xixvvxdii i.Xv'. 
G has a b-JlR-pxool with answer a such that Gc' = Ga-f". for some substitution 7". 
Now: 
r'Q _ r^i' VwJt/ — y j U  7 
^ // / 
= L7cr7 7 
where ^ , 5 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 
Many domain problem^s in Artificial Intelligence require representation of knowl­
edge which is uncertain, approximate, incomplete, or even contradictory. Realization 
of this fact has been the motivation behind a great deal of literature concerned with 
the formalization of revisable reasoning by relying on non-classical logics. First-order 
predicate calculus, itself, has been found not to be completely satisfactory because 
of its all or nothing nature; statements can be only be true or false. Naturally, this 
problem is extended to traditional logic programming languages, since they use the 
m.achinery of first-order logic. For example, the only natural way to deal with uncer­
tainty, in Prolog, is to predefine a fixed set of terms and explicitly pattern match for 
+ u viivxxi oiaxtxxc 
Yet, logic programming provides a natural and declarative framework for knowl­
edge representation as well a^ inference mechanism in many AI applications. Thus, 
it is desirable to construct logic programming systems that can adequately deal with 
the type of commonsense reasoning involved in many AI problem domains. One way 
thdl ihib issut: has inaniiesied itself has been in a variety of approaches to provide 
appropriate semantics for negation in logic programs. Another, has been the use 
of non-classical logics such has three-valued logics, intuitionistic logics, probabilistic 
logics, and modal logics as the underlying framework for logic programming. In this 
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work, we have presented a generahzed framework for knowledge-based logic program­
ming which can model, as special cases, many useful logics, such as those mentioned 
above. This generalized framework for both the declarative and the procedural se­
mantics of logic programs, is made possible by relying on algebraic properties of 
bilattices which combine the truth and knowledge components on a space of truth 
values. Similar frameworks have been studied by Ginsberg [24] (in the context of 
truth mairitsnance systems and by Fitting [18] (in the context of logic programming). 
The present work sets forth a natural procedural semantics for knowledge-based 
logic programs which takes full advantage of the bilattice properties, particularly, 
for the class of distributive bilattices whose knowledge ordering has the descending 
chain property. Furthermore, the procedural semantics has been specified according 
to a parallel computation model for evaluation of queries by making full use of the 
natural properties of the bilattice operators and incorporating the notion of substitu­
tion unification. It is hoped that the generalized framework presented her can serve 
as the basis for implementing a flexible logic programjning language which can be 
fouiiu useful lu a variclv (jf AI aoiiliraiions wunnnt siiTferiTig from the ?.foremeiitioiied 
shortcomings of standard logic programming languages. In the following we will sum­
marize some of the most important results in this work and discuss some ideas for 
future extensions and further research. 
The main contribution of this work to the theory of bilattices is the analysis 
01 ine extension oi ms lattice tneoretic results on join-irreducibie elements to the 
realm of bilattices. Birkhoff's representation theorem for distributive bilattices (see 
Theorem 2.23) shows the importance of join-irreducible elements as a characteristic 
set of elements in a lattice. It turns out that join-irreducible elements play a very 
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similar role in distributive bilattices. Since we are mainly interested in using bilattice 
elements in the context of semantics for knowledge-based logic programs, we focus 
our attention on k-join-irreducible elements. In particular, Lemma 4.14 provides a 
characterization of the k-join-irreducible elements of a bilattice in terms of the join-
irreducible elements of the underlying lattice structures. The most important result 
of Chapter 4 is Lemma 4.17 which provides the basis for the subsequent development 
of the generalized knowledge-based procedural semantics. It must be noted that it 
is possible to provide further characterizations of the join-irreducible elements in a 
distributive bilattice based on the notions of filters and ideals of lattices. Evidence 
of this is provided by the fact that the set of negative k-join-irreducible elements in 
a distributive bilattice B, is, in fact, the principle ideal generated by the 
element false (minus the bottom element), and the set JIRl{B) is the principle ideal 
generated by the element true. Based on these ideas, it seems possible to specify 
a representation theorem similar to Birkhoff's theorem for distributive bilattices. 
Considering the principle truth filtsrs and truth ideals in such bilattices can shed 
iurthcr light on the rclationsuiMs oclvvccii luc Auuwicugt; auu iruin components of 
the join irreducible truth values. 
While both Ginsberg [24] and Fitting [18, 19] consider various types of bilattices 
and the relationships among various categories of bilattice elem.ents, it seems that it is 
the join-irreducible characterization of distributive bilattices provides the best results 
in the development of more natural semantics for logic programming languages. 
In order to provide a parallel computation model for our procedural semantics 
we have used the notion of substitution unification. Substitution unification ensures 
the consistency of bindings obtained for shared variables during independent compu­
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tations of subgoals. Similar ideas have been studied in the literature, such as the no­
tion of reconciliation [26] and that of parallel composition [38j. But, these approaches 
invariably use expression-based systems of equations and identify the desired substi­
tutions by the solutions to these systems of equations. In a manner of speaking, this 
treatment hides some of the interesting algebraic properties of substitution unifiers. 
\Ne fully develop these properties in an equation or expression independent man­
ner. However, for the purpose of logic programming semantics, all of these approaches 
are equivalent. In particular, in Lemma 5.11 we showed that the substitution uni­
fication of tw'o idempotent substitutions is in fact the least upper bound cf the two 
substitutions (according to the usual ordering of substitutions). This result is also ob­
tained by Palamidessi in [38], indicating that the notions of parallel composition and 
substitution unification are equivalent when restricting our attention to the lattice of 
idempotent substitutions. 
However, our treatment of substitution unification is not restricted to idem.po-
tent substitutions and thus we have been able to consider many of its more general 
properiies which are useful in their own riglit. it would be mteresting to further 
explore the relationships between these two treatments as parts of each make useful 
contributions to the theory of unification. For example, as pointed out in [33], the 
fact that the substitution unification is the least upper bound in the lattice of idem-
potent substitutions, gives us some of the useful properties for free. These include 
idempotence and associativity (see Lemma 5.18). 
In Chapter 6 we considered a special case of our join-irreducible procedural 
semantics which was subsequently extended to arbitrary distributive biiattices with 
the descending chain property. The four-valued case deserves special attention since 
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it illustrates the utility of the proposed semantics in several respects. 
The four-valued case represents a irinimalistic logic programming system which 
resolves some of the problems we previously discussed in classical logic programming. 
In particular, the system is well suited for many AI application domains since it can 
effectively deal with incomplete or contradictory information. This is especially evi­
dent in the context of distributed deductive knowledge bases, where the information 
is obtained at different sites and independently. Furthermore, due to the emphasis 
on knowledge rather than truth, as we saw earlier, the semantic problems associated 
with negation are no longer present. Yet, the four-valued case is strong enough to 
subsume all of the machinery of first-order and three-valued logic programs. 
In the context of this four-valued knowledge-beised logic programming system, 
we also considered the incorporation of the knowledge-base version of Closed World 
Assumption. The Closed World Soundness and Completeness Theorems showed that, 
contrary to the classical logic programs, incorporation of this rule into the semantics 
does not lead to incompleteness. 
The Closed World semantics, hcv.-cver, docs suffer from a serious shortcoming. 
In order to obtain negative information about a goal (to obtain a cw-refutation), 
one must guess the answer. This answer is applied to the goal before the goal is 
evaluated. It is possible to do better than this by using a concept of non-unification. 
as described below. 
As noted above, the incorporation of the CWA into the semantics introduces an 
asymmetry between the notions of success and failure. This problem can be reme­
died by allowing the system to return a substitution, as the answer for a refutation, 
witnessing the fact that the goal does not unify with the head of any clause. We call 
165 
such a substitution a non-unifier. However, since in general there may be infinitely 
many most general non-unifiers of two expressions, we would like to use certain type 
of substitution schemes in order to represent these non-unifiers in a finite manner. 
This points to an area in which the present work is continuing. 
It must be noted, however, that one of the main motivations of CWA comes from 
the area of deductive databases where the programs are primarily function-free. In 
the absence of function symbols, there are only finitely many non-unifiers that need 
to be considered. Thus, in the context of a deductive database system based on the 
four-valued bilattice, the notion of non-unifxers should be sufficient to constructively 
obtain answers to refutations when evaluating a query. 
This situation constitutes a substantial improvement over the traditional logic 
programming systems which incorporate Negation as Failure. In general, since Nega­
tion as Failure cannot be performed on nonground subgoals, bindings can only be 
obtained by successful calls of positive literals. Negative calls never create bindings; 
they only succeed or fail. Thus Negation as Failure is purely a test and cannot be 
ubcu lu oulaiii answers in i ne query pvflinprion prorpcc 
Another related issue which deserves further study is the possibility of incor­
porating a generalized version of the CWA in the generalized semantics given in 
Chapter 7 (discussed further below) for arbitrary distributive bilattices. In this con­
text, for instance, the system could obtain a 6-proof for an atom A, if A does not 
unify Vy'iih the head of an^v clause. In this manner, the detauit truth value will not be 
false, but some other element b in the bilattice. One interesting possibility here is 
to annotate each predicate symbol with a truth value from the bilattice. Presumably, 
this annotation will determine what the default value of an atom will be if it does not 
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unify with the head of any clause (in other words, when no information is available 
about that atom). The generalization of the CWA. in this manner will be an area of 
future research. 
Finally, in Chapter 7 we generalize the ideas presented for the four-valued case. 
In particular, the operational semantics is generalized to an arbitrary distributive 
bilattice. We introduce the notion of a b-proof for each element of the bilattice 
except T and J.. (In the 4-element case true-proofs coincide with proofs and a 
false-proofs with refutations.) We prove a soundness and completeness theorem for 
this procedural semantics, again with respect to the declarative fixpoint semantics 
(see Theorems 7.8 and 7.12). 
The main results of this chapter, however, are the alternate procedural seman­
tics which we obtain, by restricting attention to the k-join-irreducible elements of the 
distributive bilattice. It is the join-irreducible semantics which is, in fact, the general­
ization of the procedural semantics given for the four-valued case. We show that, for 
a large class of distributive bilattices, namiely those with the descending chain prop-
crlv. t lit; Ivvo V't^rsions O t" x.ne r>ror(='nnrp^] lH j. illS T-Sult 
is established in Theorem. 7.19. Theorem 7.19, thus, implies a completeness theo­
rem for the join-irreducible procedural semantics as a corollary of the Completeness 
Theorem for the generalized procedural semantics presented earlier. 
The join-irreducible procedural semantics, thus, provides a generalized opera­
tional model Vv'iiicJi can serve as the basis tor efficient implementation oi Knowieoge-
based logic programming languages. The actual im.plementation of a logic program­
ming language based on the ideas presented here, however, remains an area in which 
the present work will hopefully continue. 
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